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# SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

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# HANDBOOK
# of
# CENTRAL ASIA

Bureau of Social Science Research,
American University

HUMAN RELATIONS AREA FILES, INC.,
New Haven, Connecticut

1956

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# PREFACE

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# Handbook of Soviet Central Asia

## Preface

### Purpose and Scope of Project

The present Handbook attempts to bring together available information on Soviet Central Asia. As a strategic, but fringe, area of the Soviet Union the region and its peoples are potentially vulnerable on a number of counts. The intent of this study has been to explore these vulnerabilities and their limitations.

Using a format devised by the Human Relations Area Files, the Handbook brings together a body of materials selected with a view to drawing a picture of the current life of the inhabitants of the region and their attitudes to the central regime. In brief, it is a study of the nationalities and national minorities question in the USSR.

The Handbook has been produced through a cooperative effort on the part of a group of researchers from a number of academic disciplines. The Handbook is thus the product of interdisciplinary research.

The emphasis has been on current aspects of life in this part of the world. Wherever possible, data up to 1956 have been utilized and future projections employed. However, certain subjects need to be treated on a broader time-basis. Current trends in religion, in family life or in popular attitudes, for example,

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may only be judged in terms of periods of as much as a generation in length. Reference to the pre-Soviet situation is also often necessary.

The peoples living in Central Asia have reacted to the present scene in terms of their past and have returned to it, in spirit, wherever possible. In the treatment of the history of this region, therefore, particular emphasis is placed on the meaning to these peoples of their history. The attitudes and reactions of the peoples of Central Asia to their own history are among the most important things that can be understood about them.

In certain fields, the situation in Central Asia scarcely differs from the Soviet Union as a whole or, if it does, no information on such possible differences is available. Thus, in matters relating to foreign policy, the judiciary, trade, and money and banking, the reader is referred to the Handbook of the USSR for some indications as to how these fields are treated in Soviet Central Asia.

## The Handling of Soviet Data

To produce the present Handbook, a definite selectivity had to be applied to the available data. The sources for information are in almost every case Soviet sources. As a result, information on certain subjects is embarassingly plentiful and, on others, deficient. Where information is available in sufficient quantity it may be used, provided it conforms to an internal pattern and is self-consistent. That is to say, if the data are in line with canons of prudence and common sense, and if they


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do not contradict each other, then they may be accepted.

In general, the Soviet Union has been secretive about its quantitative data except in areas where the regime believes it has done well. If a sufficient amount of data on a subject has been published by the Soviet Union, then the outside observer has enough scope to apply various tests of reliability, consistency and, in general believability.

There are some areas in which the Soviet regime is either silent or reluctant to publish data. An example of this silence or reluctance is in the field of consumers' goods. Here the student of Soviet affairs can only make generalizations from scraps of evidence, or remain silent himself. The present Handbook extends only as far as the available evidence.

## Procedures and Techniques

The basic point of departure has been the study of the Soviet press. The great bulk of quantitative data applied in the Handbook was obtained from the local press, in the main from the daily newspapers of the five capital cities of the region. Furthermore, by reading this material virtually from beginning to end, a distinct perception of the day-to-day life of the people was gained. While it is true that the press is an official press, nevertheless characteristic features of the life stand out.

An example of the research value of the local press is the multiplicity of information obtained by analyzing honors lists published

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therein. In various ways, the working and non-working of the Soviet system may be read into them. These lists reflect the composition of occupational, professional and social groups in matters of nationality, sex and educational background. A study of names and titles further shows how the different nationalities mingle in their jobs, family lives and schooling. Rates of intermarriage and distribution of key posts by nationality are also indicated.

The record of the local press is of course only one source of information utilized in this study. Other sources include diverse publications of the Soviet Union - books, journals and scientific monographs. Some of the sources are in popular writings, some technical. Finally, foreign literature, both scholarly and light, has been covered. Not all the material used has been cited or referred to in the present Handbook; but all of it has been useful as either specific or as background reading.

The history chapter deals with the area in general prior to the Soviet period. The rest of the Handbook deals with the several aspects as indicated.

Credits

Chief among those who participated in the research and editorial work in preparation of the Handbook are: Marjorie Curtis Belknap, H. David Davis, Natalie Frenkley, David Gelfand, Nicholas Galitzine, Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, Carolyn Knuemann, Doris Koski, Claire Reid Miller, Nicholas Poppe, Jr., Laure Sharp, Morris Short, Frances Miller Waldman, and Ivor Wayne. In

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Part III of the Handbook, Constitutional Systems, Structure of Government, and Structure of the Party, is the work of Teresa Rakowska Harmstone. The maps were drawn by Arthur R. Barwick and Anthony S. Reyner. Charts were drawn by David Dickson. Nicholas Poppe, Sr., has contributed from his great store of knowledge of the Altaic languages.

Especial acknowledgement must be made to the Library of Congress for generously allotting research facilities to the Handbook staff. The Stack and Readers' Division, the Slavic Division, and the Slavic Reading Room of the Library of Congress have proved immensely helpful. Without the rich resources of the library, this project would have had to exclude entire areas of research. The Bureau of the Census and the External Research staff of the Department of State have been generous with their time and facilities.

## Note on Transcription of Terms

In the English rendering of terms coming from the Soviet sphere, the Library of Congress transliteration system has been applied, in a simplified form. This rule has not been applied to geographical names; here the system of the Board of Geographical Names has been applied. Finally, in those cases falling in Central Asian or Islamic spheres outside of Soviet life and of geography, the system of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, again in a simplified form, has been applied.

Lawrence Krader,
Project Director,
Bureau of Social Science Research.

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## THE NATIVE PEOPLES OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

are the largest mass of non-Slavic peoples living in the Soviet Union. Numbering approximately 13,000,000, they form a bloc which has been at best only partially assimilated into the Soviet system. Of these native peoples, the great bulk is Turkic by nationality, language, and historical tradition. The remainder is Iranian. All these peoples are of the Islamic faith, whether devoutly or superficially.

CENTRAL Asia was conquered by the Russians in the 19th century, a conquest which disrupted their way of life. During the 20th century, Moscow has made further inroads, eliminating the traditional leadership, collectivizing the traditional leadership, collectivizing the peasantry, and forcing many new settlers from European Russia and the Ukraine into their territories. Russians and Ukrainians have been settled in Central Asia, some by force; peoples of the Caucasus and the Volga have been subjected to forced resettlement in this region by Soviet decree. Effective political control is in the hands of Russian nationals.

AS A consequence of Soviet policies, there have been drastic changes in the native way. The most radical change has been the population loss among the Kazakhs. Nearly one million Kazakhs were lost during the 1930s as a result of Soviet policies. The entire region has been first Russified and then Sovietized, though incompletely. The result has been the creation of a degree of tension between the peoples of Central Asia and the Soviet regime.

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# Annex "A"

1.

## SOCIAL SYSTEM



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Annex "A." 1.a.I

# INTRODUCTION

Soviet Central Asia comprises five present-day union republics of the USSR: the Kazakh, the Tadzhik, the Turkmen, the Kirgiz and Uzbek SSR's, the latter including the Karakalpak ASSR. Central Asia, sometimes referred to as Western or Russian Turkestan, occupies the area between European Russia and the Caspian Sea to the west, Siberia to the north, China to the east, and Iran and Afghanistan to the south. It is a region that is little known in the West, but one of central importance to the Soviet Union.

The composition of Central Asia poses a number of problems in cultural and racial relations, in economic development and in social change, in addition to problems involving the political situation of the area. Central Asia has been historically the overland highroad between Europe and the Near East on the one hand, and the Far East on the other; and it is the route between Russia and India.

Here is the zone of conflict for over 100 years between Britain and Russia, a conflict which Russia finally won. Here too lies the route from Russia to China, and the area of conflict between these countries, a conflict in which Russia was again victorious.

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Each of the Soviet republics was formed by the central regime with a view to grouping the major part of the peoples of a given nationality into one political unit. In Central Asia, the problem was rendered difficult by insufficient ethnographic analysis of the area. Peoples were grouped who did not belong together. Others were separated who should have been joined. There was a continuous joining and splitting of peoples and provinces. This process has continued down to the 1950s.

Out of the confusion of names and terms, a number of decisions as to boundaries of national units and their internal composition have been made. Some of these decisions were arbitrary, some were historically founded, some were based upon expediency of the moment.

In each of the republics, most, if not all of the peoples of that nationality were to be gathered together. They were to form the majority of the people in the republic. The remainder of the native peoples of Central Asia could not be given political domains of their own. They were to be included in the larger units.

The grouping and regrouping of peoples and republics have not been able to maintain the original intent of the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union. There is reason to believe, for example, that the Kazakhs, and possibly also the Kirgiz, no longer form the majority of their republics.

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Soviet Central Asia is typified by interior drainage, in which the rivers do not reach the oceans of the world, but flow into the lakes and sands of the area. The amount of water is low, and the rate of evaporation is high. The climate is continental, marked by rapid fluctuations between extremes of heat and cold. Winds are strong and sudden; blown sand and dust are an ever-present problem.

There is a high degree of homogeneity among the native peoples of the area. The basic traditional occupations are pastoral nomadism and irrigated agriculture, with a close integration between the two. The pastoral peoples are primarily members of the Altaic language family. The Altaic languages include Turkic and Mongol in addition to the Manchu-Tungus. Turks and Mongols form the core of the nomadic herding population of the area. The agricultural peoples are Iranian and in part Turkic. The Iranians belong to another language family, the Indo-European.

In Soviet classification, Central Asia includes only four of the republics named, in that it excludes the Kazakh. But the unity of the area, by ethnic composition, traditions and economic considerations, is clear-cut. There is even a language affinity in the area with the notable exception of the Tadzhiks, who speak a language of Iranian origin. Otherwise, the other Central Asian peoples, including the Kazakhs, speak Turkic languages.

Because of the essential unity of the area, Kazakhstan was not separated from Central

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Asia within the present Handbook. Historical, linguistic and geographic considerations make it a proper part of the whole. And the Soviet classification, too, generally groups Kazakhstan and Central Asia among the major regions of the USSR.

In the chapters to follow, the common features will be brought out. At the same time, the dynamics of population settlement, of industrial and agricultural development and of Sovietization generally may lead Kazakhstan away from the rest of Central Asia. The northern parts of this republic are already heavily Russified and are a continuation of the population and economic pattern of the southern Urals and southern Siberia. Central and southern Kazakhstan nevertheless still form a unity with Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Turkmenia.

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## Annex "A." 1.a.I

## GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

### Social Life under the Soviets

The changes which the Soviets introduced among the native populations of the area have been in part impeded and in part aided by the general cultural pattern these peoples brought into the Soviet period. This aspect of culture change is known as acculturation, that is, culture change through the impact of one people or culture upon another. In theory, the process of Sovietization is a process of controlled acculturation; Soviet thought asserts command of a theory of the course of development of the peoples within and without their territory. This command follows from the laws of social development which they have mastered, and which may be mastered only through means at the historical dialectic. These claims have little relation to social reality. The theory of culture as applied by the social scientist in the Soviet Union is little different from that which prevailed in Western thought in the latter part of the 19th century.

However, there is a definite end in view in regard to change which the peoples of Central Asia are undergoing. The process of collectivization in the rural areas is now completed. In regard to the economic life of the Central Asian peoples, there are important



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regional variations, especially in the rural economy. That is, cotton plays an important part in Central Asia, whereas it is raised in few other places of the Soviet Union. Given the regional variations, however, there is only a small difference between the economic life of the Central Asian farmer and the Great Russian, and this difference is being narrowed.

The age-old patterns of mutual interdependence between herders, farmers and urban craftsmen in Central Asia have disappeared as a whole. These trade patterns have been replaced by the absorption of the region into the total economy of the Soviet Union. There is some degree of the old patterns of distribution of goods, especially the craft products, but these remaining patterns are of minor significance.

The larger political structure of the past has been wiped out, together with the old aristocracy. The system of independent although fluid and instable states was first infringed upon by the Russian invasion, by the submission of native rulers to escape turmoil on the steppes, and by the demarcation of spheres of influence among those states which were not occupied by the Russians in the formal sense, all prior to the Revolution. During the revolutionary period 1917-1922 the entire territory of Central Asia in its present external frontiers was absorbed into the Soviet system. There was a considerable degree of shifting of internal boundaries in the period 1920-1936. The shifting of boundaries within the USSR was motivated on the surface by the desire to bring together all peoples of like nationality native to one area.



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But a number of probelms were left unsolved by this consideration. To name only one, in the area of the Syr-Darya immediately to the north of Uzbekistan, Uzbeks raise cotton within the territory of the Kazakh SSR just as their brothers do in Uzbekistan. These Uzbeks in Kazakh territory form the majority of the population of the sub-region which they occupy. The most recent change in administrative territorial divisions has added the Bostandyk Rayon of Dzhambul Oblast, Kazakh SSR, to the Tashkent region of Uzbekistan. The Bostandyk Rayon is inhabited by Uzbeks and Tadzhiks primarily. Economic as well as nationalist factors should have brought this portion of the valley of the Syr-Darya, which is directly contiguous to the Uzbek SSR, into that republic. Instead, the boundary between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan corresponds to no known criterion of demarcation; and serves the function of separating the continuous belt of Uzbek settlement in this region into two administrations. The Fergana Valley has been divided among the Kirgiz, Uzbek and Tadzhik Republics. The eastern Pamirs have been assigned to Tadzhikistan, whereas ethnically this mountain region is a continuation of Kirgizia.

The changes in the differentiation and demarcation of peoples in the over-all scene have been profound. Establishing boundaries between peoples and maintaining the boundaries over an extended period have the effect of sharpening the differences between the peoples. If communication is disrupted or made difficult, the peoples lose contact with each other. One of the most direct consequences of the policy of national demarcation is the differentiation


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in language. The Kazakhs and Karakalpaks have spoken languages which are little more than dialects of the same general area of Turkic languages used on the steppes of Central Asia. The continuity of language flow has been arrested and diverted during the Soviet regime. Languages have been standardized within the different republics, a process which sharpens the trend towards linguistic differentiation, and thereby cultural differentiation. One of the consequences of this trend is that natives have to communicate with each other in some other language, for example, Russian. At the same time, regional subdivisions or variations on the cultures, such as the speakers of traditional Uzbek versus Iranized Uzbek, or between the Kurama dialect and Uzbek generally, have been played down or eliminated.

Equally profound changes have taken place in the economic sphere. The nomadic peoples have been caused to settle down in part. This change has affected the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz, and the Turkmens primarily. The other populations - Uzbek, Tadzhik, Karakalpak, - had been farmers long before the Revolution. However, a large proportion of the nomadic populations remain nomadic to this day. On the other hand, all the rural populations, whether nomadic or sedentary, have been organized into state farms, collective farms, and other rural organizations of the Soviet Union.

The chief rural products of Central Asia are the livestock and grains of Kazakhstan, and cotton in Uzbekistan. Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia second Uzbekistan in cotton; Kirgizia



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is largely similar to Kazakhstan in its rural products.

Industry existed in the region prior to the Revolution, but had little significance quantitatively. It was restricted to a small amount of mining, mainly in Kazakhstan, and cotton processing, mainly in the cities of Uzbekistan. It is important to note that while there has been a quantitative rise in industrial production, the leading gains have been made in those branches of industry which existed prior to the Revolution; that is, in the mining and cotton processing industries. The mining is concentrated primarily in Kazakhstan, and is chiefly in fuels (coal an oil) and in non-ferrous metals (copper, lead, zinc, silver, gold). Kazakhstan is the chief source of copper and certain other minerals of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan is the chief source of cotton in the Soviet Union.

Together with the rise in certain categories of industry, there has been a significant increase in urbanization. This process has been connected with the in-migration of Slavic populations, primarily Russians and Ukrainians, into the area.

With regard to the social structure, the eradication of the former aristocracy has been noted. The traditional society of Central Asia has a twofold basis: a politico-territorial, and a kinship foundation. The politico-territorial, i.e., the organization of a society under a political ruler within a given territory, was abolished both in regard to its political

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leadership and its old territorial division. However, the kinship structure and the formation of social groups on that basis continue. Thus, for example, the old clan and kin affiliations and the genealogies which are intertwined with them, are preserved. Moreover, the kin groups united by the genealogies enter into the composition of the collective farms. Throughout the different republics of Central Asia, the collectives are based upon kin groups which closely resemble the groups of economic cooperation in the indigenous societies prior to the Revolution. This, of course, does not relate to the collective farms of Slavic and other in-migrants. However, it is important to note that there is little ethnic mixture between indigenous populations and Russians or Ukrainians, especially in the rural areas.

To sum up, there have been certain continuities and certain discontinuities between the traditional society of Central Asia and Soviet Central Asia. Such institutions as the large kin group, united by common descent, have accommodated to the process of Sovietization, and in a large number of cases form the composition of a collective farm or even an administrative district. Other institutions - the large-scale political organization, for example - were incompatible, and had to be eliminated from the start, a process which accompanied the introdution of the Soviet regime in the first place. For its part, the Soviet regime accommodated to the natural resources of the region, recognizing that the traditional economy - especially the cotton raising, the pastoralism, and such mining industry as already existed - must set the pattern for future economic


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exploitation of the region. However Sovietization has meant, in addition to collectivization, the movement into the area of populations from European Russia and of Koreans from the Soviet Far East. Thus, there are forces in the Central Asian society which are amenable to the process of Sovietization, and there are forces which block the process.

## Traditional Society of the Asiatic Steppes

The process of Sovietization in Central Asia has changed the lives of the peoples. But the change has not been total. To the extent that it has taken place, this change poses a twofold set of problems:

1. The changing form and substance of the life of the peoples themselves: (a) The factors in their cultural life which either aid or impede Sovietization; (b) The degree of awareness of the process by the people caught up in the stream, and their reactions to the process.

2. The Soviet impact on the peoples: (a) The goal of Sovietization, and the means, persuasive and coercive, of achieving it; (b) The disparity between goal and achievement.

The traditional society and culture of Central Asia must now be explored if the process of change is to be unravelled.

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## Political Characteristics

The time period for which the general features of traditional Central Asian society are valid is the 16th to the 20th centuries. During this period a political system was established in the region. Central Asia was characterized during the period by a rather fluid set of states and principalities. In one sense these were the succession states of the Mongol empire.

These states were of two characteristic forms: nomadic and sedentary. At the head of the sedentary or agricultural state was a khan or sultan who resided in one of the chief cities of the region. He maintained his court around him, and ruled from his capital. His khanate was not an empire; it usually did not comprise more than one or two of the great fertile river valleys of Central Asia. Thus, for example, the khanate of Khiva was centered around the lower Amu-Darya and the delta of the river; the khanate of Kokand was concentrated in the Fergana Valley; the emirate of Bukhara did not extend beyond the Zeravshan and the middle course of the Amu-Darya. Such is the 19th century picture; but between the time of the Mongol dynasties of the 13th to the 15th centuries and the Russian conquests in the 19th there was little change in the system of rule. The khan or sultan in turn divided his territory among a group of governors or begs, who supported the khan through payments of tax and tribute; in addition, the khan or central ruler owned land in the territories of his begs. The Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, the Karakalpaks, and part of the Turkmens were governed by this system of rule.

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The second kind of state was nomadic. The chief representative of these states were the Kazakhs, for the Kirgiz never actually developed a state form. The Kazakhs were divided into three hordes or divisions, each under a separate ruler, these major divisions being known as the Great Horde, the Middle Horde, and the Little Horde. The Little Horde at the close of the 18th century underwent a process of fission, one group, closest to the European Russian splitting off to form a fourth horde known as the Horde of Khan Bukei or the Inner Horde. The khans of the Kazakh hordes ruled from their steppe localities and rarely settled down in a city, unless they happened to conquer and hold it briefly. Tashkent, close to the range lands of the Kazakh Great Horde, was invested in this way from time to time. The nomadic states did not have the clearly demarcated chain of command of the agricultural states. Nevertheless, there arose individuals on occasion who could extend their rule over the entire Kazakh Steppe, or such of it as was not ruled from Moscow. The Kirgiz lived in their individual mountain pastures in kin-groups, without an integral political regime. The Turkmens lived in part under Khiva and in part independently. The independent Turkmens had neither the semblance of state structure of the nomadic Kazakhs, nor the purely kin-territorial organization characteristic of the Kirgiz; their organization was something between that of the Kirgiz and the Kazakhs.

In general, the system of political, social, and economic life of the Central Asian peoples has been characterized as feudal by the

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Soviet historians and others. The analogies between the Central Asian system and the European feudal system are indeed striking. However, the thesis of feudalism in the Central Asian lands, advanced not only by Soviet students but also by some outside that orbit, has implications beyond the field itself which should be examined. In contrasting the European and the Central Asian systems, certain fundamental characteristics of the Central Asian regimes may be brought out.

Among the nomads of the Asiatic steppes, Mongols as well as Turks, the analogies to feudalism have been clearly portrayed. The leader on the steppes had his retinue, just as did the feudal lord. The leader supported his retainers, and they in turn fought at his command and otherwise helped him to keep the peace within his domain and defend it from external enemies. The steppe ruler had a council of his immediate subordinates corresponding to the concilium of the European feudal lord. The steppe nomadic rulers were separated from their subjects as aristocracy and commoners; and the feudal lord in turn was differentiated from the commoners by different family trees. The feudal lord exacted from his serfs the corvée, or feudal due in labor, as well as payment in agricultural products or kind. Payment in labor and in kind is also found on the Asiatic steppes. These have been the chief reasons for advancing the theory of feudal organization among the nomadic Turks and Mongols.

All of these reasons are valid, and do not distort the picture of either society,



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East or West, whether from the political or economic viewpoints. Nevertheless these reasons concern themselves only with details, and do not relate to the nature of the society and culture as a whole. For example, both societies, East and West, have an aristocracy founded on blood ties as distinct from the commoners. However, each separate nomadic society of Central Asia is united internally by descent from a founding ancestor. In certain instances, several societies have a common descent system, and later branched off from each other. This means that even though the aristocracies of the Kazakhs or the Mongols are marked by distinctive blood lines, nevertheless everyone in the society, both noble and commoner alike, traces descent from a single ancestor. The blood relationship based upon descent from a single ancestor is the means for establishing membership in the society, and is the basis upon which the society is founded. Thus, there is a superficial analogy between the aristocratic principle of European feudalism and of the nomadic steppe societies. Yet this analogy loses its instructive force when set in the context of the society as a whole. Turkic or Mongol noble and commoner alike traced their ancestry to a single founder. The European nobleman would have been mortally insulted were a blood line of serfs found in his ancestry. The relationship of blood and common descent was not the basis upon which the feudal barony or manor was established.

It is true that the retinue, the council, the corvée, and a number of other institutions found under feudalism are likewise found in the pastoral states of Asia. F. W. Maitland, a great British legal thinker, has

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proposed that feudalism is a system in which public and private law are inseparable. From this it follows that the feudal lord or seigneur is at the same time the landowner (a private capacity). The tax paid the seigneur is identical to the rent paid him as landowner. In the political economy of Central Asia, a sharp distinction is made between the private landowner and the public office of the lord, between rent and tax. In certain instances it has been possible to show that there is a distinction made between the public treasury and the private purse of the Asiatic steppe lord. And in the latter case, there were two kinds of commoners, one paying taxes to the steppe ruler, the other pertaining to the personal holdings of the lord and paying him a kind of rent. This kind of treasury and tax system was foreign to feudalism.

Each of the societies of Central Asia was involved in a larger unity, bound together by a great network of economic exchange relations as well as certain traditions of life. The various segments of the steppe societies were all mutually dependent and ordered their lives accordingly; for example, the steppe nomads brought their livestock to the markets of the farming and urban peoples of the region in great annual drives.

In theory, the agricultural and urban populations of Central Asia had a structure similar to the nomadic. The ties of common descent and of blood relationship were clearly in disuse in some cases; in the instance of the Uzbeks they are retained to this day, despite the transition of the Uzbeks from herding to


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to farming many centuries since. It is among the urban peoples that this system early broke down entirely. Nevertheless, the political and and economic systems of Central Asia as a whole, despite certain likenesses in detail, are of a different order generally from that of the European feudal system.

The European feudal system was a rigid social hierarchy with little social mobility. The serf had little opportunity to enter the nobility. While a hierarchy or gradation in social life existed on the Asiatic steppes, it was far from rigid. The Central Asian peoples were highly mobile both in space, and on the social scale.

The Central Asian states and their component peoples were not the age-old occupants of the region in every case. An underlying principle in the cultural developments of this part of the world is the formation of a people by the very process of its occupation of its territory. If this occupation is late, then the history of that people is only a recent one. Two of the chief peoples of Central Asia, the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs, are good examples of this principle. In both these cases, the processes of the formation of the peoples and their occupation of the territory where we meet them today, are matters of the last five or six centuries.

A second principle necessary for the understanding of these societies is the central place which kinship holds in the lives, activities, and institutions of the peoples. Relationships by blood and marriage have their influence

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on every level of social life. One's closest kin is usually one's closest neighbor, further kin live in the next immediate vicinity, and so on. Those upon whom one calls for aid are the kinsmen. Cooperative groups in economic, political, judicial, military, and religious enterprises are groups of kin. Again, kinship supplies the basis for social unity in the broadest sense of the term. In order to understand this, a contrast may be drawn with American life. Citizens of the United States are bound together by a common set of political beliefs and practices, a flag to which they are loyal. The flag is the expression of the unity of the modern nation. Among some of the Central Asian peoples, kinship fulfills that function. A tracing of descent from some common ancestor, possibly a mythical being, supplies the symbol of social unity for the people. This ancestor, the tracing of descent from him, the kinship of the descendants - all correspond to the flag or the anthem of other nations.

Mention has been made of the fluidity of the system of states. A general feature of these societies was the lack of genuine concentration of power. The reasons for this may be found in both the internal structure of the society and the external relations. Kinship, even when coupled with other social ties, cannot supply the basis for a great and independent society of nations. Kinship serves well to knit a small group. But the nations of Central Asia were composed of hundreds of thousands, even millions of people. Ties of blood were an unwieldy instrument in composing the unity of these nations.

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Side by side with the internal factors which contributed to the instability of the system of states in Central Asia were the external factors. The locus of state power had shifted from its place within the area to the surrounding nations during the period in question. Prior to the modern period, in fact, during the preceding thousand years, the Mongol and Turkic Steppes had supplied a series of world conquerors and of imperial adventures. The most famous was the empire of Chingis Khan, which was the apex of a series of less mighty drives emanating from the steppe country, both earlier and later. The successors of Chingis Khan during the 13th and 14th centuries had conquered far and wide, from the Black Sea in Europe to the Pacific Ocean, and to the Indian Ocean. But in the following era, the dawn of the period with which we are dealing, China, Russia, and Iran threw off the Tatar yokes. With the rise of these states the power of the steppe peoples declined.

## Economic Life

From earliest times into the 15th and 16th centuries, Central Asia had three kinds of trade. (1) It had served as the great trade route, the line of transmission of goods and ideas across the Asiatic continent, from the Middle East to Europe, to China and conversely. (2) In addition there was a movement back and forth within the Central Asian region, among its different segments. (3) The flow of transport and communication went not only through the region, it also moved into the region and originated within it for outward flow. It will be

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recalled that the famous Silk Route between China to the east and Persia-Byzantium-Rome to the west passed through Central Asia. In the 13th century, Marco Polo sought to revive the trade between China and the Mediterranean. These are two, the most striking two, of the many trade transits across Central Asia. However, in the 15th century, a number of events took place which shifted the attention of the world from Central Asia. The Ottoman Turks conquered Byzantium. Portugal had discovered the way to the Indies around Africa. Nurtured by the growth of navigation in the Mediterranean and western Europe, the sea routes to the Orient were developed at the expense of the old land routes. The age of exploration and discovery, the development of the New World all contributed to the decline of Central Asia as a place of world importance.

The three different kinds of relations in transport and communications were mentioned above. The first mentioned was trade between east and west via Central Asia. While this kind of trade flourished, Central Asia flourished, and prior to the last five centuries there was fostered in Central Asia great philosophical, scientific, and artistic developments. Samarkand and Bukhara were world centers of thought and expression. Through their schools and leaders, much of the science and philosophy of classical antiquity was handed down to modern times. During the most recent centuries, the learning and arts of Central Asia declined, together with its commercial importance.

However, while Central Asia lost significance as a transit region, it retained its

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importance as a region to be traded with. In the 16th century, the British sought to establish trade with Russia and through Russia with Central Asia, sending a number of exploratory missions for that purpose. Throughout the 19th century the British and the Russians were centers of conflicting interests in Central Asia, the British moving north from India, Afghanistan, and Persia, the Russians south from the Urals and Siberia.

For an understanding of the region and its internal relations, the third kind of movement of goods and ideas is the most important. The two basic populations of Central Asia, regardless of tribal or national affiliation, are the nomadic herdsmen and the sedentary farmers. Neither of these groups forms an entirely independent society; each exchanges with and is dependent upon the other. In the southern parts of the region as a whole are concentrated the great agricultural valleys and oases. The chief of these are the Fergana and Zeravshan Valleys, the lower Amu-Darya Basin, and the region of Tashkent. Of scarcely lesser importance are valleys of the Syr-Darya, the middle course of the Amu-Darya, the Chu and Ili River Valleys, the Murgab and Tedzhen Oases, and the Akhal Oasis formed by mountain streams of southwestern Turkmenia. In the past century, extensive Russian settlement in southern Siberia and northern Kazakhstan has introduced European dry farming in the region.

The agriculture of Central Asia, just as that of China to the east and much of southern and western Asia, is fundamentally



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irrigated agriculture. Traditionally, the irrigation developments have been of a simple kind - a main canal, branches, and sub-branches. Sluice gates were not in general use, far less were reservoirs. Nevertheless, the canal systems of Khorezm, Bukhara, Kokand, and other states of the region were ingenious and mighty developments thus were put into cultivation vast regions of arid Central Asia which otherwise could barely support even rangeland exploitation.

The Mongols under Chingis Khan found this great system of irrigated agriculture at the time of their conquest in the 13th century. They destroyed a large part of it, together with many cities of the region. During the reign of Chingis Khan's son, Chagatai, the canals were in part restored, but have not been made whole since. Irrigation requires large amounts of labor power, whether cooperative or commanded. This labor power in the planning, digging, and maintaining of the canals requires good organization, a stable political scene, and healthy relations of trust between ruler and ruled - or failing that, a great force to coerce an unwilling peasantry to cooperate. None of these conditions were achieved after the Mongols destroyed Khorezm and the regions around Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent. The political instability of the time prevented any large-scale undertakings such as the great canal systems of earlier times. The irrigation projects, on the other hand, had served to maintain the rich and powerful states of those earlier times. Thus a vicious circle was created, the political instability preventing economic development, and the low economic status contributing to the political instability of the period after the Mongol conquest.

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These farming populations are at the present time predominantly Turkic. They are Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, and Turkmens. To these agricultural Turkic populations of Central Asia, another group must be added, the Tadzhiks, speakers of an Iranian language. The Tadzhiks once formed part of a larger group of Iranian speakers who were the inhabitants of the region at the time of the Turkic incursions in the first millenium A.D. As the result of the Turkic invasions and in-migrations, the Tadzhiks and their Iranian congeners were put into a lower class socially and economically, and lost much of their territory to the Turks.

The Uzbeks were originally nomadic herders, much like the other Turks of Central Asia. However, they were sedentarized, converted to agriculture, and are now the leading agriculturalists of the region. The Turkmens and the Karakalpaks followed the same development from nomadic pastoralism to mixed pastoralism and agriculture, to an economy which is in the main agricultural today.

To the north of the agricultural zone of Central Asia lies the great belt of semi-desert and steppe occupied by the Kazakhs. To the east lie the mountain pastures of the Tien-Shans and Pamirs occupied by the Kirgiz and the so-called Mountain Tadzhiks, small groups identified only by the localities which they occupy. The chief of these peoples, the Kazakhs, and secondarily the Kirgiz, continue the economy traditional to the Turks - pastoralism and its derivative occupations.


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The nomadic populations have a long tradition of exchange with the farming peoples. The nomads drive their herds to market in the bazaars of the cities of Central Asia, provide the animals necessary for food, draft, and transport; and supply such products of the herding economy as wool, felt, skins and hides. In exchange they receive grain, various other foodstuffs of the farm, and cotton and other textiles and fiber plant products like silk and hemp. From the cities they acquire also the products of the handicraft industries in the bazaars - metal and wood work, pattery, and other handicrafts.

This kind of exchange has continued unbroken down to the present day, and was not affected by the shift in the great trade routes of the world. However, no single people among the Central Asians was able to establish its hegemony by conquest, alliance, or peaceful penetration. For a long period, the peoples of Central Asia were at war with the Dzungarian Kalmuks until the final defeat of the latter by the Chinese in the 18th century. The Kalmuks in this warring period occupied the steppes to the east and west of the Volga (part of these steppes lies in Kazakhstan today), and for a time occupied the city of Tashkent and controlled its political affairs.

Russia had for centuries prior to the Revolution an important trade connection with Central Asia. Two groups of people from European Russia were involved in this trade. The first was the Russian merchants themselves. The second was the Tatars, a Turkic people living

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west of the Ural Mountains, that is, within European Russia. These merchants, especially the Tatars from old Kazan, not only acted as men of trade (including on occasion banking and usury); they also acted as political agents. We have a number of official reports which the Tatars prepared for the Russian regime. By the 19th century there was little movement of goods or ideas to or from any other place than Russia. The British maintained a general interest in the area, but little more than that. A large migration of Russians and Tatars into the area took place both prior to and since the Revolution.

## Religions

The religious life of the peoples of Central Asia is a complex matter. The Arabs brought Islam to the fertile valleys and oases of southern Central Asia in the seventh century. However, the earliest successes of Islam, mainly by conquest, were among the Iranian peoples. The broad-scale introduction of Islam among the Turkic peoples did not occur until the tenth century. This time the intermediaries were the Iranians who were converted to Islam in the Samanid dynasty. Under Islam, Central Asia developed great centers of intellectual and artistic creativity, with peaks in the tenth and again in the 14th - 15th centuries. Until the tenth century, the extent of the expansion of Islam coincided with the boundary between the Iranians and the Turks. Roughly, the boundary was between farmer and herdsman.

While the first incursions of Islam into the area were connected with military

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activity, the second wave came by more peaceful means, in connection with trade. Moslem proselytization proceeded along the Volga, the Syr-Darya, the Amu-Darya through economic penetration rather than military.

Islam in Turkic Central Asia has been from its very inception firmly associated with agriculture. The Turks during the first millennium of their movement into the area were subjected to a twofold process, the conversion from nomadism to a sedentary agricultural way of life, and from their aboriginal religious practices to Islam. The converse of this statement is also true: Turks who came into the region and did not settle down to agricultural pursuits were likewise removed from the profound influence of Islam. But these Turks who have retained their pastoralism to this day, the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz, have not been totally impervious to the religious and other influences of Islam. On the contrary, Islam may be perceived in practice among them in many subtle ways. But the system of organization of the Islamic religion, the social structure and daily habits associated with it, are not widespread among the nomadic Turks of Central Asia. These are the institutional features of Islam. The boundary of the spread of Islam in its institutionalized form among these Turks coincides approximately with the area of distribution of agriculture even today. On the other hand, the nomadic Iranians are all Islamic, in addition to the sedentary Iranians.

The aboriginal religion of the nomadic Turks, just as among their Mongol congeners to



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the east, is a form of shamanism and the veneration of spirits. Shamanism is difficult to define because it is not, strictly speaking, an organized religion. It is a set of cults around a religious leader, the shaman, who receives a personal calling to his role. He is often a psychological deviant, a hysterical person who puts himself into a trance state for ritual purposes. In the distant past, Nestorianism, an ancient form of Christianity, as well as Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism were widespread in this area.

The large numbers of Slavic peoples who have moved into the area in recent centuries brought Christianity of two chief varieties: the Eastern Orthodox Church and the dissenting sects of the Russians.

Finally, there is a small group of indigenous Jews in Central Asia, resident mainly in the cities.

## Social Structure

In the traditional societies of the Central Asian peoples, there was a uniform type of family. It was the extended family, composed of a patriarch, his wife, their married and unmarried sons, together with the families of the married sons, the unmarried daughters, and perhaps some kin of further remove, poor relations, hangers-on, and unrelated dependents such as servants, slaves, and others. The wives of sons came from another group to marry into the groom's family. The daughters of this extended family married away. Descent was traced in the


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male line to the father, the father's father, and so forth through dozens and scores of generations. This father-son axis is the anvil upon which the social ties are hammered out.

The women play a subordinate role; yet they have their distinctive part in the life of the society. Among the city-dwelling Islamic peoples of Central Asia it is not a public life. The woman does not mingle in the society at large; she does not greet visitors; she remains hidden both by the housing system and the pattern of dress. The wife remains in the woman's apartment of the house, and she remains veiled when she must leave it. Among the pastoral peoples, the woman is not veiled, nor is she hidden in the woman's apartment. These nomads live in felt tents which are not so chambered.

The woman in the sedentary, agricultural, Islamic communities stands mid-way between the two others, the urban and the nomadic. Whereas the merchant's wife of Bukhara, Tashkent, and elsewhere was virtually a non-person, a breeder of children and little more, the wife of the farmer was far more active, and so to this day. Yet this formula is not a complete one: the woman had her household to run in the urban community as elsewhere.

It is in the legal sense that the woman has a lesser value than man. In all segments of the social picture - the urban, the farming, and the nomadic - the punishment for the murder of a woman is less harsh than for the murder of a man, in most instances in the ratio of one to two. In the traditional society,


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the accounting could be rendered in these numerical terms because the penalty for murder was not the Mosaic doctrine of an eye for an eye and a life for a life; it was founded on the principle of the wergeld or blood-money. The murderer had to pay a fixed amount for the death of the victim if the victim was a man, half that amount if the victim was a woman. The fine was inflicted not upon the individual murderer, but upon his family and clan. And the fine was distributed among the kin, both near and distant, of the deceased.

The legal system supplies an insight into the society of the farming and herding communities. The individual counted for little; his kin-group was the significant social unit. The family authority rested in the father of the patriarch; the law seldom ventured inside the family. For example, the legal authority of the principality would not punish theft within the family. On the other hand, there were distinct areas of social life where the patriarch did not enter. The household itself and its affairs were run by the women who were ranked according to the status of their husbands. Thus, in the ideal case, the wife of the patriarch ruled the distaff side of the household; she was in that sense a female father.

Polygamy was practised widely by those who could afford the maintenance of a larger household. Ideally, separate households were maintained for the several wives, especially among the nomadic peoples. However, since a large amount of wealth had to pass from the family of the groom to the family of the bride on marriage, few could afford more than one wife.

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Thus, while plural wives were desired by the male of Central Asia, this ideal could not always be attained. The man of wealth and influence had several wives as an important sign of his station in life. Or if the first wife had not produced sons, the all-important culmination of a marriage, the husband might take a second wife, if he could afford it.

## Unity of the Area

To sum up, the traditional society of the natives of Central Asia was a poorly integrated one from a political point of view. However despite the lack of political integration, the economic relationships between the various segments of the society - urban, farming, and nomadic - showed a functional interdependence, creating a unity which was not associated with any dominating political authority. Common traditions were lacking; for example, Chingis Khan served as a unifying symbol only among the Uzbeks, the Karakalpaks, and the Kazakhs, primarily among the last. The Turkmens, the Kirgiz, the Tadzhiks did not participate in the unifying symbolization of the figure of Chingis Khan - the Tadzhiks least of all.

Nevertheless, the common social forms of family and kinship structure generally contribute to the unity of Central Asian society. The importance of kinship in areas of social life not found in European society, for instance in politics, is also a common feature to all the parts of Central Asian society.



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Although the peoples lack certain unifying political symbols, nevertheless, their history is one. The figure of Chingis Khan or that of Timur, whether hated or admired, is a meaningful one not only to the lover of the past but to the ordinary citizens. Likewise, the khanate of Bukhara, the revolt of Kenesary Kasimov among the 19th century Kazakhs or the more recent revolt of the Basmachi movement among the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks are things that the Central Asian knows about and responds to in one way or another. On a more mundane level, the market place at Tashkent or the routes across the desert sands from one valley or city to another, are something of common experience. All the peoples of Central Asia have suffered the same conquests, experienced the same events.

The unity of Central Asia rests upon a common social pattern or structure, a common set of life problems in this arid part of the world far removed from the oceans of the world, a common experience of conquest, and a common set of symbols to communicate to each other these patterns, problems, solutions, experiences. They live among each other, Tadzhiks among Uzbeks, Uzbeks among Kazakhs, Kazakhs among Kirgiz. Moreover, the way of life of Central Asia is sharply contrasted with that of the neighboring regions, China proper to the east, and Russia to the west and north. On the other hand, there is a cultural continuum between Central Asia and Mongolia to the northeast and with Iran and Afghanistan to the south and west. In this cultural continuum, Sinkiang takes its part. A cultural unity is lent to the region of Central Asia by virtue of the sharpness of



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differentiation from the Chinese on the one hand and the Russians on the other. This contrast brings into relief the unity of the area. This unity is sustained despite the language barriers between Turks and Iranians in the region, the economic barriers between herders and farmers, and the religious barriers between Moslems and non-Moslems.



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## Annex "A." 1.a.I

## INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL FEATURES

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Annex "A." 1.a.II

# GEOGRAPHY

## Environment and Culture

The relationship between culture and environment has been the subject of speculation by anthropologists, geographers, historians, philosophers. One of the most striking and single-minded theories has been devised on the basis of Central Asian history by the school of geographic determinists. A leader of this school, Ellsworth Huntington, did notable exploration in Central Asia. He was impressed with the geographic factors here, and devised a theory of history based upon environmental determinism.

The environment of Central Asia is, in fact, impressive. The weather is seldom balmy and mild; the ground is not easily worked. Communication from place to place is limited by harsh exigencies. The environmental determinist school has maintained that the dry climate of Central Asia has been the decisive factor in its history. This school asserts that Central Asia was not always arid: Once it had great civilizations which drew riches from the soil by farming, but a decrease in the availability of water caused these agricultural nations to collapse. This theory takes little cognizance of the complex history of the region. It assumes a



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progressive desiccation which in fact has not taken place. There have been oscillations between relative increases and decreases in the water supply.

A broader theory than geographic determinism is needed to account for the role of geography in Central Asia. The key factor is man's ability to make use of the natural wealth at his disposal. Part of man's ability to utilize the soil, the water, the minerals, the wind, the sunlight in a region depends on the degree of technological knowledge, the type of social organization, and the well-being of the people. If the people feel that they are not part of the social system, that they are not getting an adequate return for their efforts, that others are being favored at their expense, then even efficient social and economic organization and technology are not enough. The potential of nature and of the organization of society and culture will not keep the system running. Eventually it will fall as it has in the past. The immediate cause of the fall may be a change in the natural resources of the area. Or the immediate cause may be an invasion by external powers.

It is interesting that the geographic determinist theory was worked out in Central Asia. Attention was drawn by the authors of the theory to certain dramatic events which acted as immediate causes or triggers for the collapse of the old civilizations. Other triggers, such as military invasions, and yet others, such as internal unrest and rebellions, have been ignored. Seen in its proper context, the geographic factors which impressed the environmental determinists have played an important, often decisive



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role in the history of Central Asia. Other factors will be assessed in the relevant chapters of this Handbook. The present chapter will be devoted to an assessment of the geographic factors.

The first of these factors is aridity. Conditioned by prevailing winds, by distance from sea, and by mountain barriers, Central Asia is a dry land. The second factor is the continentality of climate. The temperature changes sharply, and oscillates from extreme heat to extreme cold in a short time. The wind generates great velocity. The sun is seldom hidden, and cloudy days are few. The third factor has already been adumbrated. Central Asia forms the heart of the greatest land mass on the surface of the earth.

The problems of the environment are distinctive in Central Asia. The culture which man has devised in this part of the world to meet the environmental problems is distinctive. Man sets up his culture as a screen or intermediary between himself and his environment. By means of his culture he gains control over his environment. At the same time, the culture of man acts as a selective force on the environment. Certain features will be sought out, others ignored. Thus man changes his environment by his culture. The environment in turn requires the development of certain aspects of the culture, and not others.

Man is part of nature, an organism among other organisms. In this sense the opposition between culture and environment, between man and nature, is false. Man is symbiotic with


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certain living things, parasitic upon other living things. He is symbiotic with his symbiotes, his domesticated plants and animals; and he is a hunter among his prey, upon whom he is parasitic.

These considerations regarding man and his environment will be developed in detail further in the present chapter. Some principles involved are the following:

(1) The influence of the environment upon man.

Here we distinguish between the influence whereby certain possibilities are eliminated, and the influence whereby already existing potentials are encouraged. The culture of the tropical rain forest or of damp western Europe has no place in Central Asia. Land transport rather than sea transport has been developed. More subtly, certain cultural potentials have been encouraged. Man came into Central Asia with techniques of plant-growing and animal husbandry. These have been developed in certain directions: certain plants and animals are raised. Techniques of plant and animal raising have been revised and adapted. Some cultural features have been lost; others have been improved; yet others have been gained.

It is well known that a culture cannot accept an innovation unless the culture is prepared to do so. An atomic energy plant would be of no value to a nation which had no physicists or engineers. In Central Asia the peoples have the cultural background to accept or develop some innovations but not others. Warfare has been a


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highly developed art in the history of Central Asia. However, these peoples do not have the cultural background to develop a guided-missiles program. There is a political factor here as well: such matters are kept in the hands of the central regime.

Because of its force the wind creates a severe problem in human health and comfort. The wind is a great problem in maintenance of domesticated animals, especially cattle, and it is a problem in machinery maintenance.

The sun supplies the heat necessary for growing things. It creates a problem in the evaporation of water, which, in consequence must be carefully stored and ducted. The sun also poses a problem in human comfort in the quest for shade.

(2) The influence of man upon the environment.

If one surveys Central Asia one may observe vast irrigation networks. Here most obviously man has changed his environment. He has used his culture, including his knowledge of nature, and his tools and artifacts, to gain mastery over the environment.

Man influences nature indirectly and inadvertently. Central Asia is virtually treeless, except in a few limited areas on mountain slopes and close to rivers. In the quest for fuel, the herdsman carefully gathers animal dung which he dries and burns. In consequence the soil loses a natural fertilizer.

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(3) The selective action of the environment upon man and his culture.

Communication is a serious matter in Central Asia. Rivers are few and usually present difficult problems because of their shallowness, turbulence, and seasonal evaporation. In most cases rivers flow only in the spring. Few Central Asian rivers flow the year round. The Chu River, for example, is dry in whole or in part for most of the year. Some rivers like the Tedzhen and the Murgab in Turkmenia, the Zeravshan and the Kashka-Darya in Uzbekistan, the Chu in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia - simply disappear into the desert sands. All these rivers are centers of agricultural development, and are virtually or entirely useless for navigation except in certain instances. Even the rivers are deep enough for navigation, such as in the case of the Amu-Darya, the problems are multiplied by the turbulence of the stream and the shifting bed.

Central Asia is characterized by interior drainage. None of the rivers reach the oceans of the world. Central Asia forms part of Inland Asia, which is the region without outlet to the sea, and extends from Manchuria in the east all the way to the Caspian Sea in the west. The rivers thus have only local and highly limited significance for transport and communication.

As a result the Central Asian communication system is chiefly overland. The automobile road system is poor, as it is elsewhere in the Soviet Union. The railroads are faced with the identical problem in their location as the problem

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which faced the caravan drivers: water.

In ancient times the first tracks were made by herds of animals in quest of water. The nomadic pastoralist with his herds followed the same tracks. Caravans in turn followed these routes. Railroads follow them today. Essentially then, the distribution of water in wells, rivers, and lakes, determines the lines of communication.

The caravan routes, herding tracks, and railroads are plotted on the appended map. (See end-pocket.) The water supply's limitation on communication between inhabited localities has another consequence. To go from one locality to another one can follow only a single path. This is not always the shortest route between the two places; it is the shortest route from one water hole and well to the next between the two places.

Railroad builders have learned this lesson. Central Asia has a limited railroad pattern. Like the rest of the Soviet Union, the railroads do not cross mountains. (There is one exception, in the Caucasus.) Communication by rail from Alma-Ata, north of the Tien-Shan-Pamir Mountain System, to Stalinabad, in the southwest of the system, is highly circuitous. The railroads follow the rivers closely. There are only a few places where rails leave the rivers and cross the desert: on the Karaganda line to Balkhash, which skirts the Hungry Steppe (Betpak Dala), and on the line from Bukhara to Ashkhabad, which crosses the southern Kara-Kum Desert.



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(4) Man as part of his environment.

It is sometimes forgotten that man is an animal, has the same needs as other animals, yet differs by the means of meeting those needs.

The hunter or fisher is a pure parasite because he does nothing about his source of subsistence. He does not know how to replenish the stocks he lives upon.

The farmer is a true symbiote. The crops he harvests are necessary for his food, but he helps to raise them. Here is an interaction. The farmer plants, weeds, waters, fertilizes. Only part of the grain is eaten. Some is stored, some kept for future sowing. The crop is as much dependent on the farmer as the farmer on the crop.

Midway between the hunter and the farmer is the herdsman. In certain senses he is a parasite, in others he is a symbiote. The animals he raises eat the grass; the herdsman does not replenish it. The animal dung is collected for fuel; the grass is not fertilized by the animals who eat it. Herdsmen and herds are thus parasitic on the grass.

On the other hand, the herdsman maintains the herd which supports him. He does not kill his herds; he milks them. Occasionally he slaughters a sheep or goat for a feast. But usually he "farms" the herd, without diminishing it. The milk of the herd is his principal food, together with the grain he obtains from the farmers by trade. Being dependent on the herds, he protects them against wolves and other preda-


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tory animals; he builds windbreaks for the herds against the blizzards of winter; he helps cows to calve and lambs to find the teats of the ewes. In this sense the herdsman lives symbiotically with his herds just as the farmer with his plant crops.

The industrial mining activities are even more destructive of natural resources than the food-producing activities. Central Asia has an important place in the mining enterprises of the Soviet Union.

## Geographic Regions of Central Asia

Central Asia is divided into four natural or geographic regions. These are:

(1) Steppe region of northern Kazakhstan, a continuation of the south Russian and southern Siberian steppe.

The steppe is a more or less even, treeless expanse, without surface water or swamps, and covered with grass on black-earth soil. The plant cover is primarily feather grass (Stipa) and is mostly continuous; however, occasionally it is interspersed with bare patches. In the extreme north of Kazakhstan is the Ishim Steppe, a forest-steppe, in a moister zone than the steppe proper. The maximum precipitation is in the late spring and early summer. Non-irrigated agriculture is feasible under favorable circumstances. The steppe is in the lower limit of precipitation necessary for agriculture.

(2) Semi-desert or steppe-desert.

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This region lies south of the steppe and extends in a continuous belt across the North Caspian Lowland to the Altay Mountains. The steppe-desert is a transitional zone between desert and steppe. The plant cover is continuous, and bare patches are more extensive than on the steppe. The feather grass, characteristic of the steppe, is interspersed with desert plants such as wormwood; the soil is saline to a high degree, with many salt lakes and expanses of solonchaks (alkali flats or salt pans). The soil is light chestnut in color. Maximum precipitation is in May and June. Agriculture without irrigation is possible but not certain.

(3) Desert.

An arid belt south of the semi-desert stretches from the Volga Delta north and east of the Caspian Sea to the Persian Highlands, then east to the Pamir - Tien-Shan Mountain complex along the Sino-Russian frontier. Desert is a technical term in geography, contrasting with popular usage. In popular usage, desert means an uninhabited, uninhabitable place. In ecological perspective, this definition is not tenable. A desert may be inhabited by man with proper cultural development and climatic adaptation of the physical organism.

In geographic usage, a desert is a region with low rainfall and high evaporation. The soil may be more fruitful than regions of higher rainfall, but the lack of water keeps down soil productivity. With water there may be a lush growth of vegetation. Along the banks of lakes and rivers of the desert parts of Central Asia


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are the tugays, or thicket jungles. The typical soil of the desert is the sierozem, or grey to light-brown earth. Vegetation growth is highly limited by season to the few days of spring rain, in which plants mushroom forth. The vegetation is in general psammophytic, that is, with low moisture requirement.

(4) Mountain region.

The mountain system of Central Asia lies almost entirely in the southeastern corner, along the Chinese and Afghan borders. But there are also some low-lying mountains in the north and west, along the southeastern shore of the Caspian Sea. In the north is the Mugodzhary Range; in the west are the Mangyshlak Peninsula, the Krasnovodsk Plateau, and the Great Balkhan Range.

The Kopet-Dag - Pamir Mountain System is composed of the Lesser Balkhan, Kopet-Dag, Paropamisus, Hissar, Peter the Great, Darvaz, Trans-Alay Ranges, and the Pamirs proper. These are young mountains, with sharp relief. They are ultimately connected with the Himalayas.

The Central Tien-Shans are older than the Pamirs, and the down-cutting of the rivers is far more advanced. The range includes the Alay, Turkestan, Zeravshan, Karategin, Fergana, Kok-shaal, Khan-Tengri, and the Dzungarian Ala-Tau Mountains. The Kuen-Lun Range of Chinese Sin-kiang is an extension of this system.

The Northern Tien-Shans are mountain ranges yet older than the Central Tien-Shans. Mountains around Lake Issyk-Kul, the Ili and Chu Rivers, and the Talas Basin are comprised in the

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Northern Tien-Shans.

Some of these mountain ranges are exceedingly high. The highest point in the Soviet Union is Mount Stalin in the Academy of Sciences Chain in the Pamirs. This peak is 7,495 meters (24,700 feet). To the north of the Academy of Sciences Chain is the Trans-Alay Chain, whose highest point is Mount Lenin, 7,134 meters (23,500 feet).

These mountain ranges make very difficult the passage between Central Asia and India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan to the south, and China to the east. The only communication is on foot and on the backs of animals. Automobile roads and railroads are few, and none extend beyond the USSR. The only alternative to archaic animal transport is the airplane.

Geography of Communications

Central Asia is difficult of access, and is closed off by a series of natural barriers. The only open borders are those formed by a series of river valleys: the Atrek near the Caspian Sea, along the Iranian frontier; the Tedzhen and Murgab Rivers in southern Turkmenia; and the Amu-Darya, which in its middle course forms the border between the USSR and Afghanistan.

Central Asia is divided into climate zones which become drier from north to south. The rivers are most numerous and navigable in the north. Those in the northeast form the Ob-Irtysh-Tobol drainage system and tributaries, which flow

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into the Arctic. The chief rivers in the northwest are the Emba, Ural and Volga, all of which drain into the Caspian.

For various reasons communication by water both within Central Asia and into Central Asia is limited and problematical. There is no communication across the region by water. The water courses merely skirt the region. They are not always navigable through their entire length. For instance, the Emba River flows into the Caspian only at high water. This is true of other Caspian rivers as well.

The Ili River, which flows into Lake Balkhash, is only navigable over part of its length. The Ili is frozen during winter, and low in water during summer. It is a rapid stream, with rates of flow varying between five and ten miles per hour (8.5 - 16 kilometers per hour). It shifts course frequently, building up and destroying its banks. The problems of the Ili River are typical of the rivers in the middle and southern parts of Central Asia, i.e., the semi-desert and desert zones.

The river systems of Central Asia's desert and semi-desert zones are sharply contrasted with the rivers of the steppe zone, that is, the Ob-Irtysh system. The rivers of the north are deep, navigable through almost their entire length, have a more or less steady rate of flow in the steppe latitudes, and do not fluctuate very much in quantity through evaporation. The rivers of the steppe do freeze in winter, however, which is a major limitation on their usefulness. But the rivers of the north have one


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great advantage. In contrast with the desert and semi-desert rivers, the rivers of the north form true systems with many tributaries spreading over vast territories. The rivers of the desert and semi-desert are marked by their linearity, that is, their one-dimensional character. They rarely have tributaries.

The fact that the Amu-Darya, the Syr-Darya, the Ili, the Chu, the Zeravshan, the Tedzhen, the Murgab and the Kashka-Darya have insignificant tributary systems limits the economic growth of the various regions. Most significant is the impact on the communication system. The rivers do not weld together large territories; they bring together only places along the river line.

The lakes of Central Asia are important as aids to communication. Transport and communication are large-scale enterprises on the Caspian Sea, Aral Sea, Lake Balkhash and Lake Issyk-Kul. All these lakes and seas are salt. The falling of the level of the Caspian Sea has been a crisis of major significance in the Soviet Union. The chief ports affected are those on the northern and eastern littorals of the Caspian, i.e., those which are in Central Asia. These ports are Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga, at the western edge of Kazakhstan; Guryev at the mouth of the Ural River in Kazakhstan; and in Turkmenia, Krasnovodsk, which is at the rail terminus and is directly across from Baku, the oil port in Azerbaidzhan.



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The falling of the level of the Caspian has created vast problems for each of these ports. The shipping to the ports is complicated by the use of lighters for trans-shipment. Ports now lie far from the sea, a situation which is the result of the delta formation at the mouths of the rivers as well as the falling of the level. Fishing suffers; the cost increases for dredging operations to keep channels open. In consequence, the costs of transporting oil, mineral salts and other products moved out of Central Asia are greatly increased.

The Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash present problems of a different kind. The vast delta of the Amu-Darya, the marshes and thicket jungles of the southern shore of the Aral Sea formed by this delta, are reproduced to a lesser extent by the delta of the Syr-Darya on the east coast of the Aral Sea. Unlike the Caspian, which is shallow in the north but relatively deep in the south, the Aral Sea is more or less uniformly shallow.

Overland transport by rail is far more important than water transport. The railroad system of Central Asia can hardly be regarded as a network. It consists chiefly of a few long lines and their branches, with some junctions.

The principal rail lines are:

1. Krasnovodsk-Ashkhabad-Chardzhou-Fergana Valley line.

2. Saratov-Tashkent line, joined at Sol-Iletsk by the Kuibyshev-Chkalov (Orenburg) line, and at Arys by the Frunze line.


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3. Novosibirsk-Barnaul-Alma-Ata line. This is the Turkestan-Siberian railroad (Turk-Sib).

4. Petropavlovsk-Karaganda-Balkhash line, which joins the Tashkent-Frunze line at Lugovoy.

5. Magnitogorsk-Akmolinsk-Pavlodar-Barnaul line.

Incomplete rail lines are the following:

1. Chardzhou-Kungrad line.

2. Aralsk-Baykonur-Uspenskii-Karaganda line.

There is a projected line from Alma-Ata to Urumchi in Sinkiang, joining the western Chinese railroad system to the Russian. Work on this line is not in an advanced stage as of the present writing (1956).

There are three major lines which link the southern parts of Central Asia with the northern: the Chkalov or Saratov-Tashkent line, the Turk-Sib or Novosibirsk-Alma-Ata line, and the Petropavlovsk-Lugovoy line. Two major lines link the eastern parts with the western: the Krasnovodsk-Fergana Valley line in the south, and the Magnitogorsk-Barnaul line in the north.

The incomplete line at Kungrad in Turkmenia would eventually connect the Amu-Darya Basin with European Russia, across the territory between the Aral Sea and the Caspian. The incomplete Aralsk-Uspenskii line would connect the


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northern shore of the Aral Sea and the Syr-Darya Basin with the Karaganda-Petropavlovsk line.

Railroad construction is also being carried forward in the zone of the virgin and long-fallow lands program of southern Siberia and northern Kazakhstan.(See chapters on Economics.)

Relationship between Water and Rail Routes

The European pattern of rail and water junctions is followed closely in Central Asia, but for different reasons. The European pattern rests upon utilization of both rail and water communication - water because it is cheaper, rail because it is faster. In Central Asia, water communication is minimal. However the rail lines keep close to the water routes.

The entrepots or points of trans-shipment between rail and water lines are found at the following places: Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga; Guryev at the mouth of the Ural River; Krasnovodsk. These are all Caspian ports; and all three are rail terminals. On the Aral Sea, Muynak is the port in the Amu-Darya Delta. Kungrad and Nukus are railroad terminals in the delta. All three towns are separated by relatively long distances measured in scores of miles. Muynak is connected by a water route over the Aral Sea with another railroad town and water port, Aralsk on the northern shore.

Lake Balkhash is navigable to a limited degree. Sand bars make trans-shipment to the Ili River difficult. The town of Balkhash and its neighbor, Kounrad, are situated on the north


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shore of Lake Balkhash. They are connected by rail with the Karaganda line.

Caravan routes and trails are the most extensive communication system in Central Asia. They go in every direction and form a veritable network, their exact route determined by the distribution of wells and other water sources. These minor water supplies would be insufficient to support large-scale transport requirements, but are able to maintain a movement of men and animals on a local scale. The caravan trails are ancient, and eventually link with routes followed by prehistoric wild herds in their quest for water.

(Note: The various communication routes discussed in the above passage are shown in the end-pocket map.)

Earthquake activity along the southern parts of Central Asia ranks among the heaviest in the world. The greatest earthquake activity is in the Kopet-Dag - Pamir System. On October 6, 1948, Ashkhabad, the capital of Turkmenia, was heavily damaged by a severe earthquake in the Kopet-Dag foothills. Even more severe tectonic activity has taken place in localities in the Pamirs, albeit with less economic loss.



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3:American U. S-4,5 1956 RL1 Turkestan

## Sub-Regions of Central Asia

### I. The Steppe Zone

The steppe zone of Central Asia is a small part of a great expanse which extends from northern Mongolia across southern Siberia and northern Kazakhstan, across the Volga to the North Caucasus and the northern littoral of the Black Sea. The general features of the steppe proper have been described above.

The temperature of the steppe zone is subject to vast swings, in keeping with its continentality. The winter mean is -17 degrees Centigrade ( +2 degrees Fahrenheit); the minimum recorded here is -51 degrees C. ( -58 degrees F.). The July mean is 21.8 degrees C. ( 71 degrees F.); and the maximum is 40 degrees C. ( 104 degreesF.).

Sometimes geographic zones which are dry generally and yet support herding are called steppes. But this usage is figurative, akin to the idea that pastoralism and steppe land are co-terminous. In fact pastoralism extends beyond the steppe into the steppe-desert on the one hand, and into the forest and forest-steppe on the other. The steppe is a region of competition between herding and agriculture. Under favorable conditions the steppe can support agriculture.

In Siberia, that is, east of the Urals, agriculture has been limited to the forest-steppe zone which lies to the north of the steppe proper. Exceptions to the rule of agricultural distribution just mentioned are in mountain valleys

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and along rivers in the Altay and in southern Siberia.

From time to time the Siberian settlers have sought to extend the farming south of the forest-steppe into the steppe proper. One of the zones of expansion has been a band of steppe lands within the quadrangle formed by the cities of Stalingrad and Saratov in European Russia and Barnaul and Novosibirsk in Siberia. The eastern portion of this region lies partly in southern Siberia, partly in northern Kazakhstan. Here is a zone of sporadic attempts at agriculture. Here are abandoned farmlands from the past, abortive experiments. This land has recently been reclassified as virgin or long-fallow land. It has been the scene of a recent agricultural campaign. The success of this campaign will be evaluated in the chapters on Economics.

The virgin and long-fallow lands program applied to the regions in the quadrangle (Volga-South Urals-southern Siberia-northern Kazakhstan) called for the conversion to farmland of 13 million hectares (32 million acres) during 1954-1955. To accomplish this, 137,000 tractors of 15-horsepower units, 37,000 combines, 116,000 trucks, and a total of 450,000 people have been moved out to Siberia and Kazakhstan in the two-year period.(See Labor Force.) The program calls for a further expansion to reach a total of 30 million hectares (75 million acres) in 1956. However, it has been recognized that the region may be more profitably put to grazing plus farming rather than farming alone.

Despite the investment, the limitations on the prospects are severe. The mean annual


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precipitation in this range is 12 to 14 inches of rainfall, the lower limit of rainfall necessary to maintain agriculture in this part of the world. The average annual rainfall requirement is generally reckoned at 16 to 20 inches in these regions. But more than this, the rainfall average is subject to much variation. In one year the precipitation may be far below the 12-inch average, another year may rise above 14 inches. The rain falls mainly in June and July, with a peak in June. Winter snow is heavy, and the wind-drift is high. Six feet of drift over extensive areas is not unusual.

In consequence, the grain yield has varied considerably even within the short duration of the program. The minimum grain yield in 1954 was 14 centners per hectare, the equivalent of six hundred weight per acre; the maximum was 20 centners per hectare (7.5 hwt. per acre). In 1955 the minimum fell to five centners per hectare (two hwt. per acre), and the maximum for the 1954 yield was 15 centners (six hwt.). This variation is typical. The year 1954 had a good rainfall; 1955 was a year of drought.

The prevailing summer wind is from the southeast. It is a hot, dry wind called sukhovey in the north, and garmsil in the south. More will be said below about garmsil. The summer wind acts to evaporate the water and creates further difficulties in the water-storage problem. It is a dust-bearing wind and increases the problems of human comfort and machinery maintenance.

In addition to the low precipitation rate and the scorching winds, there are a number


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of other factors which make agriculture difficult and expensive: there are large areas of alkaline soils; frosts in late-spring and early-fall are frequent and limit the growing season for crops in addition to disrupting sowing and harvesting schedules.

The Barabin Steppe and the Kulunda Steppe have been a zone of competition between herders and farmers. These steppe regions were historically the pasture grounds of the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde.(See chapter on History.) The Kazakhs were driven back by the Russian advance. The steppes are now the zone of Russian agricultural expansion; they are being converted from pasture and meadow to plowland.

In the extreme north of Kazakhstan, in the vicinity of Petropavlovsk, is the Ishim Steppe, watered by the Ishim River. Like the Barabin and Kulunda Steppes, the virgin lands program has been applied also on the Ishim Steppe. However, the Ishim has more favorable conditions for agriculture than the other steppe lands. It is part of the south Siberian black-earth or forest-steppe, and has less land left free and available for agricultural development, since most of it is already under exploitation.

The Ishim Steppe is classified as forest-steppe by Berg, and extends into the Barabin Steppe to the east. While the Ishim Steppe is relatively flat, there are long ridges with gentle slopes; bogs and small lakes are formed in the hollows between the ridges. The land is alkaline, and <u>solonchaks</u> (alkali flats) are also formed in these hollows.


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The steppe country of northwestern Kazakhstan, northwest of the Aral Sea, is dominated by the Mugodzhar Mountains, a southern extension of the Ural Range. The Mugodzhars are a low-lying range of hills covered with steppe vegetation: feather grass primarily, with coppices of birch, aspen and willow in ravines.

In the steppe country farther east, the so-called Kazakh Folded Country, the terrain continues broken. Here are the melkosopochniks or low hills with gentle slopes; the Kazakh Folded Country forms part of the melkosopochnik hills which extend north into southern Siberia. Here are found many salt lakes in enclosed depressions.

In the southern part of the Kazakh Folded Country lies the coal basin of Karaganda, with great reserves of coal, estimated to be the third coal reserve of the USSR.(See chapters on Economics.)

The steppe soil is relatively rich, black-earth (chernozem)soil in the north, but becomes poorer in the south where it merges into the semi-desert. Here the soil gets lighter in color, tending toward chestnut. This is the steppe of the virgin lands program.

Aside from the coal in the Karaganda Basin, which actually lies in the semi-desert region, there is little mineral wealth in the Kazakh Steppe zone.

There has been a long and often ardent discussion of the absence of forests in the steppes. The most considered analysis of the causes, by L.S. Berg, includes a critique of

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Pallas' theory which places the blame on man for the absence of forest in the steppes. Pallas was an 18th century explorer; his theory has recently been revived in connection with the absence of forest on the Great Plains of the United States. Berg points out that the steppe is an intermediate zone between the forest zone to the north and the desert to the south. Feather grasses grow on the steppe; trees do not, or at most sporadically. The low precipitation and the inappropriate seasonal distribution (late-summer drop in moisture), salinity of the soil, high evaporation rate - all contribute to the absence of forest.

## II. The Zone of Semi-Desert or Desert-Steppe

The semi-desert or desert-steppe zone has often been confused with the steppe zone, as though the two were indistinguishable. However the characteristic features of the two zones contrast sharply and the reasons for distinguishing between the two zones are significant for geographic, economic and other reasons.

Just as the steppe proper is a zone of transition between the northern forests and the true desert of Central Asia, the semi-desert presents a further classification.(See above.) The semi-desert zone lies to the south of the steppe. Its northern limit is the line between Akmolinsk and the Volga region near Stalingrad. Its southern limit is the Central Asian desert zone, a line extending approximately from the north of Lake Balkhash to the northern littoral of the Caspian Sea.

The steppe, as we have seen, is covered


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by a more or less unbroken expanse of vegetation. The desert-steppe is quite different: not only are there large (increasingly larger to the south) patches of bare earth, but the individual plants grow farther apart, so that the earth is visible between the plants. Nevertheless, in contrast to the desert in the south, the area covered by vegetation is greater than the bared ground. Moreover, the growing season in the desert-steppe is longer than in the desert because of the relatively greater amount of available water; and life of the vegetation through the year is greater than in the desert.

The soils of the semi-desert are lighter in color and poorer in quality than the steppe soils. They range from dark to light chestnut, whereas the steppe soil varies from black earth to dark chestnut. The plant cover is not the uniform, relatively rich feather grass of the steppe. In the semi-desert there is an intermingling of feather grass and desert vegetation, primarily the wormwood or polyn. The wormwood is a desert plant, of which more will be said in the section on the desert.

Alkalinity of the soil increases as we proceed south from the steppe to the semi-desert. Areas of solonetz soil increase in number and size in the semi-desert. Solonetz is a term derived from the Russian word for salt, which is sol. Solonetz is usually highly alkaline, composed of a surface of friable soil overlying a sub-surface hard soil brown in color and impermeable to water. Another term should be explained at this point, and will be mentioned below in conjunction with solonetz. The term solonchak

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is also based on the same Russian word for salt. Solonchak is highly permeable and highly alkaline, light in color, found chiefly in arid or semi-arid zones, and capable only of supporting a salt-loving plant cover of grasses and shrubs. Solonchak is formed by the action of ground water rising to the surface and depositing a layer of salt.

The climate of the semi-desert is drier than the steppe. Whereas the steppe has a mean annual rainfall of about 12 inches (300 millimeters), the semi-desert is only three-fifths to half that rate. A 65-year average at Astrakhan, at the mouth of the Volga, is 171 mm., or five inches. Irgiz to the north is slightly lower(158 mm.). Emba to the east is slightly higher (197 mm., or eight inches). The rainfall pattern through the year is different in the two zones. The peak rainfall in the steppe zone is June and July. In the semi-desert the rainfall curve reaches a peak in May and dips in June and July, with a second slight peak in October.

The temperature is warmer in the semi-desert zone. The July mean is 25 degrees C. (77 degrees F.) and the January mean is -16 degrees C. (+3 degrees F.).

In the extreme west the desert-steppe reaches into the Caspian Lowlands. This region is able to support a pastoral economy, although not as well as the area to the north and west. The Caspian Lowlands are relatively poor grazing land. In the past the region was known as the Bukei Steppe, or the Steppe of the Inner Horde of the Kazakhs. Lying between the Ural and Volga Rivers, the steppe was occupied by Kalmuks origi-

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nally between 1630 and 1771. It was vacated when the Kalmuks fled eastward, and remained vacant for a generation. At the turn of the 18th century, the country was occupied by a group of Kazakhs of the Little Horde (see below) under their Khan Bukei, for whom the horde was named. The Russian Cossacks had established a line along the Ural River which the Bukei Horde crossed on the grant of their petition. For this reason they were known as the Inner Horde. It was not the attraction of lush pastures which brought them to the Caspian Lowlands, but the search for protection from political and military turbulence.

The Turgay Tablelands lie to the east of the Caspian Lowlands. Historically the tablelands have been the pasturage of the Kazakhs of the Little Horde, from whom the Bukei Horde branched off. The pasturage of the Little Horde extended west into the Emba Plateau and the Mugodzhary Mountains, and south into the desert zone which lies between the Aral and the Caspian Seas.

The Emba Plateau is comparable to the Turgay Tablelands. This plateau lies to the west of the Mugodzhary Mountains and south of the Emba River. The Emba Plateau has salt domes which distinguish it from the Turgay country. The characteristic feature of the Turgay is the presence of table mountains formed by the erosive action of wind and water.

The semi-desert extends to the south into the area between the Aral and the Caspian as far as the Ust-Urt or Ustyurt Plateau, an escarpment in the desert zone.



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Eastward the zone of semi-desert extends south of the steppe into the vicinity of the cities of Karaganda and Semipalatinsk and south to a line slightly north of Lake Balkhash. In the matter of mineral wealth, the eastern part of the semi-desert and the immediately adjoining desert area to the south are of the highest importance. Karaganda contains vast coal reserves, while south of Karaganda at Balkhash and Kounrad on the north shore of Lake Balkhash, and southwest of Karaganda in the vicinity of Baykonur-Karsakpay-Dzhezkazgan, are the two chief copper deposits in the Soviet Union.

The semi-desert is a salt region. Here are found many salt lakes, solonchaks and solonetz areas.(See above.) It has been suggested that inundation by the Arctic Ocean in past geological ages caused the deposition of salt in the area. It is true that the low-lying parts of Central Asia, especially in the north, were once part of the Northern Ocean. Moreover in a more recent geological age, the Ice Age, which immediately precedes our present age, the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea were joined. Both of the seas are salt. After the Ice Age, the Caspian-Aral Sea receded to its present boundaries, having deposited its salt. Thus, water deposited a part of the salt in the area. However the primary sources of salt deposit are the salinized bedrock and subsoils of the region. Weathering and other processes resulting from the dry climate before the Ice Age were the main contributors to the salty nature of the region.

Even the rivers are salt. The Emba River is brackish during the summer, and the nearby Sagyz River is brackish to salt through


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most of the year.

Much of the region is covered with sand. However the sandy soil is found in greater proportion in the desert to the south.

The action of animals upon the soil in the steppe and semi-desert should be noted. There are many small rodents, the most numerous of which is the suslik. The suslik is found in wetter zones to the north and west. The suslik burrows into the ground, bringing large amounts of soil to the surface; and hundreds of burrows per acre of the spotted suslik are found on the steppe. This turning of the earth in vast quantities where man has not brought the plow is of great value to the growth of vegetation.

III. The Desert Zone

The desert zone lies to the south of the semi-desert. Whereas the steppe and semi-desert are disposed in a more or less thin band extending east-west, the desert is a vast area occuping the greatest part of the surface of Central Asia.

In the desert is found the heart of the physiographic processes (climatic and soil processes) of this part of the world. Here is the maximum aridity, the furthest removal from the oceans, and the moisture-bearing wind; there is no water outlet to the sea from the Central Asian desert.

The desert is a region of extremes.

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Here is found the lowest amount of plant cover, the smallest amount of precipitation and surface and ground water, the highest amount of salinity and alkalinity of the soil, and the highest amount of sandy soil. Travel is most difficult. The choice of overland routes is strictly determined by the distribution of water courses, lakes and wells. A large proportion of water sources is seasonal; hence travel is not a year-round venture.

The wind factor is not potent in the desert. Winds are of lower velocity than farther north in the steppe or Arctic zones. The highest wind velocity in the desert is in summer afternoons; afternoons throughout the year have a high wind velocity.

In addition to the winds prevailing over the entire area, there is a wind near the Sino-Russian border area of the Dzungarian Gates east of Lake Balkhash. This wind is an east wind called the ebe. The ebe is a warm wind which causes winter thaw and removes the snow cover, thus giving the livestock access to the fodder, especially the browsers (cattle).

The garmsil, as mentioned previously, is a parching summer wind from the south. The afganets is a dust-raising wind from the southwest which envelops everything in dust.

The continentality of climate characteristic of Inland Asia is found generally in the desert zone. The July temperature mean is between 32 degrees C. and 35 degrees C. (86 - 96 degrees F.). The higher temperature is found in the Hungry Steppe (Golodnaya Steppe or Betpak

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Dala in southern Kazakhstan). The January mean is above frost, 2 - 8 degrees C. (36 - 46 degrees F.)

The daily temperature may range from extremes of cold to extremes of heat. A range of 60 degrees C. (108 degrees F.) is not uncommon. The earth reaches high temperatures during the day, then cools quickly. A soil temperature of 79 degrees C. (174 degrees F.) has been recorded.

Lower winter temperature means are recorded in the northern part of the desert than in the regions close to the Arctic Circle. The January mean in the lower Syr-Darya is -12 degrees C. (10 degrees F.). In the southern part of the desert the winters are milder, for instance in southern Turkmenia. However any given winter anywhere in Central Asia may be exceedingly cold. Arctic air masses move unimpeded across Central Asia to Iran.

The spring is short, as is the fall; the change of seasons is rapid, in keeping with continental climate generally. The latter part of the fall is cold and wintry; the latter part of the spring is hot and summery.

The air is dry; humidity is low and evaporation is great, an important problem in maintaining water supply even with a given source.

The amount of sunny days and sun during the day is very high. In the Surkhan-Darya Oasis, near the border between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, there are 202 clear days and 37 cloudy ones. In contrast, Europe has well over 180 cloudy days

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in the course of a year.

Precipitation is low in the Central Asian desert. The number of days with rainfall is often less than 40 per annum. At Mary (Merv) in southern Turkmenia the highest annual precipitation is six inches (146 millimeters). The rainfall in the lower Amu-Darya is 3.6 - 4.0 inches. The variability of the annual rainfall is great. At Mary the maximum is 6.0 inches; the minimum is 1.8 inches per annum (50 mm.). Closer to the mountains the rainfall is somewhat higher: 14 inches (350 mm.) at Tashkent. The summers in general are excessively dry. In many localities the amount of moisture is too low to be measured during summer.

Winter and spring precipitation is higher because at these times the moisture-bearing winds pass over Central Asia from the west. Spring is the period of the greatest amount of moisture. Nearly half the total rainfall occurs then. The spring rain peak comes earliest in the south, in March, while in the north it is latest, in May. During this period the vegetation flourishes briefly and the desert has an ephemeral moment of glory.

With an adequate water supply, the desert can be made productive, and has been intensively cultivated for nearly three thousand years. The soil is fertile because of its natural potential; and the low moisture content acts against leaching, which is the washing away of the minerals and organic content of the soil. Given the great amount of heat (The sum of temperature during daylight is higher than in the tropics) and


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the clear skies, many warmth-loving plants can be grown: cotton, melons and other sugary fruits.

The Central Asian desert zone is composed of several sub-zones. In the west between the Aral and the Caspian is the Ust-Urt Plateau.

The Mangyshlak Peninsula of the Caspian neighbors the Ust-Urt to the west. South of the Mangyshlak is the Kara-Bogaz-Gol. Until recently the Kara-Bogaz-Gol was an arm of the Caspian. During the early Soviet period the body of water known as the Kara-Bogaz-Gol was kept open by dredging. Of late the sandbar which separates the Caspian from its former arm has become impassible. South and east of the Kara-Bogaz-Gol, south of Ust-Urt and bounded by the Aral Sea and the Amu-Darya Delta on the east, is the Kara-Kum Desert. This desert extends over the Ust-Urt Plateau, the Mangyshlak Peninsula, and the Kara-Bogaz-Gol littoral. The Kara-Kum forms the western part of the Central Asian desert zone.

The Kara-Kum Desert to the south extends as far as the Kopet-Dag Mountains. To the east lies the Amu-Darya Basin, and to the south the Mary (Merv) Oasis in the Murgab River Valley, the Tedzhen Oasis in the valley of the Tedzhen River, and the Akhal-Teke Oasis formed by the streams along the northern slopes of the Kopet-Dag. Beyond these oases, the Kara-Kum Desert joins the desert of northwestern Afghanistan.

The Kara-Kum means literally black sand in Turkic. This desert extends over most of Turkmenia save for the mountain zone in the south and west, and the oases and river valleys which form narrow spearheads into the desert, chiefly

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on a north-south or northwest-southeast axis.

Between the delta of the Amu-Darya and the vicinity of Krasnovodsk, south of the Kara-Bogaz-Gol is the dried river bed of the Uzboy. In past geological ages when the Aral Sea was much larger than it is today, the Uzboy bed was filled and it linked the Aral with the Caspian. There has been much discussion of late as to whether the Uzboy was a flowing stream in historic times, i.e., within the past two thousand years. It is probable that it was not, that there were occasional irrigation developments making agriculture possible discontinuously along its length. These sporadic developments have been interpreted to mean that at that time the dry-bed was filled, and therefore supported agriculture. (There is an English report of this nature made in the 16th century by Anthony Jenkinson.) The farming traces are found chiefly in the east and are a western extension of the Amu-Darya irrigation system.

The general feature of these deserts is the sand cover, which takes many forms. There are sands fixed in mounds by vegetation, chiefly shrubs; and sandy plains also fixed by vegetation. These two forms of desert sands are found chiefly in the southernmost parts of Turkmenia. Along the Amu-Darya are the barkhan sands or shifting sand dunes shaped in crescents and chains formed by wind action.

Characteristic of the Central Asian deserts are the takyrs. A takyr is an expanse of dry, salt, clay-like bare ground. When there is sufficient moisture, e.g., in the spring, the takyrs may fill their depressions with water and then form lakes. In this sense, a takyr is a de-

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pressed salt pan or solonchak. When dried, the soil of the takyrs cracks into rectangles, pentagons and other geometric shapes.

Immediately west of the Amu-Darya Delta is the Sarykamysh Basin, site of sporadic agriculture thought to be associated with the Uzboy. (See above.) This basin is a former lake. There are a few small lakes near the center of the larger basin. These smaller lakes evaporate during dry years.

The delta of the Amu-Darya is vast. A direct line from Nukus at the head of the delta to Muynak on the Aral shore is over 150 kilometers (100 miles) long. Along the delta are shrubs, reeds and grasses forming a broad, dense cover. The growth is large and jungle-like. Smaller thickets of similar character are found around lesser water sources. These thickets are called tugays.

In ancient times a culture was developed in these delta swamps and thickets which extended from the eastern shore of the Caspian to western China. Some 1,500 years ago an early Turkic population dwelled in the delta of the Amu-Darya, living among the reeds, fishing and practicing a kind of marsh agriculture.

East of the Aral Sea and the Amu-Darya is a desert similar to the Kara-Kum - the Kyzyl-Kum, literally Red Sand in Turkic. The Kyzyl-Kum extends eastward and northward as far as the delta of the Syr-Darya. It occupies territory chiefly in eastern Karakalpakia, northern Uzbekistan, and

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southern Kazakhstan. To the south, the Kyzyl-Kum stretches as far as the northern edge of the Bukhara Oasis in Uzbekistan. The sands of the Kyzyl-Kum have little of the barkhan or shifting dune formation of the Kara-Kum Desert. Sands of the Kyzyl-Kum are relatively stabilized.

The Syr-Darya Delta and the basin as a whole are less capable of supporting life than the Amu-Darya, for the Syr-Darya has less water volume. Nevertheless, surrounding the Syr-Darya are signs of irrigation developments, evidence that farming once existed over a different area, possibly a greater area, than it does today.

Beyond the Syr-Darya and extending eastward as far as the western shore of Lake Balkhash is a desert known as the Hungry Steppe (Betpak-Dala). The northern limit of this desert is the semi-desert region of central Kazakhstan; south of the Hungry Steppe is the Chu River Basin.

The Hungry Steppe, despite its dramatic name, is capable of exploitation by man. It is criss-crossed with caravan routes whose exact courses from well to well are known. The nomads move their herds across the Hungry Steppe in the appropriate season, when there is a brief but adequate water supply. If proper use is made of this desert it can support life and be useful to man.

The Chu River dissipates its water into the desert formed by the Hungry Steppe to the north and the Muyun Kum or Camel's Neck Sands to the south. The Chu has no other outlet, and is typical of many rivers of the Central Asian desert: the Murgab, the Tedzhen, the Zeravshan and

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others.

The Syr-Darya Lowland, the basin of the Syr-Darya, separates the Hungry Steppe to the east and the Kyzyl-Kum to the west. The river originally was much larger than it is today, and filled the basin to a greater degree. This was as late as the 19th century.

South of the Syr-Darya Lowlands, advancing in the direction of the Tashkent Oasis, is the southern Betpak-Dala or Hungry Steppe.

The last sandy desert we will deal with is the plain lying south and east of Lake Balkhash, the Sary-Ishik-Otrau sands in the Semirechie region. Relatively well-watered if rivers alone are counted, this region is nevertheless a desert. It is cut by the Ili River, the Karatal, the Ak-Su, the Lepsy, and others. In addition there are many former channels of the Ili River along which grow thicket jungles formed of the saxaul shrub.

Vegetation of the desert is sparser than in the semi-desert. During spring, season of highest precipitation, plant growth is at its height. But even then the plants are widely scattered, and there are vast patches without any growth at all. The salt-loving plants, polyn or wormwood, are a characteristic desert growth. Thickets of saxaul and other shrubs grow along water courses and wells. In the north are low-lying shrubs, while in depressions is found a small, leguminous shrub, the pea shrub. Sedge grows on the sand mounds. In the tugays, such vegetation as tall shrubs, trees, vines, cane

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brakes, tall grasses and reeds abound.

Among the fauna are found the suslik (a rodent), the jackal, the hyena, several species of jerboa, and several kinds of birds, among the last the bustard and the desert lark. Locusts, beetles and reptiles flourish: a small boa, the deadly carpet viper, the arrow snake, and many species of lizard are found.

IV. The Mountain Zone

The mountains of Central Asia are distributed chiefly in the south and east of the region. Their general configuration and characteristics have been sketched above.

A transition between desert and mountain is formed by the piedmont loess-plains. The loess has been the subject of much conjecture and theorizing. It is a fine-grained earth whose present distribution is due primarily to wind action. It is a friable soil, powdery when dry, and hence is blown about by winds. It has one characteristic which adapts excellently to irrigation: the loess cleaves vertically and therefore is well suited to the digging of irrigation channels (aryks). Most theories as to the source of the loess agree that its original deposition was due to glacial action during the Ice Age. Whether this is the action of mud deposited by the glacial melt, or by glacial river deposits, or whether it predates the Ice Age, is a subject which will be left open.

The loess creates a great dust problem which, next to the insect life, makes human exis-


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tence most trying. The dust also causes a problem in machine maintenance. A layer of sierozems has formed upon the loess in Central Asia during the ten thousand years or so since the recession of the last glaciation. The sierozems are fertile soils of gray-brown color, from the Russian word for gray, sery. Properly irrigated these soils form a rich agricultural area.

The piedmont is a transitional zone from desert to mountain, as we have seen. The most impressive mountain formation is found in the Tien-Shan-Pamir System. In this system is a considerable glacial formation.

Along the mountain slopes from the Kopet-Dag in the west to the east, a kind of dry (non-irrigated) farming has long been practiced. This farming is called bogara. It depends for its water upon the mountain run-offs, and is widespread in this part of Asia.

The mountains of Central Asia send their streams into the desert, creating the phenomenon of interior drainage which characterizes the region. The life of man in the desert is largely dependent on these mountain streams. The streams along the Kopet-Dag which form the Akhal Oasis originate in the mountains. The Tedzhen, the Murgad, the Amu-Darya, the Syr-Darya, the Zeravshan, the waters of the Tashkent Oasis and of the Fergana Valley (the Syr-Darya and its tributaries), the Chu, the Ili and other streams of the Semirechi district (See above) and the streams of southern Tadzhikistan - all originate in the mountains.

The precipitation patterns, and hence

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the run-off patterns, are quite variable. In the Kopet-Dag the peak precipitation is in May and the low in September. The mean annual precipitation is about 15 inches (365 millimeters). In the Hissar Range of the Tien-Shan Mountains there are peaks of precipitation in January and in May, and a low in August. In the Hissar Range, annual rainfalls in excess of 60 inches (1,500 mm) have been recorded. The altitudes of the recorded precipitations in the Kopet-Dag and Hissar Range localities are the same: 1,700 meters (5,000 feet).

The precipitation drops sharply in many mountain localities so that in effect mountain deserts are formed. The rainfall in the valleys and in highland basins cut off by surrounding ranges, may have very low annual means. The rainfall of the western Pamir Valley is expressed in annual means of eight inches (200 mm.); landlocked mountain basins may fall even lower. Rybache at the western end of Lake Issyk-Kul has a mean annual rate of four inches (100 mm.).

## Mountain Settlement Pattern

Human life and plant and animal life are sharply graded in the mountains. Kirgizia is entirely within the mountain area of Central Asia. The southern part of Kirgizia is at least 3,000 meters (10,000 feet) above mean sea level; the central and northern parts lie between 1,500 and 3,000 m. (5,000-10,000 feet) high. In the Chu Valley, forming the Kirgiz-Kazakh border area, the altitude falls to 750 m. (2,300 feet). The Kirgiz capital of Frunze is in the Chu Valley; it is at an altitude of 744 m. and the sec-



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tion bordering the Fergana Valley drops below 750 m. These are exceptional areas.

Fifteen per cent of the area of Kirgizia is below 1,500 m.; here lives 70 per cent of the population; and 80 per cent of the agriculture of Kirgizia is found in these altitudes. The remainder of the area, 85 per cent of the total, is above 1,500 m.; here lives 30 per cent of the population.

As early as the 1920s, agriculture of a European type was practiced in the northern districts of Kirgizia: in the Chu and Talas River Valleys and in the vicinity of Lake Issyk-Kul. The proportion of Russians in these valleys and basins is high. Kirgiz predominate in the mountain pastures; Uzbeks rise in proportion in southwestern Kirgizia, close to the Fergana Valley.

An excellent instance of the altitude factor in the settlement pattern and the ethnic distribution is found in the Kirgart River Valley. The Kirgart is a tributary of the Kara-Darya River, which in turn forms part of the network of the Fergana Valley. The Kirgart is over 120 kilometers long; for one-third of its course it is 1,600 m. or higher, flowing through narrow canyons. The last two-thirds of its course, some 70-80 km., it falls from 1,600 m. to 640 m., a fall of over one km. in 80.

Cotton is grown in the lowest part of the Kirgart River Valley, close to the mouth, to an altitude of 800 m. up the valley walls and upstream. There are some gardens, but 80 per cent of the sown area is cotton. In that part of

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the valley, which is also closest to Uzbekistan, Uzbeks form 60 per cent of the population, Kirgiz 35 per cent, Russians and Ukrainians two to three per cent.

Higher up the Kirgart River Valley, aridity increases, that is, above the 750-800 m. line. In this, the second zone, cotton is grown only along the river banks. Wider sectors of the valley floor take on the character of oases. Uzbek kishlaks (farming villages) begin to thin out; Kirgiz increase proportionately to 60 per cent of the population; Russians are 30-35 per cent.

At 1,000-1,050 m., the third zone, cotton is no longer raised; only cereals grow here. There is some irrigation, used for vegetables, rice and tobacco. There is a small amount of pastoralism.

The fourth zone rises from 1,400-1,600 m. to 1,800-2,000 m. Pastoralism predominates; agriculture is continued only in small pockets, and gradually thins out. The valley narrows, walls steepen to canyon-like formations. In the upper reaches are found only mountain pastures of steppe character. The inference is that Russians decrease in proportion, and Kirgiz increase in the third and fourth zones.

What is true of the Kirgart River Valley is true of others: aridity increases with altitude, and determines mode of land utilization. Densities and ethnic composition of the populations of these valleys vary with altitude.

The picture is typical also of Tadzhi-


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kistan and the mountainous parts of Uzbekistan. For example, the Tashkent Oasis is heavily Russified on the valley floors and along the lower slopes.

The Fergana Valley is an exceedingly rich agricultural area; it has been farmed for thousands of years. Here is one of the most densely populated parts of Central Asia, and one of the highest agricultural densities in the world. It is divided among three republic administrations: the Kirgiz SSR in the eastern edge of the valley, the Tadzhik in the center and south, and the Uzbek over the remainder. To a great extent this boundary delimitation is artificial; partly it was based on economic considerations, partly on political and partly ethnic and cultural. Cotton-raising is in the hands of Uzbeks and Tadzhiks; oil is in the Uzbek part of the valley, and coal and oil in the Kirgiz.

The Fergana Valley is 300 km. long (200 miles). It is a deep valley running east-west and surrounded by high mountains: the Chatkal Mountains to the north, the Fergana Range to the east, and the Alay Range to the south. In the west the valley gradually merges into the southern Hungry Steppe.(See above.) The valley is one of the chief cotton areas of the Soviet Union. The heat, number of sunny days per annum, water supply for irrigated agriculture, fertility of the soil - all contribute to the riches of the cotton economy. Cotton has been grown here for many centuries.

The Zeravshan Valley is similar in many ways to the Fergana Valley. The Zeravshan is formed by a depression between mountain ranges.

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However it is complicated by broad lowlands encircled by broad mountain ridges. Like the Fergana, the Zeravshan's high relief is focused in the eastern corner. Both the Zeravshan and the Fergana Valleys are characterized by a long, narrow shape. They do not extend in breadth in any direction. The agriculture is limited by the water courses, both natural and man-made. The natural courses are the rivers; the man-made courses are the canals and canal tributaries. At the western end of the Zeravshan Valley is the Bukhara Oasis, surrounded on the north, west and south by sandy desert.

The Tashkent Oasis is almost circular, largely because its supporting water course, the Chirchik River, is short. A canal system branches out from this river making possible agriculture in the desert.

The agriculture of Tadzhikistan is similar to that of the mountainous parts of Uzbekistan. It is found in a number of steep valleys formed by the downcutting of rivers and streams: the Penj or Pyandzh and the Vakhsh, the Bartang, the Wakhan-Darya. The latter acquires its name at the confluence of the Pyandzh and the Vakhsh in the foothills of the Pamirs. Leninabad and the surrounding country are part of the Fergana Valley. Stalinabad, the capital of Tadzhikistan, is in the Kafirnigan Valley.

All these agricultural valleys without exception are watered by mountain rivers and streams. In the mountains the rivers have a tumultous course, falling rapidly to the valley floor. Some of them are glacier-fed, some fed



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by snow melt. As we have seen, the precipitation in the mountains is high in many regions. In its eastern portion the climatic system is related to the Tibetan-Himalayan System.

The sub-zones of the mountain region have been classified on the basis of the Dzungarian Ala-Tau (close to the Chinese-Kazakh border) and the Fergana Valley, from the lowest to the highest altitudes, as follow:

1. Zone of brown-gray earth (sierozem), solonchaks and desert soils.

With irrigation this becomes a rich agricultural region, growing grains (rice, barley, wheat) and cotton. It rises to 600 m. (2,000 feet). The valleys of the Fergana and Zeravshan are the chief representatives of this zone. It is classified as desert.

2. Foothills (adyrs).

These foothills are deeply gullied by water erosion between plain and mountain. Rivulets cut through the foothills. The climate and soil are semi-desert. Dry-farming (bogara agriculture) exists but is often unstable. From 600 to 1,200 m. (2,000 to 4,000 feet).

3. Mountain meadow.

Grassy steppe well-suited to pastoralism. Agriculture is more stable here than in the foothills. To 1,600 m. (5,000 feet). This is a zone of competition between agriculture and pastoralism.

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4. Steppe-forest.

Broad steppes with strips of forest, chiefly fruit trees and other hardwoods (deciduous forest). The soil is richly chernozem (black-earth). In the same altitude as the mountain meadow.

5. Mountain steppe.

This is feather grass and polyn (wormwood) steppe. 1,700 m. (one mile) to 2,700 m. or 3,200 m. (9,000 - 10,000 feet). Cultivated under favorable conditions to 8,000 feet. Otherwise pastoral.

6. Sub-alpine.

To 3,000 m. (10,000 feet) high mountain meadow climate and soil type. Sparser vegetation of same general type as mountain steppe.

7. Permanent snow.

At altitudes above 3,000 m. (10,000 feet).

In central Tadzhikistan the same pattern of mountain sub-zones prevails as in the Fergana and Ala-Tau, save that all the altitudes are scaled upward. Desert, semi-desert and steppe vegetation is found up to 1,200 m.; the mountain forest begins at 2,000 m.; the sub-alpine meadows are at 2,700 - 3,500 m.; and the alpine meadows begin at 3,500 m. This region is far to the south of the Fergana and Ala-Tau.

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A word should be said about the gullied foothills or advrs. The ancient form of dry-slope agriculture is practiced on these hills, which are the foothills of the mountains. It is unstable agriculture because the streams may burst over the gullies and inundate the cultivated areas. However with appropriate collection and distribution of the water this area can be - and has been - supportive of a rich agriculture, even without irrigation.

The Altay Mountains do not belong to the Central Asian System in the proper sense of the term. The Altay is part of a mountain system which extends eastward to the Sayans, the mountains of Tannu-Tuva, northern Mongolia and the Baykal region. This is not an area of interior drainage. The rivers which originate in this mountain system drain into the Arctic: the Ob-Irtysh, the Yenisey and the Lena Rivers, together with their extensive and numerous tributaries.

In contrast to Central Asia, the Altay is well watered by lakes and rivers and is even swampy and has hot springs. The Irtysh Valley includes Lake Zaysan-Nor, which is swampy to the east. The valley separates the Altay System from the Tarbagatay and Dzungarian Ala-Tau System to the south.

The Altay is not high by Central Asian standards (maximum 4,650 m. or 15,000 feet). There are a number of small glaciers and plateaus in the region. The river valleys and lakes in several cases are formed in rift valleys or geological faults (horsts and grabens).


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Rainfall in the Altay is ample, rarely dropping below an annual mean of 400-500 mm. (16-20 inches) save in the west where the Altay merges into the Kulunda Steppe. In the central and northern Altay the rainfall mean ranges from 700 to 1,000 mm. (28-40 inches) annually.

There are many high altitude steppe regions, but these are characterized by permanently frozen soil at a depth of one meter, which restricts their usefulness. They are pasturages, little suited to agriculture.

The climate in the Altay is rigorous. Winds are of high velocity and usually cold, although there are some foehn winds (warm, snow-thawing mountain winds) from the east. At an altitude of 450 m. (1,500 feet) the February mean is -22 degrees C. (-8 degrees F.). Here we encounter the phenomenon of temperature inversion. At 1,000 m. altitude (3,300 feet) the February mean is 10 degrees warmer. July means of temperature are 17 degrees C. to 19 degrees C. (about 42 degrees F.).

In ancient times the Altay exported iron, copper, silver, gold and various colored stones to China, Central Asia, Iran and eastern Europe. High cultures with an agricultural base were developed sporadically in the Altay during the past three to four millenia.

The farming regions of the Altay are in the valleys. These are long and narrow as a rule, running NW - SE in conformity with slopes of the ranges. These valleys are known as steppes, although strictly speaking they are not steppes.


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They have loess soils in certain cases, e.g., the Chuya Valley, and swamps in others, e.g., the Kan Steppe. The native peoples - the Altay Turks, the western Mongols or Oyrats, and the Turkicized Samoyeds - have long been hunters and pastoralists. They fought off the incursion of Russian agriculture in the past century in vain.

## Economic Geography

The productivity of Central Asia may be divided into three general categories: pastoralism, agriculture and mining. The herding was once widespread over the desert, semi-desert, and steppe zones, competing with agriculture for control of the steppe. Agriculture has long been established in the desert areas adjacent to water courses where it has been maintained by irrigation, and in the mountain foothills and uplands where water is sufficient for dry farming. The mineral wealth in Central Asia supplied copper and iron for archaic metal industries; and a host of metals and fuels for modern industry are supplied today. There is a certain amount of industry related to the natural resources of the region, involving the processing of pastoral, agricultural and mining products.

Pastoralism has an ancient history in all parts of Central Asia. The greatest herds and the greatest reliance on herding are found among the Kazakhs, and immediately behind them, the Kirgiz. The Kazakhs conform to the pattern of open-steppe pastoralism distributed all the way from Manchuria to the Caspian. The Kazakhs are the western wing of this steppe pastoralist pattern; the Mongols form the eastern wing. Once pastoralism was developed to the west of the Kazakhs, in the steppes of south Russia. The an-

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cient Scythians and the medieval Pechenegs and Polovstsians were pastoralists. The Russian advance seized these steppelands and in the past four centuries converted them to agriculture, with the aid of the iron plow.

The pastoralism of these peoples is nomadic. The popular conception of nomadism is indiscriminate wandering over the earth's surface. On the contrary, these nomads conform to fixed patterns of movement, from a winter camp through a spring route to a summer pasturage, then back over an autumn passage to the winter camp again. The nomadic Kazakh herds are well-defined: sheep and goats are most numerous, two-thirds to three-fourths of the total stock; cattle form 15 - 20 per cent of the total; horses somewhat less, 10 - 15 per cent; there are scattered percentages of camels. The ass, the mule, the pig are absent from the steppe pastures.

The Kirgiz practice mountain meadow pastoralism, for their country is in the high altitudes of the Tien-Shans and the Pamirs. (We have seen above that the mountain zone reproduces at high altitudes all the conditions of physiography in the plains of Central Asia: in the mountains there are highland deserts, semi-deserts and steppes.) The Kirgiz are highly similar to the Kazakhs in their annual round. Both peoples move in the same manner from winter camp to summer pasture, and both are impelled by the same quest for fodder for their stock. The herds are identical in animal composition and in proportions. The exception to the analogy is that whereas Kazakhs traverse great distances, often in excess of 100 to 150 kilometers a season, the Kirgiz cover only a short distance. The Kirgiz

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also have a small proportion of yaks. The general pattern of Kirgiz upland nomadism is found in the Caucasus where it has an ancient history.

Pastoralism in the southern parts of Central Asia differs from the Kazakh pattern. The Turkmens are the principal herdsmen; the Uzbeks are herdsmen only in a restricted degree, the Tadzhiks likewise. The Turkmen pastoralism is transitional to the Middle East, which Turkmenia adjoins. Here asses and mules increase sharply in proportion to the gross total of livestock in herds. Asses and mules are only found in negligible quantities in the steppe and semi-desert of the Kazakhs. In Uzbekistan they are as much as six per cent of the total herds; in Tadzhikistan they are four per cent; and in Turkmenia asses alone are three per cent, possibly six per cent including mules.

Moreover, in Turkmenia the proportion of horses falls to four per cent, while cattle are over 20 per cent of the gross herd total. All this is quite different from the Kazakh-Mongol pattern.

The pig has been introduced into Central Asia by the Russian colonizers. The pig is abhorrent to Moslems and was therefore unknown in Central Asia until the Russian conquest. As we shall see below (chapter on Religion), the Kazakh, Kirgiz and other nomads of Central Asia were only superficially influenced by Islam. Nevertheless the pig is as foreign to the nomads as it is to the indigenous farmers of Central Asia.

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Agriculture is nearly three thousand years old in Central Asia. More or less the same crops are grown today as of old. Grains cultivated in the area include wheat, barley, millet and rice. Cotton has been raised almost as long as grains. The Fergana and related mountain valleys are among the oldest fruit-growing regions in the world.

Agriculture is of two basic varieties in the economy of the Central Asian native populations. To this number the Russian in-migrants and colonizers have added their pattern. The native populations have practiced bogara farming. The fundamental bogara crop is grain; the water supply is found in streams coming down the mountains to the foothills where the bogara crops are raised. There is no irrigation and little water control in general.

With irrigation, a higher yield per unit of cultivation is attained; the area under cultivation may be extended into the desert; and a wider variety of crops is raised. Fiber crops including silk, cotton, hemp, and more recently flax, have been raised; also grown now are truck and garden crops including vegetables and fruits, and legumes; and production includes sugar-beet, vines, tobacco and orchard crops, and grains like millet, wheat, barley and rice.

The Uzbeks have long been settled along the Syr-Darya, where they raise cotton by irrigation techniques. One of the chief Uzbek cotton-growing regions lies in the middle course of the Syr-Darya, from the town of Ilyich on the Kazakhstan border to Turkestan, a town in Kazakhstan.

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(See ethnic map.) Although this heavily settled Uzbek area is immediately adjacent to the Tashkent Oasis of Uzbekistan, it is part of Kazakhstan.

The Russians have settled in the peripheral zones of Central Asia as well as in the cities. They have brought with them potatoes and pigs and a few other innovations, and have settled in the steppe zone of northern Kazakhstan as far as the Altay Mountains, and in the piedmont of the mountains of Central Asia.

Finally, the nomads practice a modest amount of agriculture, supplementary to their herding. In past centuries nomadic agriculture was the work of women and of the poor.

Mining in Central Asia is developed in certain regions: in the northern and eastern Caspian littoral, the Karaganda region, the vicinity of Karsakpay and Balkhash, the Altay Mountains, and the Fergana Valley. With the exceptions of the Fergana and the east Caspian shore, the principal mining in Central Asia is within Kazakhstan.

The oil fields to the north of the Caspian are located within the Ural-Emba basin. Oil is found at Guryev, Iskine, Dossor, Kulsary, Baychunas, Makat, Sagyz, Kandagach, and Koschagyl - all in this vast basin. These oil fields are third in importance in the Soviet Union, after the Volga and Baku fields.

Secondary oil fields in Central Asia

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are found in Turkmenia on the eastern Caspian littoral at Nebit-Dag ("Oil Mountain") in the Great Balkhan Range southeast of Krasnovodsk, and at Chelekan, south of Krasnovodsk; and oil is found in the Fergana Valley.

The chief source of coal is in the Karaganda deposits in central Kazakhstan. This is a relatively high grade of coal, suitable for coking, hence valuable in iron metallurgy. It is sent to the steel mills of Magnitogorsk in the Urals. The Karaganda coal reserves rank third in the USSR. North of Karaganda is Ekibastuz on the Akmolinsk-Pavlodar railroad, where another rich coalfield has been opened up. Lesser fields are found in western Kazakhstan and in the Tarbagatay Mountains close to the Chinese border.

The Fergana Valley has coal fields second in potential only to Karaganda. These are mainly in the Kirgiz and Tadzhik parts of the valley.

Brown coal or lignite is widely distributed in Central Asia. Baykonur in central Kazakhstan, Lenger in southern Kazakhstan, Angren in the Tashkent Oasis of Uzbekistan, Sulyukta in the Fergana Valley (Kirgiz sector), Oglanly and Chagyl in western Turkmenia, near the Caspian shore - have deposits of lignite.

Hydroelectric and thermoelectric power stations have been built. The electric energy of Kazakhstan is chiefly thermoelectric (stations at Petropavlovsk, Karaganda, Alma-Ata, Akytubinsk, Chimkent, Semipalatinsk). There is little hydroelectric development in Kazakhstan.

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Hydroelectric power in Central Asia is more highly developed in the areas close to the mountains. Uzbekistan has two large-scale hydroelectric stations on the Syr-Darya, at Farkhad and Begovat; and one at Chirchik in the Tashkent Oasis. The hydroelectric development of Uzbekistan ranks only behind the RSFSR and the Ukraine.

Tadzhikistan has a small hydroelectric station at Stalinabad; there are no stations in Kirgizia or Turkmenia.

The position of Central Asian resources in radioactive minerals has been summarized by Shimkin.

Uranium and radium are found at Taboshar, Tadzhikistan, in the Fergana Valley, and at Maili-Say in Kirgizia; older uranium mines are at Tyuya-Muyun and Uigar-Say. All the uranium deposits are poor in Central Asia.

Non-ferrous minerals abound in Central Asia, despite the region's general paucity of iron ore. The Altay Mountains have an important polymetallic complex: zinc, lead, copper, silver and gold. In addition, jasper and marble have been mined for centuries in the Altay. Elsewhere in Kazakhstan are found chromite (northwestern Kazakhstan), phosphorites and magnesium (Mangyshlak Peninsula), zinc, lead and phosphorites (southern Kazakhstan). Above all, Kazakhstan is rich in copper ore, mined at Dzhezkazgan in central Kazakhstan, Kounrad north of Lake Balkhash


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and at Uspenskii midway between, and in the Altay. The eastern shore of the Caspian, around the Kara-Bogaz-Gol, is extremely rich in mineral salts and mirabilite. Sulphur is mined in central Turkmenia and in southern Uzbekistan. A quantitative treatment of the economic resources of Central Asia will be found in the chapters on Economics below.

Central Asian industry is poorly developed on the whole. The industrial development is closely related to the production of raw materials. With the exception of the cloth-manufacturing center at Tashkent, most of the raw materials are sent through one stage of processing and then shipped out of the area. Cotton is cleaned, baled and exported; copper, zinc, lead are refined and shipped in ingot form to the industrial centers of the Soviet Union; Karaganda coal is shipped to Magnitogorsk; the Ural-Emba oil is in part locally refined, in part shipped crude and burned in the industrial centers of the Soviet Union. Central Asia has significance in the Soviet economy for supply of raw materials: herding production in wool and hides; agricultural production in cotton, silk, hemp, grains, sugar beet, tobacco and fruits; and mining production in oil, coal, and non-ferrous metals.

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Annex "A." 1.b.

# HISTORICAL SETTING

## Introduction

The history of Central Asia is well-known to the people and cherished by them. Their orientation to life is historical and the past has an immediacy for them. On the other hand, Central Asian history is virtually unknown outside the area except by specialists.

The chief source of information about the region is the Russian, and of late the Soviet, literature. Soviet specialists in this field have devised an explanation of the events, and a theory of the historical and social development. One aspect of this theory is contained in the word feudalism. In the Soviet view, Central Asia was feudal up to the time of the Revolution.

The history of the peoples is the web our of which their society is formed. Again, ancestors are venerated, worshipped; they live in the histories of the peoples. In this sense history, social structure and religion are all interwoven.

The history of Central Asia may be divided into three great periods:



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1. The first period may be called the proto-historical and early historical period from the middle of the first millenium B.C. down to the Arab invasions and the introduction of Islam (seventh-eighth centuries A.D.). The Arab invasions were followed soon by the great and definitive wave of Turkic settlement in the region (ninth century), albeit not for the first time. The seventh-ninth centuries are a time of transition from the ancient to the medieval periods in Central Asian history. The period down to the Turkic incursions is a kind of formative period in Central Asian history.

2. The next great period begins in the ninth century with the Turkic hegemony. The period includes the Mongol invasion of the 13th century and the rule of the house of Chingis Khan down to the 15th century. With the breaking up of the Mongol rule into a series of small succession states, the second period of Central Asian history comes to an end. There follows a period of transition to the modern, covering the 16th-18th centuries.

3. The modern period begins with the absorption of the area into the Russian empire, a process which began as early as the 18th century but remained stagnant until the 19th, when with accelerating force the Russians established their rule as far as the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan and China. The last act was the formal absorption into the Russian empire of the last independent khanates, Khiva and Bukhara, in the first years of Soviet rule.



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Within these periods, the various peoples of Central Asia were formed as ethnic units. For example, the Tadzhiks appear to have formed as a people during the seventh to the ninth centuries, a period which correlates with the Arab invasions and the beginnings of the definitive Turkic incursions and settlement. Again, the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks were formed as ethnic units during the period of the Mongol rule; the states which these two peoples formed number among the succession states during the post-Mongol period. It is necessary, as may be seen, to differentiate a twofold process: (a) the formation of peoples, and (b) the formation of states. The Kazakh and the Uzbek peoples came into being in or around the 14th century, while the states which they formed came into being in the ensuing period, in the 15th-16th centuries.

## Early History

The Turks who came into Central Asia toward the end of the first millenium A.D. met a population settled in the southern portions of the region who were Iranian in language and culture. There is archaeological evidence of canal systems and irrigated agriculture, together with villages fortified by walls of clay in the basin of the Amu-Darya. The culture which produced these remains dates from the eighth-seventh centuries B.C. The people who created this culture may have been the ancestors of the Khorezmians, whom we know to have been Iranians. The Iranians appear with certainty in the valleys of the Amu-Darya (the ancient Oxus, the medieval


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Sayhun), and of the Syr-Darya (the ancient Jaxartes, medieval Jayhun) in the middle of the sixth century B. C. Cyrus, the great Persian monarch, founded during his reign in the sixth century the city later known as Cyropolis (Greek for "City of Cyrus") in the valley of the Syr-Darya. He made the regions of Khorezm, Sogdia and Usrushana tributaries of his empire.

To the north of these early agricultural societies were several nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples. The best known are the Scythians, who spoke an Iranian tongue. Less well known peoples are the Massagetae and the Yueh-chi. The Iranian-speaking peoples who nomadized in the Central Asiatic steppes in the middle of the first millenium B.C., known as Scythians, from Greek sources are the same as those who are known as Saka from the ancient Persian sources. The identity of the other peoples is not so clear, and the question whether they were Iranian will be set to one side.

There is no direct evidence of Iranian occupation of Central Asia prior to the first millenium B.C., but there is no doubt of the continuous presence of Iranians in the region from that time down to the 20th century. They were conquered by Alexander the Great during the course of his campaigns in Central Asia during the fourth century B. C. Alexander's wars brought him to the Amu and Syr-Darya basins and their surrounding territory. He formed provinces of his brief empire out of the former Persian satrapies of the region: Margiana (present-day Merv or Mary); Khorezmia, which lies



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near the delta of the Amu-Darya; Sogdia, between the Zeravshan and the middle course of the Amu-Darya; and Bactria, south of Sogdia. All these territories are comprised in modern-day Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, and northern Iran and Afghanistan.

Alexander's name occurs in geographic place-names. He is well remembered by the Central Asians and is a prominent figure even at the present time in their folklore and historical tales.

The Turks made their appearance in Central Asia shortly after the beginning of the present era, that is, nearly two thousand years ago. They established brief reigns at this early time. However, their appearance in force and in continuous occupation down to the present day dates only from the eighth century, when their westward movement brought them to the Iranian world. At this time they encountered the Arabs who appeared in Central Asia, bringing Islam with them. The Turks fought the Arabs and won control of the region, but a large proportion of the Turks was converted to Islam. From this time on the preponderance of Turks in the region was so great that the region acquired their name - Turkestan.

While Turkic peoples continuously occupied Central Asia, first as nomads, then as farmers, from the eighth-ninth centuries on, there is no record of continuous occupation by the same people. On the contrary, there was great fluctuation among Turkic peoples. One of the groups of Turks was the Oguz Turks, who in the middle of the eighth century came to the Ili

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River Valley. They are known from Chinese sources, from which we learn that the Oguz had ten divisions or tribes, five of which lived north of the Ili, five south. The Oguz were ruled by a khan, and fought against the Arabs who some decades before, at the beginning of the eighth century, had come to this part of the world and established themselves.

One of a series of complex questions is the problem of the names of ethnic groups. The groups were constantly changing, and the same name appears among different and seemingly unrelated, groups. One of these changing ethnic names applies to the forerunners of the Turkmens, who are concerned in the present study. The Oguz Turks came originally from Mongolia, having lost control of that country to the Uigurs, another Turkic people; the Oguz appeared some years later in the Ili region, south of Balkhash. These Oguz (Toquz-Oguz) have been identified with the Uigurs by Gabain. They must be separated according to Barthold. The Oguz were replaced after another disaster in this vicinity by yet another Turkic people, the Karluk. The name Oguz also appears as the people from whom the Turkmens are descended. They are not the same as the Oguz of the eighth century who lived on the banks of the Ili. The Oguz ancestors of the Turkmen are reported in the tenth century by Arabic sources; they lived in the vicinity of the lower Syr-Darya under a chief Seljuk. They embraced Islam under this leader, but appear to have broken with that faith some time after his death. They then moved south.



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The latter Oguz, forerunners of the Turkmens, are held to be the descendants of earlier invaders of the area, the Hephthalites. The Hephthalites, also known as the White Huns, were a nomadic people whose language is unknown. The Hephthalites who came to the vicinity of the Amu-Darya in the fourth-fifth centuries were Turkicized by the seventh century. The descendants of the Turkicized Hephthalite-Kidarites are considered to be the Oguz. In all probability the later Oguz Turks absorbed the Hephthalites culturally and linguistically.

These various views are an oversimplification of the processes of formation of peoples as we know them. There was at this time, and in uninterrupted course down to the present day, a constant mingling of peoples and divisions of peoples. Concomitantly, languages absorbed languages; dialects differentiated and changed. The various Turkic languages and dialects appear to have come out in a strong position in Central Asia in consequence of these developments. On their northern margin they have caused certain Samoyed peoples to take on the Turkic tongue. In the southern part of Central Asia they have Turkicized certain of the Iranian peoples.

The inference from this analysis is that the peoples of Central Asia, from the earliest times down to the recent past, were not settled in fixed territorial units. They were spatially mobile, ethnic affiliation was constantly shifting, and hence the composition of the states and their external form were in a fluid situation. The system of states is not to be understood in the sense that we understand



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the term in European or American history. Above, it has been asserted (Chapter on General Character of the Society) that the states were in one sense kinship units, and in another political-territorial units. The Western man thinks of himself as homo politicus, as the civilized man, the dominant force in world history. The more primitive beings, whose world is bounded by kinship ties, are those acted upon by forces brought to bear by homo politicus. One acted upon is homo consanguineus in our conception.

The peoples of Central Asia during the past two millenia have been neither wholly one nor the other. The man of the Asiatic steppe is at once homo politicus and homo consanguineus. It is this thought which underlies the idea of one historian that the Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kazakhs were formed into state-tribal unions as late as the 16th-17th centuries. Their societies were founded upon the bond of common descent and kinship; to that structure a political hierarchy was welded. This combination created the possibility for great economic enterprises in the movement of goods from one part of the world to another, and for the dynamism of exchange within the area of Central Asia. At the same time the combination produced great processes of military conquest and political integration over many regions of the world, involving these peoples in a process of integration which reached its culmination in world empires.

## Arabs and Early Turks

The invasion by the Arabs during the seventh-eighth centuries, brought Islam to the



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Central Asian farming population, which at that time was primarily Iranian. From that time on, there has been a close although not an exclusive association between Islam and agriculture in the region. After the association of Islam and agriculture was worked out among the Iranians, it was then applied among the Turks. At the time of their appearance in Central Asia in the eighth-ninth centuries, the Turks were nomadic and opposed to Islam. Some continue to be to this day. Those who became Islamic settled down either as farming peoples or as urban dwellers. For example, the Oguz or Guz Turks, from whom the Turkmens are derived, early settled down in the valley of the Syr-Darya. They became Islamic. On the other hand, there is a long record of wars at this time between nomadic Turks and Arabs.

Some of the Oguz town sites of the early period were in swamplands near the Aral Sea. Swamp-dwellers practiced a different kind of farming from the irrigated agriculture usually associated with Central Asia. The general correlation between permanently settled population and adherence to Islam is true of the swamp-dwellers as well as of irrigation farmers in that part of the world. By and large the correlation holds true to this day.

The Turks appeared on the northern frontiers of the Byzantine empire during the first half of the first millenium A.D. The pattern of movement of these Turks is quite different from the pattern of the Turks who moved into Central Asia in the latter part of the first millenium A.D. The Turks whom the



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Byzantines encountered - the Comans or Polovtsians, the Pechenegs, and others - lived along the northern shore of the Caspian, the north Caucasus, the south Russian Steppe, and extended into the Balkans. The Turks encountered the northern frontiers of the Byzantine empire along the Black Sea coast and in the Balkans. They figured likewise in early Russian history. At first they fought the Byzantian empire and sought to make inroads into it. The Byzantine empire sought to play these "barbarians" off against each other, using Turks, Slavs and Iranian tribes as frontier guards against incursions by their cogeners. The Byzantine policies were similar to the Chinese policies of the period. The Turkic nomads of the early period also appeared in Persia as conquerors for a short time. There was a great nomadic movement from east to west during the third-fifth centuries A.D. In the middle of the sixth century A.D., there was a revolt in the Mongolian Steppes by a Turkic people, the Tölös Uigurs, against their masters who have been thought of as possibly Mongol. These latter are known from Chinese records as the Juan-Juan or Ju-Jan. The empire founded by the Tölös Uigurs was the greatest before Chingis Khan's conquests. These early invaders warred simultaneously along the borders of Byzantium, Persia and China. After a period of initial success the empire divided into a number of states.

These early Turks left little imprint on the southern parts of Central Asia; yet in the north their influence was profound. They acted on the histories of Byzantium, Russia and the Caucasus. Moreover, once in the region of



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of the northern steppes, there they remained. According to one Byzantine source, the Pechenegs (Turks) originally lived around the Volga and Yaik (Ural) rivers. Their neighbors were the Mazars (Magyars) and the Uz (Oguz Turks). The Oguz Turks drove the Pechenegs from their native land at the beginning of the tenth century. This account agrees with the Russian chronicles of the time.

With the appearance of the nomadic Turks in the ninth-tenth centuries, a pattern was established which held for the next thousand years, a pattern of close social, economic and political interaction between nomads and farmers of Central Asia. This pattern undoubtedly existed before the ninth-tenth centuries, but the record is sparse on the subject. A group of northern Iranians called Aorse or Alans, lived in the arid parts of Central Asia in the second century B.C. In the first century they moved westward and northward along a path previously followed by Scythians and Sarmatians, who were related to the Alans linguistically. Whether they were in close relations with the agricultural centers of southern Central Asia and northern Iran of the time is not clear. During this period trade across Central Asia was extensive. The Sogdians, inhabitants of an Iranian state, were the great intermediaries between China and Iran-Byzantium. According to one authority, Sogdian was the international language of Central Asia.

At this time there was a movement of ideas (religion) and of goods (the Silk Trade) across Central Asia between eastern and western



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Asia. Samarkand in the sixth and seventh centuries was a mighty center both of commercial and of spiritual enterprise. Ten trade caravans left Samarkand for China during the 20-year period 627-647.

Evidence of the movement of culture within Central Asia relates to the spiritual culture and to the movement of goods. The Manichaean religion moved from the Iranians to the Turks; Buddhism moved from India to Turkestan through the Iranian domains. The Uigur Turks adopted the Sogdian script. There was a movement of goods between the peoples involved in the common religious movements.

## The Turkic Hegemony

We may regard, then, the latter part of the first millenium B.C. through the eighth century A.D. as a formative period in the historical development of Central Asian society and culture. The following period, from the ninth century until the 15-16th is characterized by a close interrelation between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farming peoples, the creation of great political enterprises, vast movements of culture, with high development in art, philosophy, and science. In the economic sphere, agriculture was particularly well advanced, based on vast irrigation systems in the river valleys and oases of Central Asia; trade between pastoral and farming peoples flourished. Cities grew and developed great centers of learning, art forms including architecture, poetry, scientific, religious, and metaphysical thought.



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The arid interstices between the water centers were now filled with nomads. On the one hand, the Turks settled down in many instances, and joined the Iranian populations in agriculture; some of these Iranian peoples were Turkicized. On the other hand, those Turks who did not become sedentary or urbanized, remained pastoral and are so down to the present day. These movements had great consequences in the social, political, and economic life of the region.

In the political sphere, the formation of states and empires was now possible on a far greater scale than ever before. The implications of this process in social growth are readily apparent: larger social units were formed, which were more complex societies judged by the criterion of ethnic composition, and more complex likewise from the viewpoint of social structure. The formation of social classes with differentiation between ruler and ruled and with differentiation of function in the economic life, was now established on a far greater scale than previously. At the same time, a far greater measure of political stability was gained. The states of Central Asia in the early period were as a rule little more than satrapies or provinces of the Persian empire. A constantly recurring pattern is the chaotic life of the region in periods when power lay outside the area.

At the time of the Arab conquest, Central Asian political development was characterized by a number of small principalities with much instability. There was no association between church and state as there was in Islamic times.



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Trade was primarily of the great, transcontinental kind, in which the role of Central Asia lay chiefly in transport service. The internal circulation of goods between farming and herding peoples was poorly developed. The nomads were not yet present in sufficient numbers to contribute to the circulation of goods between themselves and the agricultural populations on a scale characteristic of the later period.

There is a relationship between size and density of population on the one hand and political and economic development on the other. The nomads were not sufficiently numerous, nor were they clustered in large camps at this early time. The nomadic political units were neither large nor complex.

Samarkand and Bukhara have become catchwords of affluence in commerical relations; they were great centers of wealth and power. A graphic description of the internal flow of goods in Central Asia among the cities, farmlands and grazing lands, is given in a contemporary account by Makdisi, an Arab writer of the tenth century, and by the unknown author of the Hudud al-Alam. The external trade with the Near East and with China was mentioned above.

This pattern of exchange between nomad and farmer within the area is to be differentiated from the Silk Route trade between China to the east and Iran and Byzantium to the south and west. The Silk Route promoted trade not only across the continent but within Central Asia as well, welding the surrounding countryside which supported the caravanserai into an economic unity.



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During the first millenium A.D., prior to the advent of the Turks, there was trade within the region between town-dwellers - craftsmen, artisans, and merchants - and farmers. As to the nomads, Barthold has written, "The trade with the nomads was always of great importance. ..." It is plain from the context that his reference is to the ninth century, and to the trade of the Turks with the Khorezmians, the Chinese, the Russians, and other neighboring sedentary peoples. These nomads offered livestock to be eaten, pack animals, hides, furs, and slaves in exchange for cloth and grain. Elsewhere Barthold has written of the transition of the Turkic nomads to farming. He asserts the cause to be economic necessity. By this Barthold undoubtedly means the increasing limitations on available land, because he mentions the passage of the Turks to the eastern part of Central Asia from their former lands in the north; in their new territory "...there is almost a total lack of pastures to feed the stock, and almost all the land which is not watered by canals or set aside for pasture is a sand desert as little designed for pastoralism as it is for agriculture." The viewpoint advanced by Barthold is a geographic determinist viewpoint rather than an economic one.

However, this is only a part of the picture. The Turks adopted agriculture in part; some of them remained pastoralists. The Turks who became agriculturists did so in the course of their move from eastern to Central Asia at the end of the first millenium A.D. They came from eastern Asia, the steppes north of China. Here they were in the orbit of the Chinese, who



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presented to the nomads a tremendous agricultural development with which the nomads could not compete. There was an exchange of goods between nomad and farmer in eastern Asia. Each branch of this exchange represented a great specialization of productivity covering a sub-continent in area, the Chinese on the one side, and the northern nomads, Turks and Mongols, on the other. The westward movement of the Turks at the end of the first millenium A.D. freed them from the overwhelming preponderance of Chinese in the agricultural field. The physical surroundings supported the transition to agriculture in this new area. Geographic and economic factors worked together.

Early Culture Contacts

In summing up the history of Central Asia prior to the Mongol invasion, certain new tendencies and certain recurring forces are evident. During the first millenium A.D. Islam was introduced into the southern part of the area by the Arab conquest of the indigenous Iranian population. This Iranian population, for the most part agricultural and urban, suffered another invasion toward the end of the first millenium, this time by the Turks. The Arabs left important traces: the conversion to Islam (a powerful enough contribution in itself), and a contribution to the political integration of the region. The Arabs then virtually disappeared, either leaving the country or becoming absorbed in the local population, except for a few remnants found to this day. The Turks on the other hand overwhelmed the region numerically, fighting with the Arabs and the Iranians for

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mastery of the region. The Turks, nomadic pastoralists, came over to the indigenous way of life in a significant degree, both as to religion and economy. Many Turkic groups were converted to Islam, and settled down in agricultural pursuits. The remainder established a powerful trade with the farming populations, both Iranian and Turkic, a trade pattern which dominated the economic and cultural life of the region down to the period of the Russian conquest, and the reshaping of the life there in the 19th century.

The nomadic peoples of various parts of Asia - Mongol, Turkic, Manchu - were frequently engaged in attacks upon the sedentary areas neighboring them from north China to Iran. The economic relations of herders and farmers were unstable, often broke down, and the peaceful relations of exchange gave way to warlike raids and conquests. In the event of victory by nomads over the farmers, the nomads found themselves burdened with the responsibilities of rule, but without the apparatus. At times the apparatus adopted by the nomads was ecclesiastic - Buddhist in eastern Asia, Islamic in western. But this was not always the case, for at times the civil bureaucracy of the conquered sedentary people simply went over in a body to the conquering nomads, serving them for a period, as in the case of Chingis Khan.

Placing the same matter in a different light, the normal pattern of rule in nomadic areas is an unstable one, with constantly shifting loyalties and authorities. The only stable or stabilizing pattern is the religious hierarchy,



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such as the Lamaist (Buddhist) hierarchy of Mongolia, or the Islamic. Even when the political authority of the nomads rests in secular hands, the church, whether Islamic or Buddhist, acts as a shadow state, with its own hierarchy, its own lines of communication, its own interests, its own role to play. When the political authority of the secular leaders collapses, creating the crises alluded to by Barthold, the ecclesiastic hierarchy lies ready-to-hand, acting as an integrating force, frequently taking over the exclusive secular rule for a time. The great question is: How did the ecclesiastic hierarchy fail to concretize and make durable its power? It failed because of the frequently recurring political and economic crises, the attacks by new peoples, as yet unconverted to Islam, and unintegrated into the political and economic system of Central Asia. For example, the Oguz Turks warred with Islam; the Mongols destroyed much of the farming territory of the Moslems. Thus, the very force which Barthold establishes as contributing to the power of Islam in Central Asia, acts by the same process to restrict and limit the power of the Islamic hierarchy.

The nomadic invasions of their agricultural neighbors Barthold has analyzed perceptively, even though his picture is only a partial one. The process usually began with an attack by herders. The reason was that nomads had greater need for farming products than conversely. Barthold states: "... For the farming areas of Central Asia, the trade with the nomadic Turks always had great economic significance. For the nomads these trade relations were even more necessary than for the farming population ..." To this may be added that the

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farming populations frequently were in such economic straits through political or economic causes that they could not meet the needs of the nomads. One of these causes was economic collapse through political instability. The economic strength of Central Asian agriculture rested and continues to rest on the great irrigation projects necessary in this arid part of the world. Centralization of authority and the ability to direct the building and maintenance of these great projects is a necessity. In times of political crises, the ability to direct the needed manpower to these ends was gone. Thus, agriculture fell to pieces, the needs of the nomads could not be met, and the nomads sought to fill their needs by looting and conquering where they could not do so by peaceful exchange.

The sources concerning this early time tell much about the relations of the peoples of Central Asia to their neighbors beyond the steppes, thus, about those nations interested in Central Asia. The most important sources of knowledge about the early period are the Chinese records, because the Uigur, the Kirgiz, the Oguz of the east and other Turkic peoples were in close relations either, peaceful or warlike, with the Chinese. The pre-Islamic sources in Persian are few, but possibly they have not been fully explored. The Persian sources of the Islamic period soon mounted in importance. The Byzantine records are second only to the Chinese. From this we obtain a view of the world in which the Turks of Central Asia lived, with whom they were in contact, and the type of contact, through trade or military relations, through religious conversion, and through the adoption of new patterns of life by settling down in farms and

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cities.

To the north of the Turkic world lived the Uralic peoples, speakers of languages related to the Finns and the Hungarians. Here the records are sparse, because writing came only later to the area. But contact there must have been, because words in the various languages dated from earlier epochs move from one people to another. Certain archaeological indications likewise point to a fairly close contact between the Turks and the Uralic peoples.

In this general region lived the Kipchaks. There is some lack of clarity about the Kipchaks; to the east of the Kirgiz, i.e., in southern Siberia of today, there lived at the time of the Mongol rise to power the Kimak or Kimek, a Turkic group about whom little is known. The Kipchaks were either a branch of the Kimak, or neighbors of theirs. The Kimak continued to live to the east of the Kipchak down through the Mongol invasion.

The territory of the Kipchak extended during the 12th and 13th centuries from the Emba River across the north Caucasus, the north of the Black Sea and the South Russian Steppe as far as the Dnestr River. This territory was known as the Desht-i-Kipchak, the Kipchak Steppe. To the north of the Kipchaks lay Russia and the kingdom of the Volga Bulgars, a Turkic dynasty, while to the south lay the Byzantine empire, and in the Caucasus the territories of the Cherkess or Circassians, the Alans, and the kingdom of Georgia. In Central Asia proper, the Turkmens now lived somewhat to the north of



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the present habitat; to the east of the Turkmens, the Khorezmian state occupied the lower Amu-Darya. Between the Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya, in the territory of former Mavarannahr, the Kara-Kitai had established themselves. The Kara-Kitai had moved westward from their base in Chinese Turkestan. Their territory now comprised the region of the middle Amu-Darya, north to Balkhash, then east to Chinese Turkestan.

The Kara-Kitai are known from Chinese sources as the Hsi Liao, or western Liao. The Liao dynasty of China, originating in Manchuria, established its rule over north China in the 10th-12th centuries. When this dynasty collapsed, a remnant branch established a short-lived state in the west during the period 1124-1211. Wittfogel has shown that the Kara-Kitai were originally a heterogeneous mixture of "proto-Mongol, Turkic, Tangut, and perhaps even Tungus, augmented by some Liao Chinese." The indigenous population became Turkicized, with some Iranian admixture. The record of this transformation is not clear; however, the process of making the language and culture of a political unity into a relatively homogeneous pattern is well-known in this part of the world.

The succession of invasions by the Turks established a series of states - the Uigur, the Karluk, the Kara-Khanide, the Kara-Kitai. These states warred with and replaced one another; at the same time the region between China and Persia was being transformed. The region was Turkicized; at the same time, part of the Turks became farmers or urban dwellers, while part remained nomads. Nomads and farmers engaged in mutual exchange of goods. Turks, especially



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those who had become sedentary, were converted to Islam.

The Turkization of Central Asia had proceeded far by the 13th century. A Turkic dynasty, the Khorezm-Shah, had obtained recognition as the secular power over the entirety of eastern Islam. Toward the end of the 11th century this dynasty established its rule over the Iranian world of southern Central Asia and all of Persia as far as India. At the beginning of the rule of this house, the speech of the subject people was an Iranian dialect. By the time of the Mongol invasion in the 13th century, which brought the Khorezm-Shah rule to an end, the language of everyday life was Turkic. Nevertheless, the Turks had undergone a process of acculturation in their turn. They had adopted Islam agriculture and conformed to an Iranian pattern of rule.

## The Mongol Invasion

During the 11th-13th centuries, the Oguz, the Karluks, and other Turkic peoples had settled down to a considerable degree, leaving their nomadic pastoral life for agriculture. Certain Turkic groups remained nomadic, including the Kirgiz of the Tien-Shan. Likewise, the Polovtsians of the Russian chronicles were mainly nomadic, with only limited agriculture. These last inhabited the northern steppe as far west as southern Russia. Their area was known as the Desht-i-Kipchak or the Kipchak Steppe.

In the southern parts of Central Asia the Turks had settled down. They had Turkicized


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almost the entire population of Khorezm, which until then was basically Iranian. In this period, closer trade connections developed between farmers and nomads. A growth of the Turkic urban population had taken place by then as well; the Kara-Khanide Turks (rulers of eastern Central Asia in the 11th-12th centuries) had become urbanized to a great degree, and the Oguz-Turkmen as well.

The Mongol invasion of Central Asia took place at the beginning of the 13th century. There had been military incursions and political integrations of the region by force prior to the Mongols. The Persians had established their hegemony over the southern parts of Central Asia some 1800 years before; the Turks in a series of military invasions and peaceful penetrations had established a system of states in the region during the first millenium A.D. However, the Mongol invasion was qualitatively different from the others. In fact, Barthold has written, "... The formation of the Mongol empire was an event unique in its kind in world history; neither before nor since have the agricultural countries of the Far East and of Hither Asia been united under the power of one dynasty. ..."

The Mongols are a pastoral-nomadic people, eastern neighbors of the Turks, and related to them linguistically. The two groups of peoples are bound together by membership in a common family of languages, the so-called Altaic family, by a common habitat and subsistence pattern, and by a number of common traditions. Their social structure and political organization are close to each other, both in form and content;



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their histories have followed similar, often identical paths. The great differences between the two peoples lie in the fact that the Turks early left the Chinese orbit, while the Mongols remained within it; down to the present day the Mongols' largest proportion is still within the Chinese orbit. The Turks are chiefly Moslems, the Mongols are chiefly Buddhists. The Turks have come into the Russian orbit, with the exception of the Turks of Turkey and scattered populations in Iran, Afghanistan and western China. The Turks are in a great measure sedentary; the Mongols are not.

The Mongols came out of the steppes of northern Mongolia, having first integrated the region into one great politico-military unity by conquest or alliance or ejection of their fellow tribesmen. The Mongols did not integrate all the Mongol peoples; for example, those who later came to be known as the Buryat Mongols were not part of the Mongol empire. However, the Mongols did unify the Mongolian Steppes into one polity. Many of the peoples - the Naiman, the Kereit, the Mangit - all either submitted to Chingis Khan, or were driven from Mongolia. Having mastered his native steppe country, Chingis Khan then turned to the neighboring peoples: the Kirgiz who then lived to the east on the upper Yenisei, and Uigurs to the south.

The steppe country had no obstacles to political mastery in the 13th century when Chingis Khan's reign began; the political system was quite fluid, a fact which Chingis Khan put to his advantage. With the great power of an integrated polity in the steppelands, he overrode China to the south and Central Asia to the

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west. His sons, generals, emissaries and viceroys conquered as far as the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, pierced deep into Central Europe briefly, falling back on Russia where their dynasty remained for two and a half centuries, until late in the 15th. The Mongols were driven from China in the 14th century; in Persia their rule lasted a century longer.

The impact of the Mongols upon Central Asia was viewed as a disaster by the local population. The Mongols destroyed the city of Tashkent, which remained empty until the following century; and they pillaged and ruined Samarkand and Bukhara, but did not destroy these cities. They destroyed the irrigation works of the farming regions of Central Asia; the greatest destruction of the Mongols was wrought upon the Khorezmian irrigation system. Here a desert was made of Khorezm by the Mongols; the capital, Gurgandj was destroyed; and according to the researches of Barthold, the course of the Amu-Darya was changed, so that settlements on the left bank were flooded. However, Gurgandj was not completely destroyed; it was rebuilt under the Mongols and renamed Urgench.

The writings of contemporary Islamic historians and travelers, Ibn-Yakut and Ibn-Battuta, express the hatred of the actions of the Mongols in their conquests. Ibn-Battuta wrote in the middle of the 14th century: "...Thence we traveled for a whole day [on the route from Khorezm] through a continuous series of orchards, streams, trees, and buildings, and reached the city of Bukhara. This city was formerly the



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capital of the lands beyond the Oxus [Amu-Darya]. It was destroyed by the accursed Tinkiz [Chingis] the Tatar, the ancestor of the kings of Iraq, and all but a few of its mosques, academies, and bazaars are now lying in ruins. ..." And again, "... The old town of Tirmidh [Termez, on the present Russo-Afghan frontier] was built on the bank of the Oxus, and when it was laid in ruins by Tinkis this new town was built two miles further from the river. ..."

This was the response of the farming and Islamic sector of Central Asian life to the conquests of Chingis Khan. The dynamics out of which the Mongol empire was established were molded in part by this response. This hatred is born of a terror which serves the conqueror. In a larger sense, the Mongol empire was the product of the breakdown of the relations between farmers and herders on the Asiatic steppes. The weaknesses of the farming regions, political as well as economic, created the area of the nomadic conquests. The peaceful relations had been disrupted; in part the disruption of the peaceful relations was the result of the dynastic crises of the Chinese empire. The chaotic situation in Mongolia and in Central Asia, i.e., the warring petty principalities, presented the basis for political alliance, military conquest and total integration of the Mongols. This base was the springboard for all further expansion, and was the place of retreat when the empire collapsed.

The armies of the Asiatic agricultural civilizations were different in composition from the armies of the nomadic peoples, just as



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society at large in the agricultural civilizations was different from the nomadic society, and the technology. The nomadic peoples, being of a different cultural background, did not place much value on farmland, or on an irrigation project. The nomadic armies destroyed these things; an army of an agricultural society would not.

The contributions of the Mongols to the Asiatic civilizations were considerable. The era of warring among petty states came to an end; a pax Mongolica was imposed on the eastern world. This peace was in many ways a terrible peace, but it was not the peace of a desert of ruins, which it has been called. The possibility of movement from one end of Asia to the other existed once again. Marco Polo, a Venetian merchant, traveled all the way to China across the Mongol domain; Piano Carpini and Rubruck, on behalf of Rome to the Far East. The interchange of ideas, goods, services, flowed back and forth across the map.

The empire of Chingis Khan in the 13th century introduced no new factors in these developments which had been in existence for half a millenium. But the effect of the Mongol empire was to confirm and stabilize the trends already in existence.

The empire of Chingis Khan did not survive his death in the form in which he established it. His rule extended fleetingly from the Pacific to the Black Sea and beyond. However, the concept of his empire is not to be understood in Western terms. His hegemony was



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founded not on a purely political system, but on a consanguineal-political one. The rules of inheritance within the family were applied to the rules of succession in the empire. The rule of inheritance among the steppe nomads prescribed the distribution of property in equal proportion among the sons. Barthold has described the theory of succession among the Kara-Khanides as follows: "... In the kingdom of the Kara-Khanides, as in all nomadic empires, the conception of patrimonial property was carried over from the domain of personal law to that of state law. The kingdom was considered the property of the whole family of the khan and was divided into a number of appanages. ..." Arguments against the use of the concepts of personal and state law in this connection were given above in connection with feudalism. Here we may refer exclusively to the formulation pertaining to the political-consanguineal structure of state and society. The consequence of the rule of patrimonial succession and inheritance among the Turks and Mongols was that the empire was divided among the sons. The eldest son, Juchi, ruled in Central Asia, in what had come to be known as the Desht-i-Kipchak. During the Mongol period it was known as the ulus or appanage of Juchi. On Juchi's death, the ulus was divided between his two sons, Orda and Sheiban. Sheiban's domain lay between the Syr-Darya, east to the Chu River, north to the Irtysh and west to the Ural River. It is almost identical with present-day Kazakhstan.

The Desht-i-Kipchak has been referred to as the Golden Horde, in the Western as well as the Russian literature. This appellation was not known to the Orient, however, and will not


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be used in this account. The Mongol peoples in Juchi's domain were a numerically small element. By the middle of the 13th century, the Turkic language began to replace the Mongol. One Mongol people, the Mangit, was ultimately Turkicized during the second half of the 15th century. Save for pockets of Mongols some of which are to be found in Afghanistan in the present day, the process of Turkicizing the Mongol conquerors in Central Asia was completed in the 15th century. The Mangit, who later came to be known as the Nogai by the Russians, lived in two places, between the Volga and the Don Rivers and in the valley of the lower Syr-Darya.

Of all the regimes and dynasties of Central Asian history, the Mongols supplied possibly the sole ideological expression of legitimism. The successors to Chingis Khan in his direct line of descent ruled by virtue of that descent, and were considered to be the legitimate heirs to the rulership, the loci of sovereignty. The proof of this lies in the case of Timur or Timur-i-Leng ("Timur the Lame," better known in English as Tamerlane from the play of Christopher Marlowe and other writings.) This conqueror who lived in the latter part of the 14th century and beginning of the 15th, has been fictitiously given a descent traced from Chingis Khan, possibly the work of an over-zealous biographer, of an official apologist. Timur himself did not claim to be the legitimist ruler of Central Asia, the repository of the sovereignty of Chingis Khan's house. Timur established another man, a descendant of Chingis from the line of Chagatai, as a kind of puppet ruler for a brief time.



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The descendants of Timur, however, ruled by virtue of descent from Timur, either collaterally, such as his nephew Baber, the ruler of Mogolistan (roughly modern Afghanistan and northern India) or in direct descent from him, such as Ulug-Beg, his grandson. Timur accomplished one other change in the course of his rule. The seat of sovereign authority was transferred from the nomad camp to the town, a defiance of the yasak or law of Chingis Khan, a steppe-made law which abominated town life. Despite the edicts of Chingis Khan, the move to the town was made and became permanent.

Timur's line ruled from the end of the 14th century to the beginning of the 16th century. The era produced works of beauty and also of importance to scientific advance. Architecture, astronomy, mathematics, poetry, history flourished. Uleg-Beg made contributions to astronomy in his own right, and caused a famous observatory to be built. Baber composed a historical chronicle. There was a great flowering of poetry, in which Persian was the primary literary language. However, the Chagatai Turkic developed a poetry of its own at the peak of which stood a truly great poet in the person of Mir Alishir Nevai (or Alisher Navoi).

A khan of the Sheibanide dynasty, Abul -Khair; united part of the Uzbek and Nogai tribes and conquered the Timurides in the mid-15th century.



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## The Formation of Peoples

### The Tadzhiks

In regard to the history of the Tadzhiks, two questions must be separated: first, the history of Iranian settlement in the southern parts of Central Asia, and second, the process of formation of the Tadzhik as a people. For the first question, in the record of invasions by Iranian speakers in the middle of the first millenium B.C. there is only a vague hint about the peopling of the area. However, there is good material on one part of the process. There is a record of continuous agriculture by Iranians in the vicinity of modern Leninabad (former Khodzhent) from the period of the fifth-sixth centuries A.D. down to the present time. This agricultural record pertains to the western end of the Fergana Valley, where Leninabad is situated. The second question is more complex.

The term Tadzhik as a name of a people originally designated Arabs. A Turkic inscription of the eighth century (inscription of Tonyukuk) mentions the Tözik. Between that time and the 11th century the meaning of the word had changed, and it came to designate Iranians through association of the name with the people of Islamic faith rather than Arab nationality. The beginnings of Tadzhik nationality are put further back by current Soviet theory to the era prior to the Arab invasions. According to this theory, from the seventh century on there was a development of economic and cultural relations between agricultural districts and the growth of cities. This



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development led to the ethnic unification of the region and the domination of a few. The new rulers were primarily agricultural. There was at the same time a linguistic change and unification, and a spoken language called Dari emerged, which is the direct ancestor of modern Tadzhik. This view seeks to establish the greatest possible antiquity for the Tadzhik people and their cultural distinctiveness as opposed to the Iranians generally, primarily the Persians. Moreover, this view sets the political unification of the area back to a time prior to the Arab conquest. Political unification derived from an outside force is repugnant to the Soviet historian. However, the Arabs undoubtedly contributed to the unification of the region politically, and thereby to the religious and linguistic unity. The distinctiveness of Tadzhik culture as opposed to Iranian has been discussed to date only on linguistic grounds, and no other; the linguistic question is not settled.

## The Turkmens and Kirgiz

Two modern Turkic peoples were historical entities during the period prior to the Mongol invasions. The identification of the first of these - the Turkmens - with the Oguz Turks is an oversimplification, for more than one ethnic unit is involved. The name Turkmen appears to have been first mentioned in the tenth century. This reference establishes the Turkmens far to the east of their present habitat. In the 12th century another reference to the Turkmens mentions them as a dynasty at a historically famous town, Balasagun in the region south of lake Balkhash, near the present Chinese border. There is a good

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reason to believe that Turkmens in question relate to the Karluks, a Turkic people different from the Oguz. The Karluks were distinct from the Oguz by their historical traditions, and above all by virtue of the greater degree of Iranian and hence Islamic influence upon them. From this differentiation we infer yet again the composite process in the formation of the peoples of Central Asia.

The second Turkic people of Central Asia whose existence antedates the Mongol invasions is the Kirgiz. The Kirgiz are mentioned very early in Chinese sources. Shortly before and after the time of Christ, the Kirgiz are reported to have lived in the region of the upper Yenisei River. At the same time, one of the peoples who later appear in the Kirgiz tribal union are reported by Chinese sources to have been in the Tien-Shan Mountains far to the south. Whether these two peoples are identical is as yet an unresolved question. The Kirgiz are presumed not to have been a Turkic people originally, but were later Turkicized. Besides living in the upper Yenisei and the Tien-Shan Mountains, they also inhabited the Minusinsk region of southern Siberia, practiced agriculture there and carried on a lively trade with the Chinese, a trade which continued steadily into recent centuries. Moslem trade with this region from early times on is also reported.

Over and above the origin of the Kirgiz, the name assigned to them must be clarified. During the 18th century, the Russian Cossacks who came to Siberia began to call all people who lived to the south of them Kirgiz. This designation comprised both the modern-day Kazakhs and the Kirgiz. Another Russian appellation for the

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Kirgis has been Dikokamennyi Kirgiz, Wild Mountain Kirgiz. The western Mongols (Dzungarian Kalmuks) referred to the Kirgiz as the Burut, a name not known to the Kirgiz themselves. The Chinese followed the western Mongol practice in referring to the Kirgiz. The Kirgiz name for themselves is Kirgiz. Their habitat is today, and in recent centuries has been, the vicinity of the Tien-Shan and neighboring ranges. Radlov retains the term Kirgiz as a general designation for both Kirgiz and Kazakhs, and calls the Kirgiz Kara-Kirgiz, the Kazakhs he calls the Kazak-Kirgiz.

There are reports which carry back to the ninth century, in which the Kirgiz warred with the Uigurs. This war involved the Chinese who supported the Uigurs, armed them, thereby containing the Kirgiz around the Yenisei. Here the Kirgiz remained through the Mongol period down to modern times. In the 17th century, the Russian Cossacks drove across southern Siberia, came upon the Kirgiz in the Altay Mountains, and ejected them from the area. The Kirgiz moved south, but still fought in the southern Altay in the 18th and 19th centuries. These Kirgiz may have moved south to the Tien-Shan Range, but according to Radlov it is more probable that they were dispersed among their neighbors, the Turks of the Altay and Soyon Ranges. A small number went over to the Kazakhs. In this view it is possible that some of the Kirgiz of the Tien-Shan came from the north, but if so, there is no trace of the migration in the popular traditions. Radlov's conjecture is that the Kirgiz of the Yenisei are identical with the Hakas of Chinese reports, part of whom fled to the Tien-Shan in the tenth century A.D. The rest of the Kirgiz mixed with other Turks of the region. This mixing may

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explain the fact that many clan names are apparently shared today by the Kirgiz and the Altay Turks.

The wars of the Kirgiz and the Uigurs are well attested. The Kirgiz figure in the early campaigns of the Mongols, that is, in the 13th century. However, there are no reports concerning Kirgiz in the later part of the Mongol dynasty, i.e., in the 14th and 15th centuries. The historical course of the Kirgiz is taken up once again in the 16th century, but this time in their present, more southerly habitat, the Tien-Shan. The gap between the early, northern Kirgiz and the later, southern Kirgiz has not been filled in. It may be that the two peoples are not identical, that two different Turkic peoples have seized upon the same name. The process has occurred often enough to be conceivable in this case. In the more recent aspect of Kirgiz history, the possibility of the Cossacks having driven the Kirgiz southward, Radlov has failed to mention the overwhelming importance of the Dzungarian Kalmuks or Oirats in the 17th century. The tradition of the Oirat conquests is alive in the 20th century among the inhabitants of the Altay, and is historically attested. The Oirats were undoubtedly more vital a force than the Cossacks of the 17th century. The Dzungarian Kalmuks even drove the Kirgiz out of the Tien-Shan mountains to the Fergana Valley, and the Kirgiz did not return in strength until the latter part of the 18th century, following the definitive collapse of the Dzungarian power.

It is important to bear in mind that many Turkic groups have drawn upon a common reservoir of group names and the same name may appear



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among unrelated groups. This is presumably true of the Kirgiz, and is certainly true of the Oguz Turks who appear both in the history of the Turkmens and in a totally different context in Turkic history as well. Perhaps the best instance of this is in the name of the Uigurs, a group of relatively small number in southeastern Kazakhstan and Chinese Turkestan today. Thus, in the history of Central Asia of the past two thousand years, at least three different groups have been known as Uigurs, and no demonstrable connection has been shown to link them.

The common fund of group names upon which these peoples draw affirms the consciousness of a cultural tradition among these different peoples. The common tradition makes them a cultural and historical unity despite the fact that only at intervals have they been unified under one ruler, or shared other institutional or organizational bonds. A group in the process of formation draws upon the common fund, identifying itself with some name of the past, revered, honored or otherwise valued. The name in question may be that of a previous group, or of a hero or king. All these various peoples are either demonstrably or putatively descendants of a common ancestor, and hence are consanguineal groups. The Kirgiz claim common descent from a single ancestor - a red dog. Coupled with this myth of origin is the popular etymology of their name and a myth related to it. According to this myth, the Kirgiz claim descent from 40 maidens (kirk - 40, kyz - maidens); hence the name, Kirk-Kyz, or Kirgiz.



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The Uzbeks and the Kazakhs

At the end of the 15th century, the Uzbeks were formed as an ethnic unit. Their origin is complex. The term Uzbek as the name of a people was applied as early as the latter part of the 14th century to the Turkic and Turkicized peoples in the eastern part of the Desht-i-Kipchak. There was a Khan Uzbek (1312-1342). Beyond that the origin of the term is unclear.

The present-day meaning of the term is broader. It includes:

1. Turks of the Kipchak Steppe who came in the 14th-15th centuries to the region between the Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya, a region known as Mavarannahr or Transoxania (Oxus-Amu-Darya).

2. Turkic and Turkicized Mongol tribes already living there.

3. Older Iranian peoples.

Chingis Khan's eldest son, Juchi, had received his ulus or domain in the Kipchak Steppe. The second son of the emperor was Chagatai, who received the territory to the south, around Samarkand, Bukhara, and the territory to the east, including modern Chinese Turkestan. The nomads in these territories were sedentarized in part and mingled with those mentioned above forming the Uzbek people.

The Uzbeks today are primarily an agricultural people. They are composed of a few


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elements of age-old agricultural populations. However, the majority of the peoples who entered into the ultimate composition of the Uzbeks were pastoralists.

The Kazakhs were formed as a people in the middle of the 15th century in the process of disintegration of the uluses of Juchi and Chagatai. They took or were given the name of the peoples active far to the west. The peoples of Central Asia who came to be known as Kazakhs emerged out of the chaotic conditions of wars between principalities. They established themselves in their pastures in the eastern part of the ulus of Chagatai. From the beginning of their history they were numerically strong, counting over one million in the third quarter of the 15th century. (This figure is only an order of magnitude; precision is out of the question). They were united at first under Kasym Khan, who traced descent in the junior line to Chingis Khan. His father, Djanibek, was the younger brother of Girei or Kerei. The Kazakhs soon broke into warring groups after the death of Kasym Khan. Unlike the Uzbeks they have remained primarily nomadic pastoralists and did not take up agriculture as part of their traditional economy prior to Russian contact.

The Kazakhs were formed as a people during the same period as the Uzbeks, i.e., in the later years of the Mongol rule. Like the Uzbeks, their mixed origin is affirmed by historical tradition. According to Veliaminov-Zernov, the word Kazakh means simply Turk, a Turk who had gone over to the service of the Russians. This, then, was the usage in the records of events around the year 1471. Barthold has written that the term Kazakh designated groups of nomads separated from their


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clans, who had turned to plundering. The first mention of the term is apparently in the chronicle of the Russian city of Pskov at the time when the Kazakhs came to the aid of the city against the Tatars.

With the decline of the uluses of Juchi and Chagatai, an interregnum of chaotic conditions arose in Central Asia, and the freebooters such as the Kazakhs were one expression of these chaotic conditions. According to the traditions of the 19th century Kazakhs, however, a more unitary picture of their ancestry is presented. The Kazakhs have regularized their descent, claiming a single great founding ancestor, Alach or Alash. This Alash tradition has had a crucial role in events of the 20th century.

The various Turkic peoples have had a passion for genealogy whereby they express a fictitious consanguineal unity of all their congeners. A tradition recorded in the 19th century from a judge (bii) of the Kazakhs traces 55 generations from Adam to Abul-Khair, the first khan of the Kazakhs (a figure different from the founder or ancestor of the Kazakhs in the genealogy mentioned above. Another genealogy, that of the Karakalpaks, purports to unite the Turkmens, the Uzbeks, the Karakalpaks, and the Kazakhs. This genealogy is shown in the following diagram:



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




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These genealogies supply a common base for the social organization of the people. Without the sense of a common territory, of a united polity or leadership, they have only their consanguineal bonds to unite them. The consanguineal bonds, traced through genealogies over many generations, provide a foundation for a polity of sorts, a polity which is different from that of the west.

The genealogies do not all agree with each other. They are used to make a point of interest and utility to the individual or group which draws them up. They assert membership in a descent line, rights inherent in the line, and so forth. A genealogy of the Kazakh leadership asserts the rights of the khans of the Kazakhs to rule by virtue of their descent in a direct line from Chingis Khan. This is, on the face of it absurd, because the Kazakhs were not a social group at the time of Chingis Khan. They are a people of later and mixed origin. Their common descent from Alash and the genealogy tracing it is fiction. The descent of their rulers from Chingis Khan is perhaps also a fiction. But even if they are fictions, they are important. Descent, whether fictional or actual, is a vital matter, for it supplies a basis for the structure of the society and defines the place for the individual within it.

## The Karakalpaks

The Karakalpaks appeared in the basin of the Syr-Darya during the 16th century. Their origin is unclear, but according to one account they originated among the Nogai Turks, moving from the lower Volga to the Ural (Yaik) River,


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then to the Emba, and still in a southeasterly direction arrived on the Syr-Darya and the southeast shore of the Aral Sea. There they remained all the way through the 17th century. Their own tradition traces their origin from the Nogai. However, one tale of theirs places them along the middle Volga in the 16th century. A people called the Chernye Klobuki, "Black Hats" is mentioned in the Russian chronicles of the 12th and 13th centuries. These medieval Karakalpaks are sometimes identified with the modern ones. The connection between the two has been questioned, however, and must be set aside until more definitive evidence is forthcoming. This point is of more general interest, for, regardless of which Turkic people is involved, the fact remains that a close connection between Russians and Turks existed in the Middle Ages. And if it proves that the two Karakalpak peoples are not directly connected, then we have one more instance of a general name at the disposal of Turkdom being revived by a later Turkic people.

The Karakalpaks had a modest agricultural development on the Syr-Darya in the 17th century, a development which was of necessity irrigated agriculture. The nature of their trade with Bukhara, Khiva, and the Uzbek settlements in Khiva (Khorezm) indicates that the Karakalpaks were primarily pastoral. They served as middlemen in the economic exchanges between Kazakhs and Uzbeks in the area, buying Kazakh livestock for resale to the Uzbeks and selling grain in turn to the Kazakhs.

In the first quarter of the 18th century the Karakalpaks began their move to Khiva, i.e.,

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the lower Amu-Darya, where their principal settlements are to this day. The motivation for this move lay in the Kazakh-Oirat wars of the period, because of which the Karakalpaks sought the protection of the Khivan Khanate in a parallel manner to the protection sought by Kazakhs of the Little Horde under Khan Bukei among the Russians. Some Karakalpaks also moved to the Bukei Horde district, possibly for the same reasons.

The Karakalpaks continued to move to Khiva during the 19th century for natural and for economic reasons. The bed of the Amu-Darya is mobile. In the course of one of the shifts in the channel of the river, the Karakalpak irrigation system in the middle of the Amu-Darya was destroyed, and they therefore sought land in Khiva. Moreover, they were dissatisfied with their economic lot under the Bukharans and revolted several times against the tribute collection (in 1827 and in 1855-56). They were now definitely agricultural.

With the establishment of the Karakalpaks in the lower Amu-Darya, the last of the principal indigenous peoples arrived in their present location, and undertook the occupations which are their primary concern today.

## The Transition Period: 16-18th Centuries

From the 16th century onward, the framework of the modern period was established. The present-day indigenous peoples of Central Asia were formed as ethnic - and, in certain cases, political - unities, and came to occupy

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the areas which they occupy today. In the north of Central Asia, the Kazakhs occupied the range-lands or steppes north of the Caspian Sea, as far as the Dzungarian border, the former Kipchak Steppe. The Uzbeks occupied at this time the former territories of Mavarranahr and Khorezm, that is, the lower Amu-Darya, the Zeravshan and Fergana valleys, as well as the oasis of Tashkent. The Kazakhs had no cities, save those which they occupied by invading the Uzbek khanates. The Uzbeks had become urban and agricultural; their centers were the former great cities of Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent. To the east were the Kirgiz in the Tien-Shan and Pamir Ranges. To the south were the Tadzhiks. To the southwest were the Turkmen, at that early time living somewhat to the north of their present territory.

The Uzbeks of the 16th century were led by Khan Sheibani to their present territory. Sheibani Khan conquered the best pastures of the region - the Zeravshan, the Kashka-Darya, the Surkhan-Darya, the left bank of the Amu-Darya. Farming declined, and many Tadzhiks fled to the mountains, dwelling in regions considered too poor for the conquerors. Local Turkic nomads gradually merged with the conquerors, joining already existent kinship units or forming new ones within the tribal and clan composition of the Uzbeks. In the process of formation of their nationality, the Uzbeks were settling down as farmers. Three types of communities were distinguished at this time according to whether they were nomadic or sedentary: diknishin, settled population; sakhranishin, nomadic population; kishlakhnishin, nomadic people in the process of settling down. The kishlaknishin


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transformed the winter camp of the nomads (kishlak) into a place of permanent settlement.

The locus of power now lay outside Central Asia - in China, Persia, Turkey and Russia; Central Asia was divided into a number of principalities frequently at war with each other. The Timuride line had been the last integral political structure in the region.

During the 16th century the overland route from Europe and the Near East to China fell into disuse. The age of discovery had opened trade routes over the oceans of the world that brought about the movement of goods from east to west and back in ships. Moreover, the New World now occupied a major share of the attention of the European merchants. Nevertheless companies were formed to engage in trade between western Europe and Russia, and via Russia with Central Asia. A trade mission, quasi-diplomatic, quasi-commercial, set out from England during the latter part of the 16th century under the direction of Anthony Kenkinson. The purpose of this mission was to explore and develop trade with Russia and the lands of Central Asia. Jenkinson and his companions visited the various countries and prepared reports on the possibilities of commerce between them and England, reports which are revealing of the economic, political, and social conditions of the countries which he was interested in.

However, these and similar missions could do nothing to stimulate the trade which Central Asia had lost to the sea lanes.



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During the same period Russia was establishing itself as a power. In 1480, Russia ceased all tributary relationships with the Mongol-Tatar empire, the last vestige of which was the Kipchak or Golden Horde. Under Ivan the Terrible (Ivan IV), the Russian empire expanded eastward and southward, gradually absorbing former Turkic lands and shaping the form of European Russia as it is known today. While the Russians did not invade beyond the Volga and the Caspian, nevertheless they exerted a great influence on the affairs of Central Asia by presenting a rising power in the area, restricting the movement of peoples who had formerly nomadized in lands now seized by the agricultural Russians, and by heightening trade connections with Central Asia.

A secondary political development of the Mongols arose at the very beginning of the 15th century, after the decline of the empire of Chingis Khan. This secondary political development may be so-called only in the light of later developments; at the time it was important. This is the Oirat or Dzungarian Federation, a union of western Mongol peoples, the Kalmuks who lived in Dzungaria, the area between Mongolia and Central Asia. A part of the Oirat Federation gradually moved west, part moved south. The existence of the Federation was first noted in the years 1399-1408. The southerly dynamics caused an attack in 1430 on the Kirgiz in the vicinity of Lake Issyk-Kul; an attack in 1447 on the nascent Uzbek Federation in the vicinity of the Syr-Darya. In 1459 the Oirats sent an embassy south to Herat. There then followed a temporary decline in Oirat power.


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In 1522-1524, Rashid-Khan, a descendant of the Chagatai state, defeated the Oirats. The westerly drive caused raids at the beginning of the 17th century on the town of Tarsky and Tyumen in southwestern Siberia. In 1630 the Oirats appeared on the lower Volga, where they have remained down to the 20th century.

Above all the Oirats contested with the Kazakhs for control of the steppeland in the north of what is today Kazakhstan. Intermittently these wars were fought from the very beginning of the histories of these two peoples down to the mid-18th century. At this time Russian power exerted itself definitively in the west over a part of the Kazakhs, and Chinese power finally crushed the Oirats in the east. The Kazakh-Kalmuk wars were wars for political domination, for control of the Central Asian pasture lands, and for control of trade with the agricultural areas, that is, with the cities through which this trade was funnelled: Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent, Khiva. Cities were often ruined in the course of these wars. Samarkand was deserted during the years 1723-1730 on account of wars, and Khiva at the same time was reduced in population to 40 families.

During this entire period, the Kazakhs and Kalmuks remained nomads, that is, raisers of sheep, goats, horses, cattle and camels. The Kirgiz were similarly engaged. The Uzbeks at the beginning of the 16th century appeared in Khiva as pastoral nomads. Indeed, even in 1558 Jenkinson reported that the Uzbeks had only meat and no grain, in their subsistence base. However, at the beginning of the 17th century,



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according to Abulgazi, Uzbeks already had begun to practice irrigation. Thus in the matter of one century they had become transformed from a people based on pastoralism to a primarily agricultural people.

In terms of political development, this was an era of great internal rifts. The Uzbek Khanate had no fixed form during the 16th century; there was a constant expansion and contraction among the principalities founded in the domain of Khan Sheibani's rule. This domain covered the region approximately coincident with Uzbekistan today: from the delta of the Amu-Darya (Khiva or Khorezm) to the Fergana Valley, inclusive. The consanguineal base upon which these principalities were formed underwent a certain transformation, but not a uniform one. Thus in Khiva, the idea of blood relationship lasted longer and exerted a more powerful influence upon the social matrix than it did in Bukhara. Consistently, however, the Uzbeks had less of a role for blood relationship than did the Kazakhs in the formation of political units. The transition of the Uzbeks from herding to farming is directly related to the diminution of the role of consanguinity in the formation of their principalities.

The Kazakhs soon after the death of their first historically attested khan, Kasym, divided into three main divisions or Hordes: the Great Horde, the Middle Horde, and the Little Horde. (The term "horde" is originally a Mongol or Turkic word for the court of a prince or khan. The Kazakhs did not use this word, which in its form among the peoples of the steppes is orda;



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they called each of the divisions yűz or jűz, literally "hundred," thus ulu jűz, meaning "great hundred," orta jűz, "middle hundred," and kshi jűz, "little hundred.") The Kazakhs never were integrated under one firm rule, save for a brief period at the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th century under their great Khan Tevke or Tauka. However, the union of the Kazakhs which he formed did not survive his death.

The Kazakhs of the different hordes did not have fixed boundaries. In general, however, they were distributed as follows: the Little Horde was the northwesternmost, occupying the steppes north and west of the Aral Sea. The Middle Horde was in the center, occupying the steppes east of the Little Horde and north and east of the Aral Sea. The Great Horde was the easternmost, occupying the steppes east of the Aral Sea to the Chinese border. The pattern of Russian expansion was such that the hordes were absorbed into the Russian empire according to their proximity to European Russia, not to Siberia. Thus the Little Horde was absorbed first, the Great Horde last.

The political unions of the Kazakhs, the hordes and their subdivisions, were units of common descent and consanguineal relationship. The explanation of the political dynamics of kinship, how a political unit with a sharp cleavage between ruler and ruled was based upon kinship, is a problem which will be analyzed in the chapter on Social Structure. The correlation between nomadism and consanguinity is clear. The Turkmens, the Kirgiz and the Altay Turks,



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all fundamentally nomadic, likewise based their social organization on consanguinity. The Mountain Tadzhiks, too, were based primarily upon kinship units in their social structure. The urban populations were furthest from the bonds of consanguinity in their organization, the nomads most completely involved in consanguinity, the farmers of Central Asia midway between. Lacking in the organization of the Kirgiz and the Altay Turks, and lacking among the Tadzhiks as well, was a clearly developed aristocracy of blood. The Turkmen aristocracy was but weakly developed. The highly centralized and stratified political systems of Central Asia in the post-Mongol period were developed solely by the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs - and by the Dzungarian Kalmuks. Only among these peoples of all the societies of Central Asia was there developed an aristocracy based upon descent and ties of blood.

The Kazakhs extended their control southward as far as the northern limits of Uzbek agriculture. In the southeastern part of their domain they encountered the Uzbeks in the neighborhood of Tashkent; the southern boundary of the Kazakhs in this area is the valley of the Angren, just north of Tashkent, first established in the 16th century and still noted in the 20th. Further west, the frontier between Kazakhs and Uzbeks is marked by the northern limits of irrigated agriculture in the Syr-Darya Valley and in Khorezm (the Amu-Darya Delta).

Except for a brief period of ascendancy by the Dzungarian Oirats and their occupation of the region around Tashkent at the beginning of



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the 18th century, the power in the area passed from the Uzbeks to the Kazakhs and returned during the 16th-19th centuries. At the beginning of the 19th century, part of the Kazakhs were subject to Tashkent, i.e., to the Uzbeks. These were Kazakhs of the Great Horde. At this time, however, Russian power had asserted itself in the north of the Central Asian steppes. The Kazakhs traded with the Chinese in the east, with the Uzbeks in the south of their area, and with the Russians in the north.

Islamic Law and Land Tenure

The development of Islam in the transition period, was held in the main to the urban and agricultural areas of Central Asia. Among the spiritual orders of Islam, the dervishes had a large following and an important role here. The order of the dervishes of Central Asia originally began in the reign of Timur. The dervishes in the 17th century had considerable power; however, they acted as a restrictive force in the development of other sources of power rather than as a self-developing and integral movement. One sheikh of the dervish orders led a revolt against the Persian rule which had been established by force of arms over Khorezm at the beginning of the 17th century. Another leader of the dervishes incited a revolt of the people against the Uzbek aristocracy some years after the earlier, successful revolt against the Persian rule.

The clergy at this time amassed great wealth and a strong economic position, albeit not for the first time in history. In the latter


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part of the 12th century the Islamic clergy had important landholdings around Bukhara, and in the middle of the 16th century it achieved a strong economic position based on landholdings and water control. The land and water controlling clergy were known as the Djuybari sheikhs. The analysis of their role and the source of their economic power will shed light on the system of rule of the Uzbek khanates in this period and in later times down to the Russian conquest.

In Bukhara of the 16th century, the state or treasury lands were called memleke-i-padshahi or simply memleke. They are the same as the divan lands of the Middle Ages. The ultimate owner of these lands from the juridical point of view was the chief of state or khan. This person, according to Moslem law, was the representative of Allah on earth. Those who dwelled on the memleke land, who worked it and enjoyed its produce could only be considered as lessees or rentors of the land. They had rights to the land only in their lifetimes. They could not bequeath it, transfer it, or establish it as wakf. (A wakf is a religious endowment of any kind, under Islamic law. The property established for a religious purpose by this endowment may not be further divided, sold or assigned. It is a property of the religious community, and no longer of the secular. It differs from the Djuybari lands; Djuybari sheiks held land of the secular power, at least in theory.) The memleke lands gradually lost their specific nature, and were considered to be permently assigned to the religious community, the Djuybari sheikhs in this case.

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Not all the land belonged to the crown. Private property in land was an important part of the total landholdings. There were during the 16th-19th century period a number of forms of private property in land. Private property in land and in other real forms is known as milk in Islamic law. This term governs the landholding system in Central Asia as well. The milk land is divided into various categories by the kind of taxes assessed on them. The chief kinds are: ushr, or tithe land, theoretically the land divided among the Moslem conquerors of Central Asia, taxed at one-tenth of the return annually; kharadj or ordinary private land, taxed at one-seventh to one-half of the annual return; and finally, land freed from tax at the time of its creation.

Meyendorf, who traveled in Bukhara early in the 19th century, gives the following classification of property in land:

1. State lands.
2. Kharadj lands ceded to individuals by the state for a fee.
3. Fiefs assigned for military service.
4. Milk, or private property in land.
5. Wakf, or pious donations.

This agrees in the main with the analysis by Schuyler a half-century later. However, Schuyler classified the land tenure not only by types of owner or method of acquisition, but also by the kind of tax due, if any, placed upon the owner.



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Schuyler has given an account of other forms of landholding by private persons. He has distinguished land in the public domain which, if held by a private person, is held by him at will, passing to the male descendants; dead or waste lands which can be turned into milk land by anyone who "revivifies" it, i.e., irrigates it with the government's consent. Reclamation must take place within three years after the time of initial occupancy, or the right of property is lost. Abandoned land is yet another category, that is, land which is given over to public uses such as roads, streets or pasture of an entire village. Wakf land has been mentioned above as land bequeathed in perpetuity by either the state or an individual for a religious purpose.

Although these categories of land-holding are clear, and both the local practice of Central Asia as well as the theory of Islamic law agreed on them, the Russians in the 19th century held that the state holdings covered a wider area. The Russians proclaimed that lands belonged to the state: (1) if the origin of the property was by conquest or by reclamation; (2) if there were no heirs; (3) in certain other cases where the enjoyment of the land was restricted. Lands held in these ways were reduced to a form of state tenancy. These proposals were founded on a misconception of the forms of ownership of property in land in Central Asia, whereby the state was conceived as having a wider role than it had in fact.

The property of the religious community was of several kinds, two of which have been mentioned: the Djuybari lands, those lands which

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were memleke in origin, i.e., lands held of the state; and wakf lands assigned to the religious community, although the direction or management of the property might remain in lay hands as a trust.

A distinction was made between crown lands, i.e., the personal property of the ruler, and state lands, the property of the state and public treasury, such as was made by the Russians to the west and the Mongols to the east. The khan had under him a series of begs, rulers of provinces. The begs effectively had all the land divided among them, aside from the actual place of residence or capital of the khan. The khan, aside from owning and assigning all the land of his khanate, in theory also owned specific properties in the various begships of his domain, properties which contributed to his support and that of his court. The state was supported by taxes levied in the various begships and transmitted to the state treasury by the khan's ministers; this is a different form of property from the lands personally held and administered by the khans.

This theory holds for the agricultural lands of Central Asia. A parallel distinction between crown property and state property exists among the herders of Central Asia.

Among the societies not fully transformed from pastoral to agricultural in Central Asia, the various forms of private property in land were not distinctive. Private property in land was clearly defined only among the agricultural peoples. Thus the Turkmens, still partly nomadic, identified milk property as communal

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(tribal or clan) land. Individual ownership was not conceived by the Turkmens.

The irrigation works were handled in a manner similarly to the land. Just as there were taxes on the land, there was a corvée levied for maintenace of the irrigation canals. This tax in labor was levied only on the main or khan's canals, and was not levied on canals of purely local significance. This followed from the general differentiation of three kinds of irrigation works: (1) the state or large canals; (2) middle-sized or communal canals; (3) small or private canals.

## The Russian Conquest

The Russian contact and relations with Central Asia are of recent origin historically. However, the relations of the Eastern Slavs, among whom the Russians are counted, with the peoples emanating from Central Asia dates back to the earliest times. The Scythian and the Alans, Iranian peoples of classical antiquity, either migrated from Central Asia to the south Russian steppes, or else they occupied both regions at the same time. The Eastern Slavs encountered the northern Iranians and their descendants during Byzantine times. During the first millenium A.D. the Turkic Pechenegs and Polovtsians (Kipchak or Koman) also made their appearance on the south Russian steppes.

Another eastern state, the Khazar Kingdom ruled by a Turkic dynasty, was settled on the trade route along the Volga, southeast of the Russian area. To the east was the


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kingdom of Bulgars, a people whose language and culture is related to the Turkic. The Russians expanded into the area of the Bulgars only in the 13th century (The Bulgars, originally an Altaic-speaking people close to the Turkic and modern Chuvash, later gave their name to a Slavic nation and culture, the Bulgarian.), moving down the Volga to the cities on the middle Volga. Here the Russians founded the latterly famous trade city of Nizhni-Novgorod (Gorkii).

Throughout the course of their history, the Russians have been in close contact with cultures whose roots are wholly or partly in Central Asia. The Russians have expanded into area of what is today eastern and southeastern Russia at the expense of the Turks and Iranians. And in the last two centuries the Russians have established themselves in Central Asia, where the Iranian and Turkic peoples form the most important indigenous populations.

The contact between Russia and Central Asia was constant but ever shifting. The ascendancy at first lay in the east, but moved west. The Russians established their rule over parts of their present domain in the eastern and southern parts of European Russia at the end of the first millenium A.D. and continued to expand, with some setbacks, down to the Mongol invasion at the beginning of the 13th century. The Mongol and Turkic hegemony was imposed for two and one-half centuries; the Russians then freed themselves at the end of the 15th, and at that point began an expansionist drive which was maintained until the ultimate formal incorporation of the area by Russia in


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in 1920-1922.

Because of the long and close contact, the Russians have considered the history of the Turkic peoples both in Russia and in Central Asia deeply involved with their own.

During the 16th-17th centuries the trade in goods and slaves between Russia and Central Asia was remunerative. Involved in the trade were glass and mirrors from England; furs, leather, wooden utensils and knives from Russia and Siberia; horses and cloth of silk and cotton as primary exchanges from Central Asia, which also shipped musk, roots and herbs, and aromatic substances; finally slaves from Persia and Circassia.

During the reign of Peter the Great the Russians were westward in their orientation. The movement to Central Asia and Siberia was slowed. After Peter's death, the eastward movement was resumed. The Cossacks had been established in fortified points in the south Urals at the beginning of the 18th century; Orenburg, the chief of these forts, and eventually the center of Russian rule in the northern steppes, was built in 1734. The Kazakhs of the Little Horde, those closest to Russia geographically, played a mixed game, applying to the Russians for alliance and support, and warring with them. The khan of the Little Horde in the mid-18th century, Abul-Khair, sent a mission to the Russians in 1730, and moved closer to the Russian border of the time (roughly on a line from the south Urals to the Caspian). However, the Little Horde during this period also warred with the Russians, and only in 1748


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did it petition Russia, this time as tributary.

At the same time the Kazakhs of the Great Horde allied themselves with the Dzungarian Kalmuks under Amursana against the Chinese in the 1750s. However, the alliance was forced upon them, and they withdrew as soon as Amursana suffered his ultimate defeat at the hands of the Chinese.

Between 1630 and 1771 the Volga Kalmuks occupied the steppes in the south of Russia on the left and right banks of the Volga. Their lands included the rich steppelands between the Ural and Volga Rivers. The Kalmuks had determined to return to China in 1771. Only those on the left bank made the move; those on the right remained behind because the Volga broke up its winter freeze at the time of the move. The Kalmuks on the left bank suffered overwhelming losses across the Kazakh Steppe. As a result of their flight, however, the steppe east of the Volga and west of the Ural River was empty. At the end of the 18th century, a portion of the Little Horde of the Kazakhs applied to the Russians for permission to move to the steppes between the Volga and the Ural Rivers, i.e., to cross the Cossack line. This permission was granted, and a small group of Kazakhs of the Little Horde under their chief, Khan Bukei, occupied the abandoned steppe. This group came to be known as the Inner Horde or the Bukei Horde, Inner because of its position relative to the Cossack Ural River line.

The advance of Russia across Central Asia was slow and sporadic. In this it contrasts with Russia's advance across Siberia.



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Russia had established its control over Siberia, with the exception of the Amur River Basin and the Maritime Provinces of the Pacific, in the mid-17th century during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich. Kamchatka was added in the early 18th century, during the reign of Peter the Great.

The advance into Central Asia did not begin until after Peter's death. The Cossack lines were established along the Ural River in 1734, and at the same time went across southern Siberia at the latitude of Omsk to the Irtysh River. Russia did not advance into the Kazakh Steppe, but remained north of the Irtysh.

In 1745, a Cossack line was established along the Emba River, and included all of northern Kazakhstan, comprising within it the northern and western steppes of the Middle Horde. There then followed a hiatus of more than a century in the Russian advance.

In 1863, the Russians took over the steppe northeast of the Caspian, reached the Aral Sea and established themselves along the lower Syr-Darya, along the Chu River as far as Lake Issyk-Kul, and the Chinese border. This formed the Steppe Province or the Kirgiz (Kray).

During the 1860s and 1870s much of Turkestan was conquered by the Russians or ceded by agreement with the Chinese. The Trans-Caspian region up to, but not including, the Kopet-Dag Range; the ancient district of Trans-Oxania (the region between the Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya); the districts of Tashkent, of Samarkand and the Zeravshan Valley, Kokand and

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the Fergana Valley, and the western Tien-Shan Range to the Chinese border - were all embraced within the Russian empire.

At that point the Russians moved more slowly. The Chinese were torn with internal strife and presented no obstacle to the Russian advance, but the British had established themselves in the northwest frontier provinces of India and had expressed an interest in Afghanistan. The power of the Central Asian peoples themselves was insufficient to block Russia, but the British were another matter. In consequence, the Russians reached the Pamirs only in the 1890s, and the corridor of the Wakhan Valley was maintained between themselves and then-British India. This corridor, in Afghanistan, has remained to the present day, making that country contiguous to China, and separating Kashmir from Soviet Tadzhikistan.

The British felt that the Russians should not establish themselves at Merv (present Mary), still less at Serakhs and the present Iranian-Afghan frontier. However, the British could not prevent the acquisition by Russia of the Akhal Oasis (southern Turkmenia), nor of the Tedzhen and Murgab Valleys. But Russia did not feel free to acquire outright the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara. These lands were recognized as spheres of Russian influence, but they were not actually acquired until the first years of Soviet rule, when British influence in the area was at a low point and the Russians were caught up in the victory of the Revolution.

The railroad politics is indicative of the balance of power in the area. The conquests

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of Central Asia required force of arms in the Turkmen domain, perhaps to a greater extent than in any other. In the course of the Russian campaigns in the 1870s and 1880s, the conception of a railroad as an adjunct in military supply was applied by the Russians. Railroads as logistic supply routes were well understood in military thinking of the time; their utility had been demonstrated in the American Civil War. Soon after the reduction of Turkmen opposition the Russians extended the railroad and, by the end of the 19th century, had linked the Caspian port of Krasnovodsk with the Merv (Mary) Oasis, Bukhara, Samarkand and the Zeravshan Valley, and the Fergana Valley. A line following the Murgab River was sent from the Merv Oasis south to the Russian outpost of Kushka on the Afghan border. Another line was built north to Tashkent.

During the first years of the 20th century, prior to the Revolution, a line was constructed from Orenburg (now Chkalov) in the southern Ural Mountains to Tashkent, thus connecting Central Asia by rail with Russia. In the northwest, a line was sent from Saratov on the Volga to Uralsk on the Ural River; and in the northeast, the first link in the future Turk-Sib (Turkestan-Siberia) line was built, from Novosibirsk to Semipalatinsk. All the railroads were single-track, as they are to this day.

There is little doubt that the primary initiative in building these railroads came from the military, who conceived of the railroad net as a means of control by integrating the region, defending it, and pacifying it internally. On the other hand, the railroad stimulated trade.


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It was recognized that the rich oases and river valleys were potential sources of economic exploitation. The first railroads connected the Kopet-Dag Oasis, the Merv (Mary) Oasis, the Zeravshan Valley, the Tashkent Oasis and the Fergana Valley with European Russia. The Kopet-Dag or Akhal Oasis is a narrow irrigated agricultural belt fed by mountain run-offs on the northern slopes of the Kopet-Dag, a low-lying chain on the Turkmenian-Iranian border. The Merv Oasis is formed by the Murgab River in the southeastern part of Turkmenia. The Zeravshan Valley is known by its cities of Samarkand and Bukhara; the Tashkent and Fergana water systems are well-known as such. The Caspian port of Krasnovodsk permitted Central Asian commerce to pass over the Caspian to Baku, Astrakhan and Russia beyond. With the opening of the line from Orenburg (Chkalov) to Tashkent, an overland route direct to Russia was established, avoiding the cost of trans-shipment. Above all, the eastern districts of Turkestan were integrated more closely with Russia proper: Tashkent, the Fergana Valley, the Pamirs and the Tien-Shan.

The growth of trade was rapid. In 1893 no commodities moved by rail; in 1897 the total movement of commodities, including imports, exports and intermediate traffic, was 250,000 tons; in 1909 the commodity traffic exceeded 1,250,000 tons. The principal commodities moved in 1909 were raw cotton and cotton seed, and wheat and wheat flour. Raw cotton and cotton seed were over 25 per cent of the total commodity traffic; wheat and wheat flour were over 16 per cent.

The first railroad building, in the



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1870s, was directly in conjunction with military conquest. The line from Krasnovodsk to Merv was built after the cession of Merv to the Russians in 1884. The line from Merv to Bukhara went through territory not formally Russian, but conceded by the British to be a Russian sphere of influence. This formality is an index of the relationship of forces: the British were powerless to stop the Russians entirely; but the Russians did not want to go too far in challenging the British. The power - political, military or economic - of the "independent" Central Asian states of Khiva and Bukhara was a negligible quantity and was disgarded by the Europeans.

Local Counter-Movements: Wars and Rebellions

The advance of Russia into Central Asia gained accelerating force in the 19th century. While Russia could move almost at will in view of her superior numerical strength, technological achievements and military power, nevertheless the movements were not passively accepted by the local populations. The Kazakhs, primarily the Little Horde, during the 18th century sought alliance with and support of Russia. However, at the end of the 18th century and during the course of the 19th century, a series of rebellions, resistance movements and wars of national liberation were fought.

These movements were at first centered among those Kazakhs closest to Russia. The Russians had a double impact on the Kazakhs: (1) They had political control over those Kazakhs who were within their empire; (2) The presence in force of the Russians had an effect on


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Kazakh nomadism beyond the Russian frontiers. The Kazakh herdsmen suffered serious limitations in the amount of pasturage area available to them. Qualitatively, they lost their best pasturages to the Russians; the areas close to rivers and streams were now occupied by Russian (Cossack, Great Russian, Ukrainian) farmers. The pattern of the nomadic Kazakh movement with the seasons from pasture to pasture was radically altered. Finally, the structure of social life was changed. The supreme power now rested in the hands of the Russians. The Kazakh khans were weakened; they became creatures of Moscow. The lesser nobility achieved a relatively greater position in the society with the decline of the power of the khans. Among the lesser nobility who thus rose, Batyr Srym Datov played a great and important role.

Batyr Srym led a series of anti-Russian movements between 1783 and 1797. Early data on his life are not known, but in 1775 and 1776 he led a group of Kazakhs to join Russian Cossack rebellion under Pugachev against the Tsar. After a long period of quiescence, Batyr Srym became active once again in 1783. He was imprisoned briefly by loyal Cossacks, but was released in 1784, on payment of a large ransom by Khan Nurali. However, the great popularity of Srym among the Kazakhs was later regarded as a threat to the Khan's power, and relations between the two were strained.

At this time, the early 1780s, an intermittent but prolonged series of troubles in the form of raids and expeditions between Syrm's Kazakhs and the Russian Cossacks took



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place. The significance of Srym's movement spread far beyond the Russo-Kazakh border area, where it began. Srym found adherents deep in the Kazakh Steppe. In consequence, two processes emerged. The first was the deeper commitment of Russian force to the area. The second was a closer inter-relationship among the Kazakhs, a sense of social unity and common fate. There are no direct data but there is reason to believe that Srym, who sought refuge in Khiva, was killed there in 1802 at the instigation of the Sultan.

Resistence movements to Russian penetration arose in wave after wave for sixty years after the beginning of Srym's campaigns down to the 1850s. A political unity of sorts arose out of these movements, after a century of internal dissension and fractionalization. The effect of these resistance movements, and the particular form that they took as wars of liberation after the Russian penetration, had a secondary effect: they created a series of heroes, legends, and symbols for future unity of the Kazakhs.

Prior to the period of the 1780s-1850s, the sole Kazakh symbols of integration were those drawn from the distant past, from the myths of origin and from the period of Chingis Khan. The 19th century leaders engaged in political and military enterprises of direct significance to the Kazakhs. Their wars with the Russians, the unity of the Kazakhs created by those wars, the heroes who led the people into battle, victory, and ultimate defeat - are part of present-day Kazakh traditions.



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Following Srym's undertakings the Kazakhs organized a series of movements of further resistance. Isatai Taimanov led a revolt in the Bukei or Inner Horde in 1836-1838. The greatest, most far-reaching and most renowned rebellion of the period was the war of Khan Kenesary Kasimov against the Russians in 1837-47. Yeset Kotibarov directed yet another movement in the Little Horde in 1855-1857. The last was a revolt of minor significance, a final, epigonal effort of Dzhankhozhi Nurmuhammedov among the Kazakhs along the Syr-Darya in 1856-1857.

Kenesary (1802-1847) was born in the year Srym died. Srym was a minor nobleman. Kenesary was a khan of the highest rank of the Middle Horde who sought to unite with Tashkent (still independent at that time) against the Russians. He was unsuccessful in this, and was even imprisoned briefly by the ruler of Tashkent, but was released through the intervention of Kokand, another state which was still independent of Russia. Kenesary then directed his activities against Russia in the north-central Kazakh Steppes, around Akmolinsk and Petropavlovsk. He attracted Kazakhs of the Middle Horde to him and forced others to join him. His influence spread beyond his own Horde, and the leaders of the Middle Horde in conjunction with certain Kazakhs of the Little Horde elected him ruler over them all.

By 1838 Kenesary dominated the caravan route leading into Central Asia. Since the Russians could not reach out to him with military expeditions, they built a line of fortifications south from the north central steppe, and forced



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Kokand into the Russian empire. Resistance was crushed in Khiva and Bukhara, and Russian control was established as well. Between 1865-1875 the largest part of Central Asia was brought into Russian hands, and the border with China was established. England was treated with; the spheres of influence of England and Russia were demarcated. The final pieces of the Russian empire in Central Asia fell into place with the acquisition of the southern Pamirs in the 1890s.

The Turkmens had occupied the area of southern Turkmenia for many centuries; the Persians had been there before them and had later driven the Turkmens north. It was only at the end of the 18th century that the Turkmens with the aid of the Emirate of Bukhara, were able to retake the lands along the northern slopes of the Kopet-Dag.

Faced with the Russian advance in 1877, the Turkmens had offered to place themselves under Persian rule in exchange for support against the Russians. However, the Persian empire had weakened considerably by this time and was no longer a force in international affairs. The Russians acted against the possible consolidation of Turkmenia with Persia by diplomatic and military pressure; they quickly mobilized in the area, and in a few years crushed the Turkmen forces. Britain's influence in the area was nullified; a modus vivendi between the two powers, Britain and Russia, was created, rising out of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. In consequence of these relationships, the relationships in regard to China, and those


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in regard to the last independent states of the region, Russia was able to establish definitive form of control over Central Asia.

The Russians conquered Turkmenia by moving across the Caspian Sea from the Caucasus and down the eastern shore of the Caspian from the Volga. The establishment of the Russians at what is today Krasnovodsk, the movement along the north of the Kopet-Dag Range, the laying of a railroad along this line of advance - all culminated in the battle of Geok-Tepe (near modern Ashkhabad) in January 1881. The fall of the Turkmen stronghold was the last large-scale resistance to the Russian advance in Central Asia. Therefore the British have viewed the battle at Geok-Tepe as one of the world's decisive battles. The resistance was prolonged and bloody.

Russian rule was set up in the form of Governments-General. Of these there were two: one ruled from Orenburg, covering the region of central and northern Kazakhstan, and one ruled from Tashkent, covering the agricultural zone of Central Asia. The Russians were able to conquer Central Asia because of its internal weakness and their own relative strength. The use of the Cossacks was vital to the Russian strategy. The Cossacks were military colonists who were given land to farm in the area of expansion of the Russian empire. The establishment of a line of Cossack villages (stanitsy) along the Ural River in the 18th century was the key to conquest of the nomadic steppe. The effect of the establishment of this line was the political stabilization of the area. The



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Kazakhs were set apart into zones east and west of the Ural River and then the Emba River, along which the Russians were in military control.

When the Kazakhs offered resistance during the 19th century, the Russians moved out from their areas of control along the rivers and in southern Siberia and quickly established lines of forts reaching out into the steppe. The rapid building of lines of fortified posts was the means of extending the Russian military power in the area, of cutting up the Kazakh Steppe into pacific units, isolating centers of resistance and finally reducing the area. Railroad building played a similar role in the Turkmen Steppe.

The agricultural states in general were more easily conquered than the nomadic. Centers of resistance could be more easily crushed in farming areas than in nomadic, since the enemy could be more easily sought out. The pastoral nomads were organized military lines; their political structure was at the same time a military one. Traditionally, the nomads identified readily with the imperial conquerors of the past. In practice, they raided both each other and their farming neighbors; hence a military campaign was not foreign to their experience.

Central Asia had a long tradition of fortified towns. There is evidence of construction of this kind of town as far back as the sixth century B.C. Archaeology of the Khorezmian Valley shows almost continuous occupation of a series of kalas (fortified towns) in the area.



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In the Middle Ages, Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent, and other cities were all protected by walls. However, the Russian strategy applied their strongpoints as places for attack, not for defence. The conception was new in the area.

## Uprisings at the End of the 19th Century

The Russian rule had not been long established when the new rulers had to face a series of uprisings by the native peoples. In 1885 there was a popular rising in the Fergana Valley under a certain Dervish-Khan-Turya, whose program called for a general revolt against Tsarism. The rising was crushed by Tsarist forces. Further rebellions took place in the Fergana Valley in 1891 and 1892 and met a similar fate. In 1892 a second major uprising by the local peoples was centered in the city of Tashkent. This popular movement arose on the occasion of a cholera epidemic in March 1892. The conflict between Islam and Tsarism was sharpened in the course of this rising. The principal issue was a protest against the Tsarist administration of the city.

The strongest movement at the end of the 19th century was the Andizhan rebellion of 1898. It was centered in the Fergana Valley cities of Osh (Kirgizia), Andizhan (Uzbekistan), and Khodzhent (Leninabad, Tadzhikistan). The Kirgiz of the mountain districts were suffering under the agricultural incursions into their territory. The Uzbek and Tadzhik farmers were burdened with heavy taxes.

In the face of these conditions arose



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a Moslem leader, Ishan Muhammed-Ali-Khalfa Sabir Sufiev. Knownto his followers as Ishan Madali, he was a member of the Dervish Order of the Nakshabandi, the most powerful dervish order in Central Asia. (For an account of this order, see the chapter on Religion.)

Ishan Madali's movement soon assumed the dimensions of a ghazna, a holy war against the infidels, and recalled a parallel movement a generation earlier when Imam Shamil opposed the Russians in the North Caucasus. The Madali rising was a veritable, spontaneous expression of the people against the Russian regime. In response to Ishan Madali's appeal the ghazna cry arose. At one time 2,000 men were in arms, although many times that number were involved during the entire course of the revolt. A Russian garrison was wiped out and other garrisons were attacked with nearly as much success. The uprising was suppressed in blood. However echoes of it continued for decades, even down to the present.

The 1905 Revolution in Russia had corresponding waves of rebellion against the Russians in Central Asia.

One of the most important political developments was the Dzhadid movement. Beginning as a secular intellectual tendency in Central Asia, outside of Islam, the movement quickly took on a political character - or rather took on this coloring from the beginning, since politics and religion, including opposition to religion, are inseparable in Central Asia. One of the leading Dzhadid intellectuals was Adzhzi,



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an educator and man of letters against whom the Soviet regime is still conducting a campaign. Adzhzi's name in full is Sayid Ahmad Khodja Siddiki. He worked with another Moslem intellectual leader of the time, Mirzo Siro Hakim. The Dzhadid movement was continually praised in Central Asia through the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s; and it has been furiously attacked by the Soviet regime from 1937 to the present.

The Dzhadid movement arose out of a New-Learning trend. It has been attacked for pan-Turkist connections, pan-Islamic ideology; it has been merged with the Basmachi movement of later years in these attacks. It is probably related to a revival of Turkic culture and learning introduced in the 1870s and 1880s by the European Tatars who came into Central Asia.

## Central Asia in the 20th Century

The Central Asian peoples played a minor part in the great events of Russian history in the 20th century: the Russo-Japanese War, the Revolution of 1905, World War I, the Revolution of March, 1917, and the Revolution of November 1917.

However, in 1916 a great wave of rebellion against the Russians encompassed Central Asia. All the Turkic peoples of Central Asia - the Turkmens, the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz, the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks - were involved in it.

It is generally agreed that the revolt began in Kazakhstan, then spread among the neighboring peoples. Among the causes enumerated



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are the Russian seizures of Kazakh land, requisitioning of horses, and increased taxes. Taxes in Kazakhstan are reported to have increased fifteenfold during World War I. To these causes should be added the unrest created by mobilization of the Central Asian peoples for non-combattant labor at the front.

There is a Soviet controversy regarding the sources of the revolt. The Soviet interpretation advanced in the early 1920s was that the revolt was a provocation by agents of the Tsar with the aim of wiping out the natives and seizing their lands. According to a later view, the 1916 Revoltuion in Central Asia was a struggle of the natives against colonial enslavement. In the present period, the Soviet conflict over interpretation continues. In 1947 the movement of 1916 continued to be interpreted as a revolt against Tsarism; but in this case the role of the native ruling class was added to the interpretation of the revolt. At this time, the "double yoke" idea was in force: the natives were under a double oppression imposed by Moscow and the native rulers.

The crux of the conflict over the 1916 revolt now involves the nature of the leadership. Were they Tsarist agents or honest leaders? One Soviet view has sought to identify the local leaders of the revolt by the double yoke theory with Tsarist provocateurs who sought to embroil the peoples in the First World War. This view is advantageous to the Soviet regime because it discharges the native and Tsarist leaderships from historically positive roles at one blow. The field is cleared for the discovery of positive leadership among the Russian



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revolutionary forces. Thus, the leadership of the revolt in Central Asia is made out to be truly progressive, anti-imperialist and revolutionary, in keeping with the official doctrine.

The Soviet controversy aside, the nature of Central Asian political development was completely changed at the beginning of the 20th century. The 19th century wars of Kenesary and the Kazakhs, of Muzaffar and the Uzbeks, of the Turkmens, had all been wars of properly constituted and independent societies. After the conquest, the political movements lost their initiative and became local responses to real or fancied weaknesses in Russia. The political movements may be likened to the watchful waiting of a prisoner. The exception to this was the Turkmen people who, as in the past, continued to fight wars against the Khivan Khanate and the Russians for long-standing reasons: land and water.

The Central Asiatic peoples were now peoples and no longer nations. Their political movements were movements directed against Russia, rather than self-constitutive political movements. The most important of these national-liberating movements were the Alash-Orda among the Kazakhs and the Basmachi and the Dzhadid movements among the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks and others. These movements are part of a series of political formations, uprisings, and demonstrations of discontent, attendant upon the quest for liberation which reached a peak of activity among these people at the time of the Russian Revolution. Armed conflict in Central Asia was henceforth rebellion, and no longer war, if war is the conflict of independent states.



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The Basmachis, for example, were a political movement whose beginnings were obscure, active in 1920 and after in Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. According to one account the movement was formed by the deposed Emir of Bukhara, Sayid Mir Alim, who fled to Dyushambe (now Stalinabad) in 1920 and there formed the Basmachi movement. There is some basis for the belief, however, that the Basmachis antedated the Russian Revolution of 1917. Following the advance of Frunze and the Red Army to the Pamirs, the Emir fled to Afghanistan. This was in March 1921. There he joined with Ibrahim Bek and in December of that year advanced on Dyushambe (Stalinabad, the present capital of Tadzhikistan) with 15,000 troops, and recaptured the town. The Basmachis fought a series of campaigns between 1922 and 1931. Armed warfare ended only in that year.

The Alash-Orda was a similar movement in its political program, calling for the liberation of the Kazakh people, as the Basmachis did for the Uzbeks and the Tadzhiks. Unlike the Basmachi movement, the Alash-Orda had no active base abroad. The leadership was intensely nationalistic, counting Kazakh intellectuals among them. However, the movement was crushed by the Bolshevik Revolution; some of the leaders were killed while others made their peace with Moscow. These leaders were not of the older aristocracy, as in the case of the Basmachi. The new Kazakh leaders - Baitursunov, Bukeikhanov, Tanyshpaev, Karataev, Seidalin - were "enlightened" young Kazakhs, who emerged from the 1905-1907 period. They could make no claim upon the past for sanction of their leading role. However, their party took the name "Alash," the

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ancient war-cry of the Kazakhs, alluding to the legendary first ruler, or primordial ancestor, of the Kazakhs. This was a romantic gesture in a sense, because the leaders were educated, and in that sense anti-legendary. Yet, they sought their roots in the past for the Kazakh movement of liberation. They formed a political party in December 1917 and supported the White Russians under Kolchak. They organized an armed force which never gained more than local significance and called for complete independence for Kazakhstan. When the Whites were defeated in Central Asia, Kazakhstan was once more absorbed into the Russian political being, and the Alash-Orda was put down. Thus ended the last overt movement in the northern steppes. The open activity of the Basmachis in the south of Central Asia lasted a decade longer.

The Turkmens formed no party of their own. Their political expression had taken the form of rebellion which they carried out until at last suppressed in 1916.

With these events, the history of Central Asia as an independent political entity comes to an end. The last acts of independence are approximately coincidental with the end of Tsarism in Russia. The Bolshevik regime disabled all further acts of liberation in Central Asia, more effectively than Tsarism had done. On the other hand, the conquest of Central Asia by Tsarist Russia had debilitated the indigenous political life, so that its later collapse under the Soviets was the more readily achieved.



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## The Interpretation of History

The interpretation of the past has an important part to play in the current ideological development of the Soviet Union. The rewriting of history and re-evaluation of figures and events serves as a device in creating a state ideology, a banner around which the loyalty of the people is to rally. These re-evaluations serve likewise to set the tone in the relations between Russia and the minority nationalities.

The rewriting of history of the Soviet Union first took place in attitude toward the role of Tsarism. Lenin had regarded the Tsarist empire as the prison of nationalities, hence Tsarism in regard to the Finns, the Latvians, the Armenians, the Kazakhs, was an absolute evil. In consequence the local leaders, such as Khan Kenesary of the Kazakhs who opposed the Tsarist advance, fought on the side of the angels.

The second stage in this development brought out a less antagonistic attitude toward Tsarist colonial policy: Russia was more advanced than the colonized areas; therefore union with Russia meant union with a more advanced state. Central Asia was in a feudal state of development; Russia had already advanced to the state of capitalism. The tsars were now not an absolute evil, but a force for the good. In this view, therefore, Kenesary fought on the side of the devils. He was a khan, a feudal lord, a defender of reactionary interests.



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However, there were leaders of the national minorities who joined with the rebellious Russians under the tsars. The rebellious Russians were even more progressive historically than the tsars. Thus, unity with the Russian revolutionaries was an absolute good; union with the tsars, only a qualified good. Batyr Srym had joined with Pugachev; hence, he was historically progressive. Kenesary fought the tsars; he was historically reactionary, for he never joined with Russian rebels. The relationship of the Soviet regime to the Tsarist regime had not progressed to the point where the Soviets could admit any beneficial matter in Tsarism.

After Stalin's death, a new formulation was introduced, the two streams versus the single stream in the histories of the minority nationalities. Soviet writers who idealized the lives of the khans and their courts were severely criticized. There were two nations in every nation, two national cultures in every national culture. One was progressing, eventually leading to unification with the Russian revolutionaries, one was reactionary, eventually leading to counter-revolution, anti-Leninism, support of foreign agents, pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, union with England, Germany, and eventually the United States. This series of thoughts has been formulated with especial sharpness in the local press of Central Asia, where the issues are more closely perceived than they are in Moscow, and still less than they would be abroad.

Thus, the reports and congresses on history and literature in the Central Asian



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republics have been in advance of the analogous reports and congresses in the Soviet capital in expressing the change in evaluation of older historical trends. The mention of Lenin's single stream as a reactionary concept first appeared in the outlying regions, and only later in the central ones.

The two-stream idea versus the single-stream makes it possible to pick and choose among the national heroes of the people. In this way the choice of Batyr Srym and the rejection of Kenesary, the choice of the great poet Navoi and the rejection of Adzhzi, can be explained. The net effect is the pulverizing of the local historical tradition, and the superimposition of Soviet historical concepts. Finally, Central Asian history, thoughts about history and popular historical traditions have been absorbed into Soviet history, thought and the superimposed traditions. Central Asian heroes are no longer Central Asian.



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Annex "A." 1.b.

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Annex "A." 1.c.

# SIZE AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION

## I. Central Asia before the Revolution

### Early 19th Century Population

During the latter part of the 19th century Central Asia was divided into five chief administrative units. These units formed the framework within which population statistics were collected even after the Tsarist empire was destroyed by the Revolution.

Three of the administrative units were ruled directly from the Russian capital. They were the governments (Russian, guberniia) of the Steppe, of Turkestan, and Transcaspia. The Steppe government covered the central and northern parts of present-day Kazakhstan. The Turkestan government covered present-day southern Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan and eastern Bukhara. The Transcaspian government coincided with central and western Turkmenia.

The remaining two administrative units of pre-Revolutionary Central Asia comprised the vassal Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva. These two khanates lay along the valley of the Amu-Darya, and separated the Transcaspian from the Turkestan governments.



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In a broad manner, a total of five to six million native population in Central Asia in the 1830s may be posited. This figure is useful only as an order of magnitude of the population of the time.

Meyendorf's estimate (1820) sets apart the sedentary from the nomadic population. In his classification the sedentary includes both urban and farming. This grouping is justified by what we know today of Central Asian society. In the 1820s there was no urban-rural cleavage as we understand it in Western civilization. Rather, the Central Asian city was a continuum with the farmlands. The city was more densely settled, but had most of its area in orchards, vegetable gardens and small farms.

The 1897 Census.

The 1897 census conducted throughout the Russian empire included data on Russian Central Asia alone; no census data were gathered in the vassal Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. Nevertheless, for the first time a systematic coverage of most of the area was supplied, in addition to which the methods employed maintained a relatively high degree of reliability.

Table 1.c.I shows the area, population and density of the various divisions of Central Asia in 1897.



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Table 1.c.I. Area, Population and Density of Central Asia, 1897
(Thousands)

| Oblast | Area Km. Sq. | Total Population | Density per Km. Sq |
|---|---|---|---|
| Akmolinsk | 442 | 683 | 1.54 |
| Fergana | 107 | 1,572 | 14.7 |
| Samarkand | 54 | 860 | 15.9 |
| Semipalatinsk | 391 | 685 | 1.75 |
| Semirechie | 306 | 988 | 3.2 |
| Syr-Darya | 400 | 1,478 | 3.7 |
| Transcaspian | 468 | 382 | 0.82 |
| Turgay | 351 | 453 | 1.3 |
| Ural | 250 | 645 | 2.6 |
| Total | 2,719 | 7,747 | 2.9 |
| Bukhara | 216 | 2,300 1/ | 10.15 |
| Khiva | 62 | 700 1/ | 11.1 |
| Khiva and Bukhara | 278 | 2,175 2/ | 7.8 |
| Grand Total | 2,997 | 10,747 | 3.6 |

1/ Contemporary Russian estimates.
2/ Volkov's estimate.



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The total population of Russian Central Asia in 1897 was 7,747,000. The total area was 2,719,000 kilometers square, with a mean population density of 2.9 per km. sq.

The Transcaspian Province more or less coincided with the present-day republic of Turkmenia. The low density is explained by the vast amount of desert, Kara-Kum, in the region. Population was scattered around the edges of the province: in the south along the Kopet-Dag and the Murgab and Tedzhen Oases; and on the west along the Caspian littoral.

Typical steppe densities, where a more or less even distribution of herding prevailed, were to be found in the Ural Province, 2.6 per km. sq. The Semirechie and Syr-Darya densities were higher because of the inclusion of herding and farming in the two provinces. Farming permits a greater population density than herding.

The densities of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Turgay Provinces were low for the same reason as the Transcaspian: the desert zones in these provinces, which, however, are not so extensive as the Kara-Kum.

The high densities of the Fergana and Samarkand Provinces are accounted for by the considerable concentration of irrigated agriculture, which, despite aridity and evaporation factors, supported a population relatively large for the size of the area.

The Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara were not included in the 1897 census. Volkov in 1930 estimated the combined population of the two



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states to have been 2,175,000 in that year. Estimates made at the turn of the century were much higher. Khiva was thought to have a population of 700,000 at the end of the 19th century, and the population of Bukhara was estimated at two million in 1890 and three million in 1910. By interpolation and addition the combined population according to contemporary estimates is reckoned to be around three million, 38 per cent higher than Volkhov's estimate, which was probably low. By Volkhov's estimate we derive a mean population density of 7.8 per km. sq. for Khiva and Bukhara together. By the contemporary estimates we derive a mean density of 10.8 per km. sq., representing 11.1 per km. sq. in Khiva and 10.15 in Bukhara. For reasons which cannot be developed here, the densities of Khiva and Bukhara are considered to be closer to those of Fergana and Samarkand Provinces than Volkov's estimate suggests - hence the higher population estimate.

* * * *

The ethnic composition of Central Asia in 1897 is shown in Table 1.c.II.



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Table 1.c.II. Ethnic Composition, 1897
(Thousands)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Turkic Peoples** | |
| Bashkirs | 3 |
| Karakalpaks | 104 |
| Kazakhs | 3,787 |
| Kipchaks | 8 |
| Kirgiz | 202 |
| Taranchis (including Kashgarians) | 71 |
| Tatars (European) | 60 |
| Turkmens | 249 |
| Uzbeks (including Sarts) | 1,698 |
| Other Turks | 440 |
| Total | 6,620 |
| **Iranians** | |
| Persians | 13 |
| Tadzhiks | 350 |
| Total | 363 |
| **Slavic Peoples** | |
| Poles | 12 |
| Russians (including Ukrainians and Belo-Russians) | 690 |
| Total | 702 |
| Armenians | 5 |
| Cheremis | 1 |
| Germans | 8 |
| Jews | 8 |
| Latvians, Lithuanians | 2 |
| Mordvins | 13 |
| Permians | 1 |
| Total | 38 |
| Others | 16 |
| Grand Total | 7,740 |



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The vast majority of the population of Central Asia in 1897 was Turkic-speaking. However the Bashkirs and Tatars were not native to Central Asia; they were relatively recent inmigrants. The native Turkic peoples numbered 6,120,000, or 79 per cent of the total. The Tadzhiks, numbering 350,000, were 4.5 per cent. Russians were 8.9 per cent. All other groups were less than one per cent.

If the entire area of present-day Central Asia is included in the computations, then a picture of even greater ethnic homogeneity is derived for Russian Central Asia (including Khiva and Bukhara) in 1897. The total population of the region was between 9.9 million and 10.7 million. Of this total, the greatest non-native population was the Russian. The total number of Russians in Central Asia, including those in Khiva and Bukhara, was 697,000, or 6.5 - 7.0 per cent of the total population.

Males were more numerous than females. There were 4,167,000 males to 3,581,000 females, or 53.8 per cent male and 46.2 per cent female, a rate of 1,163 males per 1,000 females.

Several factors contributed to the preponderance of males in Central Asia. Among the native peoples the rate of males per thousand females was the following: Kazakhs, 1,142; Kirgiz, 1,173; Uzbeks, 1,199; Uzbeks including Sarts, 1,208; Turkmens, 1,118; Tadzhiks, 1,183. The highest proportion of males to females was found among the Sart-Uzbeks, a predominantly sedentary people. The Tadzhiks, also a predominantly sedentary people, had the next highest proportion of males to females. The predominantly herding

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peoples - Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and to some extent the Turkmens - also had an excess of males over females, but less than the farming and urban peoples.

The fact that Russians in Central Asia had more males than females in 1897 may be explained by the fact that Russians were in-migrants, subject to various factors accompanying migrations, which disrupt peoples and cultures. In Central Asia Russian males had a numerical superiority, 1,127 per thousand females. In European Russia, Russian females had a slight numerical superiority 1,052 females per thousand males.

* * * *

The number of females per thousand males by province in Central Asia in 1897 is shown in Table l.c.III.



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Table 1.c.III. Females Per Thousand Males by Province, 1897. (Thousands)

| | |
|---|---|
| Akmolinsk | 923 |
| Fergana | 843 |
| Samarkand | 820 |
| Semipalatinsk | 876 |
| Semirechie | 869 |
| Syr-Darya | 840 |
| Transcaspia | 799 |
| Turgay | 905 |
| Ural | 920 |
| Mean Average for Central Asia | 860 |

Aside from Transcaspia, the lowest proportions of females, hence the highest proportions of males, were in the predominantly agricultural provinces of Samarkand and Fergana.

* * * *

The urban-rural ratio in Central Asia is shown in Table 1.c.IV.



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Table 1.c.IV. Urban Population by Province, 1897.

| Province | Population (Thousands) | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|
| Akmolinsk | 74.5 | 11 |
| Fergana | 283.5 | 18 |
| Samarkand | 135 | 16 |
| Semipalatinsk | 55 | 8 |
| Semirechie | 63 | 6.5 |
| Syr-Darya | 206 | 14 |
| Transcaspia | 40 | 11 |
| Turgay | 20 | 4 |
| Ural | 53 | 8.5 |
| Total | 930 | 12 |



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The highest urban rates in 1897 are found in the predominantly agricultural provinces of Fergana (18 per cent of the total population), Samarkand (16 per cent) and Syr-Darya (14 per cent). The lowest urban rate is found in the Turgay Province, predominantly herding and composed of nomadic Kazakhs. Semirechie is similar to Turgay, as is the Ural Province. The higher urban rate of Akmolinsk reflects the Russian in-migration to the region. Transcaspia has a rate similar to Akmolinsk and higher than the other Kazakh rates for several reasons. The first reason is the relatively greater degree of agriculture among Turkmens who were the ethnic base of the Transcaspian Province population. Another reason may be sought in Russian in-migration. Again, the total population of Transcaspia was small compared with the other provinces. Hence, a slight increase in urban population would have meant a larger percentage increase than the same numerical change elsewhere. Only the Turgay Province had a smaller urban population, and concomitantly, the lowest urban rate.

* * * *

Not all the native peoples of Central Asia were living in the region at the time of the 1897 census; a significant proportion resided in neighboring provinces.

Table 1.c.V shows the total numbers of the peoples native to Central Asia recorded in the Russian census of 1897.

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Table 1.c.V. Central Asian Peoples in the Russian Empire, 1897. (Thousands)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Turks** | | |
| Karakalpaks | | 104 |
| Kashgarians | | 15 |
| Kazakhs | | 4,084 |
| Kirgiz | | 202 |
| Sarts | | 967 |
| Taranchis | | 56 |
| Turkmens | | 281 |
| Uzbeks | | 726.5 |
| Other Central Asian Turks | | 440 |
| | Total | 6,875.5 |
| **Iranians** | | |
| Persians | | 13 |
| Tadzhiks | | 350 |
| | Total | 363 |
| | Grand Total | 7,238.5 |

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In 1897 the only significant number of Central Asian peoples within the Russian empire outside Central Asia were the Kazakhs. Some 300,000 Kazakhs lived in the adjacent regions of southeastern Russia and southern Siberia. The rest of the Kazakhs were concentrated within Central Asia.

The population of Central Asia grew rapidly from about 1830 to the end of the 19th century, from five-six million to nine-ten million. This was an increase of about four millions, to which the Russian in-migration as well as natural increase contributed.

## The 20th Century down to 1917

A survey of the population of Central Asia was made in 1911 by the Migration Bureau of the Russian government as part of a general description of Asiatic Russia. The results of the population survey are shown in Table 1.c.VI.



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Table 1.c.VI. Population of Central Asia, 1911
(Thousands)

| Province | Population | Density Per Sq. Km. |
|---|---|---|
| Akmolinsk | 1,444 | 2.6 |
| Fergana | 2,042 | 14.3 |
| Samarkand | 960 | 11 |
| Semipalatinsk | 874 | 1.7 |
| Semirechie | 1,201.5 | 3.2 |
| Syr-Darya | 1,816.5 | 3.7 |
| Transcaspian | 472.5 | 0.8 |
| Turgay | 713 | 1.6 |
| Ural | 804 | 2.6 |
| Total | 10,327.5 | 3.4 |
| | | (3,118,500 sq.km) |



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In the period 1897-1911 the total population of Russian Central Asia grew from 7.7 million to 10.3 million, an increase of 25 per cent during the 14 years.

The density increased, likewise, despite certain oscillations. The density of Fergana Province dropped while that of Samarkand Province rose to become the highest in the area. Akmolinsk increased as well, a reflection of further Russian in-migration.

* * * *

The ethnic composition of the population in 1911 is shown in Table 1.c.VII.



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Table 1.c.VII. Ethnic Composition of Population, 1911
(Thousands)

| Peoples | Population | Per Cent Increase over 1897 |
|---|---|---|
| Turkic Peoples | | |
| Karakalpaks | 134 | 29 |
| Kashgarians and Taranchis | 138 | 95 |
| Kazakhs | 4,654 | 17 |
| Kipchaks | 61 | 660 |
| Sart-Uzbeks | 2,440 | 44 |
| Tatars | 87 | 45 |
| Turkmens | 290 | 16 |
| Other Turks | 5 | — |
| Iranians (including Hindus) | 431 | 16 |
| Slavic Peoples | | |
| Russians | 1,950 | 180 |
| Chinese and Others | 21 | 45 |
| Jews | 31 | 290 |
| Kalmuks | 2 | -37 |
| Other Europeans | 60 | 95 |
| Uralic Peoples | 23 | 45 |
| Grand Total | 10,327 | |

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The Kazakhs were called Kirgiz in the 1897 census and the 1911 survey, and the people called Kirgiz today were not listed in 1911. At that time the Sarts were combined with the Uzbeks. The sharp increase of Uzbeks shown by the survey was partly a natural increase, partly the result of a different classification of peoples. Some of the peoples who had been classified as unidentifiable Turks in 1897 were classified as Sarts in 1911. The Kipchak increase was the result of a similar reclassification; the Kipchaks ultimately were joined to the Uzbeks. The Kashgarian-Taranchi rise was partly the result of natural factors, partly the result of natural factors, partly in-migration, and partly reclassification.

In the 1897-1911 period the Russian population increased greatly through in-migration, which was partly urban and partly agricultural. Tatar and Jewish in-migrations in this period were likewise heavy and were principally urban.

The Iranian increase, chiefly Tadzhik, was comparable to the Kazakh, Kirgiz and Turkmen. All were 16-17 per cent. The Karakalpak increase reflected a more knowledgeable classification as well as natural factors of growth.

* * * *

The urban population of Russian Central Asia numbered 1,423,000 in 1911; the rural population numbered 8,904,000. The urban Russians increased by 219,000 from 1897 to 1911.

In-Migration before the Revolution

The rate of increase by provinces from 1897 to 1911 is shown in Table 1.c.VIII.

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Table 1.c.VIII. Population Increase in Central Asia, by Province, 1897-1911. (Thousands)

| Province | Population 1897 | Population 1911 | Per Cent Increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Akmolinsk | 683 | 1,444 | 114 |
| Fergana | 1,572 | 2,042 | 30 |
| Samarkand | 860 | 960 | 12 |
| Semipalatinsk | 685 | 874 | 28 |
| Semirechie | 988 | 1,202 | 22 |
| Syr-Darya | 1,478 | 1,817 | 22 |
| Transcaspia | 382 | 472.5 | 24 |
| Turgay | 453 | 713 | 57 |
| Ural | 645 | 804 | 25 |
| Total | 7,746 | 10,323.5 | 33 |

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The greatest increase in 1911 was recorded for Akmolinsk Province. At that time the province extended to the city of Omsk, and included a long stretch of the Trans-Siberian railroad, which had been completed shortly before 1911. Moreover, the northernmost part of the province included a portion of the south Siberian black-earth belt to which Russian peasants moved in vast numbers. During the period 1897-1911 Russians increased in Akmolinsk Province by 610,000, a growth of nearly threefold. The increase can be accounted for in large measure by in-migration.

The Turgay Province, bordering on Akmolinsk to the west, shared the same trends in a lesser way. The remaining provinces, with the exception of Samarkand, increased by 20-30 per cent in the period 1897-1911. There is no explanation of the relatively low rate of increase in Samarkand Province, 1897-1911.

During these years Russians were tending to displace Kazakhs in the northern parts of Central Asia. By 1911 Russians formed the majority of the population of Akmolinsk Province, 835,000 out of a total of 1,444,000, or three-fifths of the population. In the Turgay Province the Russians had increased nearly sevenfold, and by 1911 were one-third of the population.

## II. The Revolutionary Period

Central Asia was caught in the revolutionary turmoil and the subsequent civil war. The years preceding the Russian Revolution also were years of unrest in Central Asia. And fighting as well as other forms of resistance continued throughout the 1920s.

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It is difficult to bring together the pre-Revolutionary and the post-Revolutionary population data. The units of data collection were not the same. The Steppe government included the districts of Orenburg (now Chkalov) and Omsk, which are outside Kazakhstan today. On the other hand, the western frontier of Kazakhstan has been moved west along the Caspian Sea from the Ural River Delta region to the delta of the Volga River. The town of Semipalatinsk was on the border of the privince bearing the same name; Kazakhstan now extends far to the east of Semipalatinsk, and includes the important mineral region of Ridders-Leninogorsk which once lay outside the Kazakh SSR.

In the southern part of Central Asia, the former vassal states of Khiva and Bukhara were incorporated into the Soviet state. In addition to these major administrative changes, there were minor ones, all with their effects on territory and population size of the region.

The 1926 Census

The first formal census of Russia since 1897 was undertaken in 1926. Table 1.c.IX shows Central Asia according to the 1926 census. The data in this table are in general comparable to the data in Table 1.c.V.

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Table 1.c.IX. Total Population of Native Peoples of Central Asia in USSR, 1926. (Thousands)

| | |
|---|---|
| Afghans | 5 |
| Arabs | 29 |
| Beluchis | 10 |
| Dungans | 14.6 |
| Dzhemshids | 0.9 |
| Fergana and Samarkand Turks | 0.5 |
| Karakalpaks | 146 |
| Kirgiz | 763 |
| Kashgarians | 13 |
| Kazakhs | 3,968 |
| Kipchaks | 33.5 |
| Kuramas | 50 |
| Persians | 9.2 |
| Sart-Kalmuks | 2.8 |
| Tadzhiks | 979 |
| Taranchis | 53 |
| Turkmens | 764 |
| Uigurs | 42.5 |
| Uzbeks | 3,905 |
| Yagnobis | 1.8 |



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During the 30 years between the two censuses - January 28, 1897 and December 17, 1926 - many changes in the ethnic composition had taken place.

The losses through war, revolution and civil strife have been analyzed by Volkov and Lorimer. But one factor of undoubted importance in the population history of Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan has not been given sufficient attention. This is the phenomenon of cross-border migration.

In 1926 it was reported that non-returnees in Afghanistan numbered 202,681. This represented the number of those who had moved across the border, less those who had moved back. The total number of those who had moved back and forth in the 1920s was estimated to be several times that number.

As a result of the reclassification of ethnic groups, older units such as the Sarts, now included among Uzbeks, no longer appeared in 1926. Other groups emerged considerably in increased numbers, not because of natural processes (excess of births over deaths) but rather because of administrative changes and redefinitions. The most important of these changes was inclusion for the first time of Khiva and Bukhara in Russian Central Asia. Moreover, Uzbeks resident in Bukhara and Khiva were counted together with other Uzbeks of Central Asia. In consequence, the number of Uzbeks increased out of all proportion in 1926.

Kirgiz likewise increased in number

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beyond the expected natural rate, probably on the basis of reclassifying some Kazakhs as Kirgiz, and on the basis of more systematic knowledge of the populations of the Tien-Shans and Pamirs.

The Turkmens increased by inclusion of Turkmens from Khiva and Bukhara for the first time under the heading of Turkmens in Russian Central Asia.

Out of the new 1926 census classifications, two groups emerged with great numerical superiority. These were the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs. Both numbered close to 4,000,000 in 1926. The Kazakhs were 3,968,000, the Uzbeks 3,905,000. Among all Turkic groups in the world, the Kazakhs were surpassed only by the Turks of Turkey.

The Uzbeks after the 1926 census came to include the Kipchaks and Kuramas. The Kipchaks and Kuramas were gradually being absorbed by the Uzbeks, and the differentiation among the three peoples still accepted in 1926, disappeared thereafter.

Of the other Turkic groups, the Kirgiz and Turkmens were next in line in numerical strength after the Kazakhs and Uzbeks. Both Kirgiz and Turkmens numbered in the 700,000s.

The Karakalpaks increased steadily over the preceding period. There were 42,000 more in 1926 than in 1897, an increase of 29 per cent. The combined number of Kazakhs and Kirgiz increased by 742,000 from 1897 to 1926, an increase of only 19 per cent. The increment of Karakalpaks may be attributed in part to the addition of Karakalpaks from Khiva and Bukhara.

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Finally, the Taranchi-Kashgarian-Uigur group remains to be accounted for. This group is at present classified as Uigur. Together these peoples numbered 71,000 in 1897, 138,000 in 1911, and 108,500 in 1926. The great increase from 1897 to 1911 was the last wave of a movement from China. The loss in the period 1911-1926 is in part explained by the reclassification of some Uigurs as Uzbeks.

Among the non-Turkic native peoples of Central Asia, the Tadzhiks are numerically the most important. Numbering 980,000 in 1926, the Tadzhiks were exceeded as a group only by the Kazakhs and Uzbeks. There is, however, a problem involved in Tadzhik classification. For example, the writer Sadriddin Aini has regarded himself sometimes as an Uzbek, sometimes as a Tadzhik. The problem is not his alone, but is shared by thousands of others.

* * * *

All these peoples had a preponderance of males over females in 1926. The ratio of males per thousands females is shown in Table 1.c.X.



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Table 1.c.X. Central Asian Peoples, 1926, Males per Thousand Females

| | |
|---|---|
| Beluchis | 1,177 |
| Dungans | 1,127 |
| Karakalpaks | 1,091 |
| Kazakhs | 1,113 |
| Kirgiz | 1,102 |
| Tadzhiks | 1,121 |
| Turkmens | 1,106 |
| Uigurs | 1,194 |
| Uzbeks | 1,128 |

The same trends are to be noted in 1926 as in earlier decades. The predominantly farming peoples were the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks and Uigurs. They had the highest ratios of males to females. Those with either a mixed economy of herding and farming or a predominantly herding economy had more males than females, but the difference was not as great. The sole exception to the rule of preponderance of males over females was found among the Yagnobis, one of the mountain Tadzhik or Galcha peoples, who had a ratio of 912 males to 917 females in 1926.

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The rural-urban ratio of the Central Asian peoples is shown in Table 1.c.XI.

Table 1.c.XI Central Asian Peoples, 1926, Urban and Rural Ratios (Thousands)

| Peoples | Urban | Per Cent | Rural | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dungans | 5 | 33 | 10 | 67 |
| Karakalpaks | 4 | 3 | 142 | 97 |
| Kazakhs | 87 | 2 | 3,882 | 98 |
| Kirgiz | 11 | 1 | 753 | 99 |
| Tadzhiks | 149 | 15 | 829 | 85 |
| Turkmens | 11 | 1 | 753 | 99 |
| Uigurs | 19 | 17.5 | 89 | 82.5 |
| Uzbeks | 729 | 20 | 3,269 | 80 |



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There is a correlation among various peoples between urban-rural rates and traditions as herders or farmers. The tradition may or may not coincide with actual practice; more important is the traditional orientation of the people. The Kazakhs and Kirgiz are predominantly herding both in their traditions and in actual occupation. If they farm in any large numbers it is only since the period of collectivization. The Turkmens and Karakalpaks are also basically herdsmen by tradition. They have been farmers for several generations, but the transition has been a recent one. All these peoples have low urban rates, from one to three per cent.

The Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Uigurs and Dungans all have relatively high urban rates, or 15 to 33 per cent. They have been farmers for a long time. Their traditions and orientations are those of farmers. It has been pointed out that by tradition the farmers of Central Asia live in close conjunction with the city and the urban market.

The herdsmen of Central Asia have had little contact with urban life, except by trade with the farmers. Therefore it is to be expected than the urban ratio of herders, and those who recently had been herders, is low.

* * * *

The breakdown of the population of Central Asia by administrative units has little continuity with pre-Revolutionary breakdowns shown already.

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As we have seen, Kazakhstan was formed out of the former Steppe government, from which the city of Omsk and the surrounding region had been taken; Orenburg (Chkalov) also had been taken away. However, the Caspian littoral as far as the Volga Delta was added. This area formerly had lain behind the Cossack lines. The Altay mining region of Ridders (Leninogorsk) had also been added to Kazakhstan. These were the major changes in the north.

In the southern part of Kazakhstan, the principal addition was the valley of the Syr-Darya, as far as the perimeter of the Tashkent Oasis. In the southwest of Kazakhstan, the Mangyshlak Peninsulahad been added from Transcaspia.

The ASSR of Karakalpakia had not yet been taken away from Kazakhstan in 1926. It was to be added to Uzbekistan later. Kirgizia had already been established as an administrative unity, and a census-taking unit.

Tadzhikistan was still administratively part of Uzbekistan in 1926, but counted separately in that census.

* * * *

Table 1.c.XII shows the size of population of the different administrative divisions of Central Asia, first, within the 1926 boundaries, and second, within the 1939 boundaries. The 1926 population in the 1939 boundaries is shown for purposes of comparability with the 1939 census to follow.

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Table 1.c.XII. Population of Central Asia by Principal Administrative Divisions, 1926. (Thousands)

| Republic | Within 1926 Boundaries | Density | Within 1939 Boundaries |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | 6,503 | 2.2 | 6,074 |
| Kirgizia | 993 | 5.1 | 1,002 |
| Tadzhikistan | 827 | 5.4 | 1,032 |
| Turkmenia | 1,001 | 2.2 | 998 |
| Uzbekistan | 4,446 | 28.3 | 4,565 |
| Total | 13,770 | | 13,671 |



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Reduced populations from territorial losses were sustained in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan lost Karakalpakia, containing a 1926 population of 305,000, which was reassigned to Uzbekistan in 1936. During the 1926-1929 period Kazakhstan suffered an additional population decrease of 124,000 through territorial loss. In consequence, the difference in the population of Kazakhstan between 1926 and 1939 was a loss of 429,000, according to the boundaries of the two years. This difference exceeds the 1926 population of Karakalpakia.

Uzbekistan lost Tadzhikistan, which was administratively separated in 1929. In the process of separation Tadzhikistan was changed from an Autonomous SSR to a full SSR. Part of the Fergana Valley was added to Tadzhikistan from Uzbekistan, and the Tadzhik Republic gained 205,000 population thereby.

Despite this territorial population loss, Uzbekistan won 119,000 population by the re-districting process. However, part of the gain was 305,000 in Karakalpakia. Thus Uzbekistan proper had a negative increment of 186,000 by subtracting Karakalpakia. Uzbekistan had a total increase in population of 19,000 through territory alone.

Kirgizia and Turkmenia changed by less than one-tenth of one per cent in the process. Kirgizia gained 9,000 population. Turkmenia lost 3,000.

The total losses through territory within Central Asia totalled 429,000 in 1926; the gains totalled 333,000. The net population loss

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by territory was 99,1[illegible]6. The total population of Central Asia in 1[illegible] fell from 13,[illegible]00,000 to 13,671,000 by adjusting the population to the 1939 boundaries.

* * * *

The total densities of the Central Asian republics in 1926 also are shown in Table 1.c.XII. These indicate certain changes from 1897. In 1897 mean population density ranged from 0.82 per km. sq. in Turkmenia to [illegible] per km. sq. in the Fergana. In 1926 the lowest mean density was 2.2 per km. sq. in Kazakhstan and Turkmenia. The highest density was in Uzbekistan, 28.2 per km. sq.

Rural densities in Central Asia were as follows: Uzbekistan, 21.5 per km. sq.; Tadzhikistan, 5.1; Kirgizia, 4.5; Kazakhstan, 2.0; Turkmenia, 1.9.

The highest densities were those in conjunction with irrigation farming. The lowest were those in conjunction with herding.

The population in urban communities in 1926 was unevenly distributed. The rural-urban ratio is shown in Table 1.c.XIII.

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Table 1.c.XIII. Urban-Rural Ratios in Central Asia, 1926.
(Thousands)

| Republic | Urban | | Rural | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pop. | Per Cent | Pop. | Per Cent |
| Kazakhstan | 540 | 8.3 | 5,967 | 91.7 |
| Kirgizia | 121 | 12.2 | 872 | 87.8 |
| Tadzhikistan | 37 | 4.9 | 835 | 95.1 |
| Turkmenia | 137 | 13.7 | 864 | 86.3 |
| Uzbekistan | 1,063 | 23.9 | 3,383 | 76.1 |
| Total | 1,898 | 13.7 | 11,921 | 86.3 |

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The urban rate for the USSR as a whole in 1926 was 17.9 per cent. Thus the urban rate of 13.[illegible] per cent for Central Asia was significantly below that. The rate for Tadzhikistan was the lowest of all; Kazakhstan was next; Kirgizia was just below the mean for Central Asia; Turkmenia exactly at the same mean rate; and Uzbekistan was well above the mean for Central Asia and for the USSR as a whole.

In terms of absolute size of urban population in 1926, the Uzbek Republic was by far the largest, containing 56 per cent of the total urban population of Central Asia. Kazakhstan was next in size of urban population, containing 29 per cent of the total urban population.

Uzbekistan was the only republic with a number of large urban communities in 1926. At that time Tashkent was the seventh largest city in the USSR. No other city in Central Asia was close to it in size. Of 14 urban centers (20,000 and above) in Central Asia, seven were in Uzbekistan, four were in Kazakhstan, two in Kirgizia, and one in Turkmenia. None were in Tadzhikistan.

Tashkent had a population of 324,000, Samarkand 105,000, and Bukhara 47,000 in 1926. The cities of the Fergana Valley (Kokand, Andizhan, Namangan, Khodzhent-Leninabad, and Osh) had a total population of 285,000, and over 300,000 if Margelan and Fergana were added. Of the rest of Central Asia, Alma-Ata alone, with 132,000, was a city of any size. Ashkhabad had 52,000, Frunze 37,000, and Stalinabad 5,600. (These are the capitals of Turkmenia, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan respectively.) The remaining urban centers

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were in Kazakhstan: the oil and railroad city of Uralsk, the cotton and coal city of Chimkent, and the cotton city of Dzhambul.

Some of these urban centers were administrative, such as the republic capitals, some cultural, such as Samarkand and Bukhara, and some economic, such as the Fergana Valley cities and those enumerated above in Kazakhstan. Only in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were the urban communities economic or intellectual centers. The urban communities of Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia were administrative centers and little more.

Tadzhikistan in 1926 had no large urban centers and few small ones. Stalinabad (Dyushambe), the capital, was at a temporary low point; it had lost part of its population because of unrest in the region. Leninabad (Khodzhent), with a population of 37,500, had not yet been joined to Tadzhikistan. Thus, the population of Tadzhikistan was disproportionately rural.

The Kazakh urban rate was low. The relationship between herding and low urban rates has already been pointed out.

* * * *

The distribution of ethnic groups by republic gives some idea of concentration or dispersion of the various peoples of Central Asia. The republic as a unit is a gross measure, but is useful. Table 1.c.XIV shows the distribution of ethnic groups by republic.

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Table 1.c.XIV. Distribution of Ethnic Groups by Republic, 1926.

(Thousands)

| Ethnic Group | Republic or Administrative Division | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Kazakhstan | Uzbekistan | Kirgizia | Turkmenia | Tadzhikistan | Karakalpakia |
| Dungan | 8 | | 6 | | | |
| Karakalpak | 2 | 27 | | 1.5 | | 116 |
| Kazakh | 3,713 | 105 | 2 | 9.5 | | 86 |
| Kirgiz | 10 | 80 | 661 | | | |
| Tatar | 79 | 28 | 5 | 5 | | 1 |
| Turkmen | | 22 | | 720 | 4 | 10 |
| Uigur1/ | 63 | 36 | 7.5 | | | |
| Uzbek2/ | 129 | 3,299 | 110 | 104 | | 84 |
| Afghan | | | | 4 | | |
| Beluchi | | | | 10 | | |
| Dzhemshid | | | | 1 | | |
| Tadzhik3/ | 7.6 | 351 | 3 | | 619 | |
| Belo-Russian | 5 | 3.5 | | | | |
| Russian | 1,520 | 241 | 116 | 75 | 6 | 5 |
| Ukrainian | 657 | 25 | 64 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| Arab | | 28 | | | 3 | |
| Armenian | 15 | | 14 | | | |
| German | 51 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | |
| Sart-Kalmuk | | | 2.5 | | | |

1/ Includes Taranchi and Kashgarian.

2/ Includes Kipchak and Kurama.

3/ Includes Yagnobi.



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The total number of Kazakhs in the USSR in 1926 was 3,968,000. Of these, 3,831,000 lived in Central Asia, and 137,000 in the neighboring RSFSR. Another 20,000 Kazakhs resided in Central Asia outside of Kazakhstan. Therefore 86 per cent of the Kazakhs lived in Kazakhstan. Kazakhs constituted only 57 per cent of the population of Kazakhstan.

The Kirgiz numbered 763,000 in 1926. Of these, 661,000 lived in Kirgizia, 80,000 in Uzbekistan, 11,000 in Tadzhikistan, and 10,000 in Kazakhstan. A small number of Kirgiz lived outside Central Asia in the USSR. Kirgizia contained 87 per cent of all Kirgiz in the USSR in 1926. The Kirgiz constituted 67 per cent of the population of Kirgizia.

The Karakalpaks numbered 146,000 in 1926. Of these, 116,000 dwelled in Karakalpakia, 26,600 lived in Uzbekistan, 2,000 in Kazakhstan, and 1,500 in Turkmenia. Insignificant numbers lived elsewhere in the Soviet Union. A total of 79 per cent of the Karakalpaks lived in Karakalpakia. They consituted 38 per cent of the population of the region.

The Uzbeks (including Kipchaks and Kuramas) numbered 3,988,000 in 1926. Of these, 3,382,000 lived in Uzbekistan, excluding Tadzhikistan. Of the remainder, 604,000 resided elsewhere in Central Asia. Some 2,000 lived in the Soviet Union outside of Central Asia. The Uzbeks were 74 per cent of the population of Uzbekistan; here lived 85 per cent of all Uzbeks in the Soviet Union.

The total number of Turkmens in the

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USSR in 1926 was 764,000. Of these, 720,000 lived in Turkmenia, and 36,000 elsewhere in Central Asia, primarily in Uzbekistan, Karakalpakia and Tadzhikistan. Some 8,000 dwelled in the Soviet Union outside of Central Asia. Turkmens were 72 per cent of the population of their republic. In Turkmenia lived 96 per cent of all Turkmens in the Soviet Union.

The Tadzhiks (including 2,000 Mountain Tadzhiks) numbered 980,000 in 1926. Of these, 619,000 lived in Tadzhikistan, 351,000 in Uzbekistan, and 10,600 elsewhere in Central Asia. Few lived in the USSR outside Central Asia. Tadzhiks composed 75 per cent of the population of Tadzhikistan; here lived 63 per cent of all Tadzhiks in the USSR.

The Uigurs (including Taranchis and Kashgárians) numbered 108,500 in 1926. Of these, 63,000 were in Kazakhstan, 36,000 in Uzbekistan, and 7,500 in Kirgizia. Few lived in the USSR outside Central Asia.

In 1926 the Dungans, a Chinese Moslem people, numbered some 14,000, of whom 8,000 lived in Kazakhstan and 6,000 in Kirgizia.

The Tatars, who were Turks originating in European Russia, numbered 118,000 in Central Asia in 1926. Of these, 79,000 lived in Kazakhstan, 28,000 in Uzbekistan, and the remainder in small numbers elsewhere, with the exception of Tadzhikistan.

Azerbaidzhanis, or Turkis, in Central Asia were found chiefly in Uzbekistan. Here they numbered 17,000 in 1926. In Turkmenia they numbered 4,000, in Tadzhikistan 4,000, and in

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Kirgizia 4,000.

Russians, including Ukrainians and Belo-Russians, totalled 2,726,000 in Central Asia in 1926. Of these, 2,182,000 lived in Kazakhstan, and composed 80 per cent of the Russians in Central Asia. The remaining 544,000 lived chiefly in Uzbekistan (269,000) and Kirgizia (180,000).

A small number of Germans, 61,000, inhabited Central Asia. Of these, 51,000 lived in Kazakhstan.

Additional peoples in Soviet Central Asia in 1926 included 29,000 Arabs. Of these, 25,000 lived in Uzbekistan, 3,000 in Tadzhikistan, and scattered numbers elsewhere. Beluchis, whose main population is located in present-day Pakistan, totalled 10,000, primarily in Turkmenia, in 1926. Afghans, numbering 5,000, were found chiefly in Turkmenia (4,000) and in Uzbekistan (1,000).

Other ethnic groups numbered less than 1,000.

The general conclusion from the foregoing Table 1.c.XIV and accompanying remarks is that sub-groups in Central Asia are not widely scattered. The various nationalities are found either in their native localities or in adjacent ones. For example, the Kirgiz are separated from Turkmenia by Uzbekistan. The number of Kirgiz in Turkmenia in 1926 was zero or close to it, and the number of Turkmens in Kirgizia likewise appears insignificant.

It should be considered that the

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habitat of the Kirgiz is the Tien-Shan and Pamir Ranges, while the Turkmens live in and around the Kara-Kum Desert and the Akhal, Murgab, Tedzhen and Amu-Darya water courses. Nevertheless, some Turkmens also occupy the Kopet-Dag Range. Thus, habitat is not a decisive factor, as illustrated by the fact that Turkmens are able to live in a mountainous environment as well as in deserts and close to the water courses.

The Dungans are a Chinese-speaking Islamic community. They migrated from Chinese Turkestan to Russian Central Asia in the 1870s and 1880s. Primarily dependent on irrigation agriculture for subsistence, they are found in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, regions directly bordering their place of origin. In 1926 nc Dungans were found elsewhere in Central Asia. The same thesis regarding migration can be made out for the other native peoples of Central Asia.

For centuries Russians and Tatars have been migrating as merchants into the region. Russians are scattered also as civil administrators and military personnel. Therefore these peoples are found in republics with large urban centers, chiefly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, next in Kirgizia and Turkmenia, finally in Tadzhikistan and Karakalpakia.

But Russians migrated into Central Asia also as peasants and urban workers. As such they are subject to the same rule of distribution as Central Asian peoples. Their greatest proportion is in northern Kazakhstan. The reason for this is to be found in the geographic proximity to western Siberia and European Russia,

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the place of origin of Russian farmers in Central Asia.

The Collectivization Period, 1930-1933.

The populations of Central Asia were affected by the collectivization process in different ways. Collectivization meant radical shifts in the way of life of all the Central Asian peoples. It should be borne in mind that during the 1920s little significant change had been introduced into Central Asia. The initial Russian conquest of Central Asia in the mid-19th century probably wrought a deeper effect than the first decade of Sovietization.

However, in 1929 and on, the political, economic and cultural situation generally underwent a profound transformation. During the collectivization period, the last open resistance of the Basmachi movement came to an end; the Communist Party organization achieved its ultimate form; herders were settled in permanent villages; the establishment of the collective farm system was carried forward; industrialization was accelerated; and urban communities were developed at a faster rate than before.

The main impact of the collectivization process was borne by the Kazakhs. Their population fell, and the traditional leadership was eliminated. The elimination of traditional leadership was a process in which all other peoples of Central Asia participated, but among the Kazakhs this process was accompanied by vast demographic and economic losses.

The herds in Kazakhstan fell in

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the collectivization period. The total number of livestock was above 40 million in 1929, falling to 33 million in 1930. In 1933 the herds numbered five million head. So severe was the loss during the collectivization period that even in 1953 the number of sheep had not regained the level of the late 1920s.

The Kazakhs were the primary herd owners in Kazakhstan. Hence, we may say that their population losses, which will be shown below, reflect in the most direct way this herd loss.

The reasons for the losses in Kazakh population are complex. The Soviet writings of the period refer to GPU (State Police) arrests and related police action. Flight across the border was undoubtedly another factor contributing to population loss. The official Soviet explanation in 1939 alluded to the movement of Kazakhs to the cities. This explanation does not tell how a Kazakh changes his nationality by moving to the cities.

The chief cause of the loss in Kazakh population was directly involved with the process of collectivization. The Kazakhs, we may hazard, slaughtered their stock or left them untended in the years of turmoil at the beginning of the 1930s. The livestock starved, hence the people starved. Moreover, the Kazakhs were settled in villages and camps in preparation for collectivization. But the people were not prepared for the new way of life; and the villages and camps were not prepared for the new occupants. In this area must be sought the principal causes of Kazakh population loss.

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The over-all drop in Kazakh population was from 3,968,289 in 1926 to 3,098,764 in 1939. This is a net loss of 869,525, or 21.9 per cent.

Other peoples in the Soviet Union showed a net loss between the 1926 and 1939 censuses. Ukrainians fell off by 3,100,000, or ten per cent. Poles were reduced by 166,000, or 21 per cent. Suffering losses too were the Moldavians, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Kurds and Iranians (Persians). However, Kazakh losses were among the most severe in the entire USSR, both in absolute numbers and in percentage loss.

The figures cited show only the net loss of the period. The expected population of the Kazakhs would have been far higher had they shared the increase of the USSR as a whole or of the neighboring Kirgiz. The total increase of the Kirgiz 1926-1939 was the same as the USSR as a whole. Both were 15.9 per cent. Applying this rate of increase to the Kazakhs, we derive an expected 1939 population of 4,600,000, a projected increase of 630,000. The projected population loss is 1,500,000.

It may be presumed that Kazakhs outside of Kazakhstan did not share in this loss, but participated in the increase of population in southern Siberia, Kirgizia, Uzbekistan and other areas. If this is so, then the loss among the Kazakhs of Kazakhstan was even greater; the projected loss among these Kazakhs is estimated at over 40 per cent.

The total population change for the native peoples of Central Asia from 1926 to 1939 is shown in Table 1.c.XV.

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Table 1.c.XV. Population Change in Central Asia by Native Peoples, 1926-1939. (Thousands)

| Peoples | 1926 | 1939 | Per Cent Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arabs | 29 | 22 | -24 |
| Dungans | 15 | 25 1/ | |
| Iranis | 44 | 39 | -11 |
| Karakalpaks | 146 | 186 | +28 |
| Kazakhs | 3,968 | 3,099 | -22 |
| Kirgiz | 763 | 884 | +16 |
| Tadzhiks 2/ | 980.5 | 1,229 | +25 |
| Turkmens | 764 | 812 | + 6 |
| Uigurs 3/ | 42.5 | 45 | + 6 |
| Uzbeks 4/ | 3,988 | 4,844 | +21 |

1/ Circa 1950. No information for 1939.
2/ Including Yagnobis.
3/ Uigurs alone. Uigurs together with Kashgarians and Taranchis numbered 108,5000 in 1926 and "over 100,000" in 1939.
4/ Including Kuramas and Kipchaks.



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Ethnic groups in Central Asia which increased from 1926 to 1939 were: Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirgiz, Turkmens, Karakalpaks and Uigurs. Ethnic groups which decreased were Kazakhs, Iranians (Persians), and Arabs. For all these nationalities there was a total increase of seven per cent from 1926 to 1939. Those nationalities which gained in number gained at a rate of 20 per cent.

The ethnic groups showing increase were highly uneven in the rate of increase. The Kirgiz increased at the same rate as the All-Union average, 15.9 per cent. The Turkmen increase was six per cent, well below. The Uzbeks, Tadzhiks and Karakalpaks were well above the All-Union average rate of increase. The highest percentage was found among the Karakalpaks. The question arises whether they increased at the expense of the Kazakhs.

Culturally the Karakalpaks have been close to the Kazakhs. At the beginning of the 20th century many teachers among the Karakalpaks came from the Kazakhs. In the 1926-1939 period Karakalpak teachers increased about 15,000 above the expected rate. It is possible that this difference was made up by Kazakhs who either joined the Karakalpak communities by migration, or simply declared themselves to be Karakalpaks in the 1939 census.

The Turkmens had a low rate of increase in the 1926-1939 period. Applying the arbitrary rate of 16 per cent to the Turkmens, the expected increment in 1939 would have been 120,000 over 1926, yielding a projected population of about 885,000. Instead, the 1939 total was 812,000,

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which was 73,000 below the expected number. Little attention has been paid to the Turkmen population trend which fell below the projected increase. The Turkmens, presumably, were subject to the same forces as the Kazakhs, although to a lesser degree.

## III. Population Trends by Republic, 1926-1939

The entire population of Central Asia increased in the 1926-1939 period. The various administrative units underwent a number of changes in the period. The chief of these changes were:

(1) The separation of Tadzhikistan from Uzbekistan.

(2) The addition of a part of the Fergana Valley in the vicinity of Leninabad (Khodzhent) to Tadzhikistan from Uzbekistan.

(3) The addition of Karakalpakia to Uzbekistan from Kazakhstan.

The total area of Central Asia in 1926 was 3,918,000 km. sq., whereas in 1939 it was 3,972,000 km. sq., an insignificant change. The difference in area is 54,000 km. sq., an increase of 1.2 per cent.

The area of the United States is 7.8 million km. sq., and that of the USSR as a whole is 22.3 million km. sq. The territorial expanse of Central Asia is over half that of the United States; it is 18 per cent of the total area of the Soviet Union.

The population change by republic is shown in Table 1.c.XVI.

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Table I. c. XVI. Population Changes in Central Asian Republics, 1926-1939. (1939 Boundaries) (Thousands)

| Republic | 1926 | 1939 | Per Cent Increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | 6,074 | 6,146 | 1.2 |
| Kirgizia | 1,002 | 1,459 | 45.7 |
| Tadzhikistan | 1,032 | 1,485 | 43.9 |
| Turkmenia | 998 | 1,254 | 25.6 |
| Uzbekistan | 4,565 | 6,282 | 37.6 |
| Total | 13,670 | 16,626 | 21.6 |

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The total increase in Central Asian population for the period was 2,956,000, or 21.6 per cent. The decrease in the number of Kazakhs and the low rate of increase of Turkmens was counterbalanced by in-migration of Russians into Kazakhstan and Turkmenia.

The rate of increase in population of each republic was consistently higher than the rate of increase of the titular nationality, i.e., the nationality giving its name to the republic.

The rates of the republics as compared to the ethnic groups are shown in Table 1.c.XVII.

Table 1.c.XVII. Rate of Population Change by Republic and by Titular Nationality, 1926-1929.

| Republic | Per Cent | Nationality | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakh SSR | +1.2 | Kazakhs | -22 |
| Kirgiz SSR | +46 | Kirgiz | +16 |
| Tadzhik SSR | +44 | Tadzhiks | +25 |
| Turkmen SSR | +26 | Turkmens | +6 |
| Uzbek SSR | +38 | Uzbeks | +21 |



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In every case in Table 1.c.XVII population of the republics has grown faster than the titular nationality. The difference is to be accounted for by in-migration of Russians.

The result of the Russian in-migration was the reduction in proportion of the native populations of Central Asia to the total population of the region. The best index of this reduction is the proportion of the titular nationality of a republic to the total population of that republic (e.g., the proportion of Uzbeks in the population of Uzbekistan). The comparison between 1926 and 1939 is shown in Table 1.c.XVIII.



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Table 1.c.XVIII Titular Nationality by Republic, 1926-1939
(Thousands)

| Republic | 1926 | | 1939 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pop. of Titular Group | Per Cent | Pop. of Titular Group | Per Cent |
| Kazakhstan | 3,713 | 57 | 2,640 | 43 |
| Kirgizia | 661 | 66 | 760 | 52 |
| Tadzhikistan | 619 | 75 | 890 | 60 |
| Turkmenia | 720 | 72 | 740 | 59 |
| Uzbekistan | 3,299 | 74 | 4,080 | 65 |



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The course of Russian in-migration has had a number of important consequences. The Kazakhs are no longer the majority in their own republic. The Kirgiz are little more than a majority, and if the trends of the 1930s continue, will follow the Kazakhs in this matter. The Turkmens and Tadzhiks have fallen off sharply. The Uzbeks, while strongest of all, were relatively weaker in 1939 than they were in 1926.

The proportion of Tadzhiks decreased by 15 per cent between 1926 and 1939. They were 75 per cent of the population of Tadzhikistan in 1926; they were 60 per cent in 1939. During the same period the Kirgiz and Kazakhs decreased by 14 per cent, the Turkmens by 13 per cent, and the Uzbeks by nine per cent.

* * * *

The Russians (excluding Ukrainians and Belo-Russians) numbered 1,958,000 in Central Asia in 1926. They were 14 per cent of the total population. In 1939 Russians were about 3,900,000 or 23 per cent of the total population. The Russians in 1939 were nearly double the number in 1926. These conclusions are estimates.

The breakdown of Russian population in Central Asia is given in Table 1.c.XIX.

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Table 1.c.XIX Russians in Central Asia, 1926-1939.

| Republic[1] | 1926 Russian Pop.[2] | 1926 Per Cent | 1939 Russian Pop.[2] | 1939 Per Cent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | 1,525 | 23.5 | 2,300[3] | 37 |
| Kirgizia | 116 | 11.7 | 480[3] | 33 |
| Tadzhikistan | 5.6 | 6.8 | 133 | 9 |
| Turkmenia | 75 | 7.5 | 226 | 18 |
| Uzbekistan | 246.5 | 5.5 | 727 | 11.6 |
| Total | 1,958.1 | 14.2 | 3,866 | 23 |

1/ 1926 boundaries.
2/ Great-Russians alone, excluding Ukrainians and Belo-Russians.
3/ Estimate.



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Between 1926 and 1939, Russians in Kazakhstan increased by 700,000 - 800,000, or 66 per cent; in Uzbekistan they increased by 480,000, a threefold increase; in Kirgizia by 366,000, a fourfold increase; in Tadzhikistan by 127,000, a twenty-four fold increase; and in Turkmenia by 150,000, a threefold increase. Of the Russian in-migrants to Central Asia in 1926-1939, some 40 per cent settled in Kazakhstan, chiefly in urban areas.

The whole of Central Asia increased from 13.77 million to 16.6 million during the 1926-1939 period. This is a difference of 2,860,000, or 21 per cent. According to the above estimate, the Russians in Central Asia increased by 1,200,000, or about 45 per cent. The Russians therefore contributed 42 per cent of the rise in population.

Russian in-migration prior to the Revolution was partly urban, but to a great extent was rural; since the Revolution Russian movement into Central Asia has been chiefly urban.

* * * *

The rate of urban growth in Central Asia, 1926-1939, is shown in Table 1.c.XX.



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Table 1.c.XX Urban Growth by Republic, 1926-1939.
(Thousands)

| Rep. | 1926 Urban Population 1/ | 1926 Per Cent Urban | 1939 Urban Pop. | 1939 Per Cent Urban |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kaz. 2/ | 519(539.5) | 8.5 | 1,706 | 27.8 |
| Kir. 3/ | 122(121) | 12.1 | 271 | 18.5 |
| Tad. 4/ | 106(40.5) | 10.2 | 252 | 17.0 |
| Tur. 5/ | 137(137) | 13.7 | 416 | 33.2 |
| Uzb. 6/ | 1,012(1,062.5) | 22.1 | 1,445 | 23.0 |
| Total | 1,897(1,900.5) | 13.8 | 4,090 | 24.6 |

1/ 1939 boundaries. 1926 urban population in 1926 boundaries given in parentheses.
2/ Kazakhstan.
3/ Kirgizia.
4/ Tadzhikistan.
5/ Turkmenia.
6/ Uzbekistan.



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Kazakhstan lost a small amount of urban population by shifts in boundaries from 1926 to 1939, as did Uzbekistan. Turkmenia and Kirgizia were virtually unaffected; Tadzhikistan gained heavily in the region of Leninabad Oblast, transferred from Uzbekistan. The over-all urban change through change in boundary was insignificant.

The urban rate of increase by republic, 1926-1939, is shown in Table 1.c.XXI.



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Table 1.c.XXI Urban Rate of Increase by Republic, 1926-1939.

| Republic | Absolute Increase (Thousands) | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | 1,187 | 229 |
| Kirgizia | 149 | 122 |
| Tadzhikistan | 146 | 138 |
| Turkmenia | 279 | 204 |
| Uzbekistan | 433 | 43 |

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Kazakhstan, the least urbanized of the republics in 1926, was one of the most highly urbanized in 1939; it was 27.8 per cent urban, second only to Turkmenia, which was 33.2 per cent urban. Uzbekistan, the most highly urbanized in 1926, increased but little in 1939, from 22 per cent to 23 per cent urban. Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan increased in urbanism in a degree midway between the high rates of increase in Kazakhstan and Turkmenia, and the relatively low rate of Uzbekistan.

By way of contrast, the over-all rural change was very small. There was great variation in the change in each republic

Table 1.c.XXII shows the rural population change by republic, 1926-1939.



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Table 1.c.XXII. Rural Population Change by Republic, 1926-1939.

| Republic | (Thousands) 1926 | 1939 | Change Absolute | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | 5,555 | 4,440 | -1,115 | -20 |
| Kirgizia | 879 | 1,189 | +310 | +35 |
| Tadzhikistan | 926 | 1,233 | +307 | +33 |
| Turkmenia | 861 | 837 | -24 | -3 |
| Uzbekistan | 3,553 | 4,837 | +1,284 | +36 |
| Total | 11,775 | 12,537 | 762 | 6.5 |



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The decrease in Kazakh population as an ethnic unit, 1926-1939, was a rural loss, amounting to 20 per cent. The over-all gain in the population of Kazakhstan, as an administrative unit, was urban. The rural population of Kazakhstan decreased through the decline in the number of Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs probably lost over one million people in rural Kazakhstan.

Turkmenia, too, had a rural population loss which, despite the large urban increase, contributed to the relatively small population increase of Turkmenia. It will be recalled that the gain in Turkmen ethnic population was six per cent. Thus, while the Turkmen population increased, it was largely an urban increase, accompanied by a rural decrease.

The 1926-1939 rates of increase in the rural populations of Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikistan are all above 30 per cent, relatively high rates. In these three republics the rates of increase of the titular nationality were also high.

The last census of the USSR took place on January 17, 1939. Since that time no census has been taken. Population estimates are based upon school data and voter district analysis. These are subject to wide margins of error, but are the best available techniques for population estimates.

A number of factors contribute to the most recent population trends in Central Asia.

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The first of these are the war losses. While Central Asia was removed from the center of hostilities in World War II, nevertheless the region suffered a loss in population. Part of the war losses were direct - those killed, wounded, or missing in action. On the other hand, families were broken up, and the birth rate declined. Medical facilities contracted in scope. It may be assumed that the war loss rate for Central Asia is low compared to the USSR as a whole.

There was a large amount of re-settlement in Central Asia from the theater of war in European Russia. Therefore, we may expect a relatively small movement in population figures either way, since the war-loss rate is opposed by the re-settlement pattern.

School registration data in the 1950s indicate a declining birth rate during the war years, for the new school registrations in 1950-1953 were those children born seven to eight years earlier, in 1942-1945. Finally, there was a movement back to European Russia after the war. Industries which had been formerly re-located in Central Asia, primarily in Kazakhstan, were once more re-established in their original sites, at least in part. The workers in these industries moved back with the plants.

Then came a countermovement in the 1950s, involving a renewed flow back to Central Asia. The increased mining activities in Central Asia required an ever-greater labor force, larger than the labor force that could be recruited locally. In 1952-1955 an increase in the rural labor force took place. The virgin soil policy of these

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years called for recruitment of urban youth in European Russia to go to southern Siberia and northern Kazakhstan where the new lands program was being carried forward. These various trends have increased the number and proportions of Russians in Central Asia.

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## IV. Estimated Population since 1939

Since the last population census in 1939, a number of factors have influenced the growth and decline in population of the Soviet Union and of Central Asia. The chief of these influences has been World War II, with its profound effect on the Soviet birth rate, on the deaths directly and indirectly related to the war, war-caused migrations, and the acquisition of the western provinces by the Soviet Union. All but the last factor have had an effect on Central Asia as well. The shift in Soviet population eastward has had a particularly powerful influence on population trends in Central Asia, which has been a primary objective in the eastward movement as well as a staging area for further eastward movement.

Another factor which has affected the population of Central Asia has been the location of scheduled populations in the region. By scheduled population is meant a group which is subject to any kind of restriction not generally imposed. Thus there are labor camps in various parts of Central Asia, the settlement of nationalities deported from other parts of the Soviet Union, and of individuals who are not under police guard but whose movements, work and pay are restricted by other means.

The population of Central Asia in 1939 was 16,600,000, or just under ten per cent of the total population of the Soviet Union which at that time was 170,500,000. The 1955 estimate for Central Asia as a whole, given in Table 1.c.XXIII, is 20,000,000, which is close to ten per cent of the total population of the Soviet

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Union. However, the absolute increase in the population of Central Asia had to be higher than that of the Soviet Union as a whole in order to maintain the same proportion. Whereas the Soviet Union gained population through territorial gains along its western frontier (eastern Finland, the Baltic states, parts of East Prussia, eastern Poland and northern Rumania), no territorial gains were made in the Middle East. The ratio was maintained by virtue of in-migration of people from the western parts of the Soviet Union, a phase of the Soviet eastward movement generally.



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Table 1.c.XXIII. Population of Central Asia by Republic, 1939-1955 (Millions)

| Year | Kaz. | Uzbek. | Kir. | Turk. | Tadzh. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1939 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| 1947 | (6.3) | 5.9 | | 1.3 | 1.6 |
| 1950 | (7.1) | 6.5 | 1.8 | | |
| 1951 | | 6.6 | 1.8 | | 1.7 |
| 1953 | | | | 1.3 | |
| 1955 | (8.2) | 7.2 | (1.9) | (1.3) | (1.8) |
| 1956 | 8.5 | 7.3 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.8 |

Total Population, Central Asia (Thousands)

| | |
|---|---|
| 1939 | 16.6 |
| 1955 | 20.4 |
| 1956 | 20.9 |

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The total population of Soviet Central Asia in 1955 on the basis of figures given in Table 1.c.XXIII was 20,400,000. This is a highly approximative estimate, and is given only in a tentative manner. It is founded on a number of assumptions. The method whereby this figure was arrived at is a modified version of that which has been applied by D. B. Shimkin, Bureau of the Census.

The estimates of population have been made by working with two sets of knowns - the school enrollments and the voting registrations. In one case, however, there is a marked discrepancy between the actual number of registered voters and the expected number. In Kazakhstan, the number of registered voters in December 1937 was 2,788,000, while one year later, in January 1939, the total population of Kazakhstan was 6,146,000. Inasmuch as the number of voters is approximately equal to the total number of full and franchised citizens in the Soviet Union, we may assume that this is approximately the number of people aged 18 and over, i.e., those able to vote. The average proportion of those aged 18 and over in Central Asia as a whole in 1939 was 54.9 per cent on this basis; the proportion of those aged 18 and over in Kirgizia in 1939 was 54.8 per cent. If we apply the gross proportion of 55 per cent to Kazakhstan in 1939, then we would expect a figure of 3,370,000. Thirteen months earlier the number given was 580,000 below that. The inference is that the population of Kazakhstan increased by that amount in 13 months. This inference cannot be accepted. The voting population of Kazakhstan increased by 86,000 in 1950-1951. In this figure both natural and migration factors are present.



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If we assume that the natural increase in 1937-1939 was about 80,000, then the difference of approximately one-half million must be accounted for in another way. One explanation is that the difference is the number of those counted in the January 1939 census, but deprived of the right to vote in December 1937.

A general idea of war losses may be gained from Table 1.c.XXIII. The estimated population for Kazakhstan in 1947 was about 110,000 over 1939; Uzbekistan in 1947 was about 360,000 below; the figure for Turkmenia in 1947 is about 20,000 above 1939; and Tadzhikistan some 130,000 above 1939. No figure for Kirgizia is available. The gains in Kazakhstan may be attributed to in-migration of workers in various industries during the war, as well as of certain minorities abolished in other parts of the Soviet Union. It is known that the Chechens who were deported from their land in the North Caucasus have appeared in Kazakhstan. Balkars, a people of the North Caucasus, were deported. They are reported at present in Kirgizia.

The loss in Uzbekistan through the war may be partly a reflection of an out-migration from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan during the war period.

The bases upon which the estimates were computed are given in Tables 1.c.XXIV and Table 1.c.XXV. Table 1.c.XXIV shows the school enrollments in Central Asia, and Table 1.c.XXV shows the voting registrations.

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Table 1.c.XXIV. School Enrollments, Central Asia, 1938-1955
(Thousands)

| Year[1] | Kaz. | Uzbek. | Kir. | Turk. | Tadzh. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1938 | 1,102 | 1,105.5 | 297 | 205 | 252 |
| 1939 | 1,132 | 1,211 | 317 | 223 | 280 |
| 1940 | 1,150 | 1,252 | 320 | 215 | 302 |
| 1946 | 863 | 1,046 | 244 | 185.5 | 256 |
| 1947 | 1,000 | 1,071 | 280 | 200 | 273 |
| 1948 | | 1,121 | 303 | | 291 |
| 1949 | 1,200 | 1,242 | 315 | 204 | 302 |
| 1950 | 1,330 | 1,255[2] | 330 | 223 | (301) |
| 1951 | 1,346 | 1,300 | 324 | 230 | 300 |
| 1952 | | 1,268 | 315 | 232 | |
| 1953 | 1,263 | 1,260 | 305 | | 310 |
| 1954 | | 1,279 | | 222 | 336 |
| 1955 | 1,300 | 1,300[3] | (305)[4] | | |

1/ September of school year.
2/ Alternatively, 1,265,000.
3/ Under 1,300,000.
4/ Approximate figure.



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Table 1.c.XXV. Number of Registered Voters by Republic, 1937-1955. (Thousands)

| Date | Kaz. | Uzbek. | Kir. | Turk. | Tadzh. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec. 1937 | 2,788 | 3,548 | 799 | 652.5 | 752 |
| Feb. 1946 | 3,302 | 3,106.5 | 779 | 623 | 725.5 |
| Feb. 1947 | 3,554 | 3,268 | | 655 | 779.5 |
| Mar. 1950 | 3,860 | 3,498 | 977 | | 856.5 |
| Feb. 1951 | 3,946 | 3,546 | 994 | | 872 |
| Mar. 1953 | | | | 774 | |
| Mar. 1954 | 4,202 | 3,863 | 1,071 | | 949 |
| Mar. 1955 | 4,456 | 3,931 | | 780.5 | 965 |

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In January 1939 the total number of school enrollments of Central Asia was 3,027,000, or slightly over 18 per cent of the total population of Central Asia. The school enrollments of Kirgizia totalled 21 per cent of the total population. The school enrollments of Kazakhstan were 18 per cent, the Central Asian average. Those of Uzbekistan were the same as the Kazakhstan and the all-Central Asian ratio. The Turkmenian ratio was under 17 per cent. The Tadzhikistan ratio was 17.5 per cent.

All the Central Asian republics increased in school enrollments up to the beginning of World War II. The period 1940-1946 shows a sharp drop, not through war losses, but through inability to maintain the level of general schooling because of shortages in war manpower and materials.

During the war period, school enrollments in Central Asia declined by 25 per cent. The loss was about 645,000. Of all the republics, the decline in Kazakhstan was greatest, a loss of 287,000 school enrollments, 1940-1946. Uzbekistan fell off 206,000, far less than Kazakhstan.

The school enrollments for Central Asia increased from 1946 to 1950, then dropped decisively in the early 1950s. The total school enrollments in 1951 were 3,500,000, or 16 per cent over 1939. In 1953 school enrollments had dropped about 135,000, or four per cent. Children entering school in 1951 were born in 1943, that is, they were about age seven. The falling school enrollments in 1951-1953 reflect a falling birth rate in 1943-1945. This is to be expected.

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The voting activity of the different republics is another index of population trends. The number of voters by republic is given in Table 1.c.XXVII.

The in-migration pattern has had a demonstrable connection with the school registration pattern in the late 1940s, as shown by Table 1.c.XXIII and Table 1.c.XXIV. The school enrollments of Kazakhstan were 183,000 below Uzbekistan in 1946. The Kazakhstan school enrollments rose sharply in the period 1946-1950, the period of the Fourth Five Year Plan. By 1950 Kazakhstan was about 70,000 ahead of Uzbekistan. The rise in Kazakhstan during the period is probably the result of in-migration.

In the 1950-1955 period school enrollment in Kazakhstan fell more rapidly than in Uzbekistan. However, the voting pattern diverged from the school enrollment pattern: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been more or less equal in school enrollments, but Kazakhstan has forged ahead in voting registrations in the period 1950-1955.

The answer to these divergences in pattern may be sought in the history of the in-migrant movement. During the period 1940-1946, labor was moved into Kazakhstan. The voting registrations reflect this movement. At that time the families either did not accompany the working force to Kazakhstan, or, if they did, the schools were unable to accept the children. The great rise in Kazakhstan school enrollments from 863,000 to 1,000,000 during 1946 and 1947 shows this trend. The enrollment of the backlog of 137,000 children in the first full post-war school year in Kazakhstan was greater by 44,000

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than the increased enrollment of the rest of Central Asia together.

There was probably a population movement away from Kazakhstan in 1947-1949, or at least a reduced in-migration to Kazakhstan. During these years Uzbekistan increased its school enrollments at a faster rate than Kazakhstan, and was increasing its voting registration at almost the same rate as Kazakhstan. The number of registered voters in Kazakhstan increased by 8.6 per cent from 1947 to 1950; the number of registered voters in Uzbekistan in the same period increased by seven per cent. The movement out of Kazakhstan in the late 1940s probably included cross-border migration to southern Siberia, European Russia and Uzbekistan.

* * * *

A more simplified technique of population estimates is based upon the analysis of voting districts. The electoral laws of the Soviet Union record the ratio of total population per candidate for the various types of office. The number of candidates and voting districts is likewise known. The total population at the time of the election is thus a simple matter of multiplication. The difficulty with this method is that it does not allow for a time lag between registered voters and total population per district. That is, the exact population in a voting district may be several years behind the particular election date. Another difficulty is that the techniques of data-gathering are based on the same assumptions of the final estimate, namely, school enrollments and voting registrations. Therefore, there is a built-in error of

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circularity in the estimations. The end-result has no way of compensating for errors in the steps leading to it. Finally, the net in which to catch the population figures is a crude one.

The election districts are as large as 300,000 people per candidate (in the elections for All-Union Supreme Soviet). That is, a population estimate based upon an election to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is built upon districts of 300,000 population. The estimate may be high or low by half the figure per republic. The population of Turkmenia, given at 1.5 million plus or minus 150,000, thus has an error of ten per cent. Where the districts are smaller, as in the case of Republic Supreme Soviet elections, the standard error is of a totally different order of magnitude.

However, population estimates based upon voting district analysis afford a useful check on estimates based on other methods. Table 1.c.XXVI shows estimates by republic based on these election data.



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Table 1.c.XXVI. Population of Central Asia Based on Voting District Analysis, 1939-1955. (Thousands)

| Date | Kaz. | Uzbek. | Kir. | Turk. | Tadzh. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan. 1939 1/ | 6,146 | 6,282 | 1,459 | 1,254 | 1,485 |
| Feb. 1946 2/ | 5,700 | 6,000 | | | 1,500 |
| Feb. 1947 3/ | 6,600 | 6,000 | | 1,170 | 1,455 |
| Mar. 1950 4/ | 6,600 | 6,000 | 1,500 | | 1,500 |
| Feb. 1951 5/ | 6,800 | 6,180 | 1,565 | 1,220 | 1,455 |
| Mar. 1954 6/ | 7,200 | 6,300 | 1,800 | | 1,800 |
| Mar. 1955 7/ | 7,225 | 6,360 | 1,645 | 1,290 | 1,500 |

1/ Census.
2/ Election to Supreme Soviet, USSR. Voting district, 300,000 population, ±150,000.
3/ Election to Supreme Soviets of Republics. Voting district, Kazakhstan, 20,000 population, estimate ±10,000. Uzbekistan, 15,000, estimate ±7,500. Kirgizia, voting district, 3,000, estimate ±1,500. Turkmenia and Tadzhikistan, same as Kirgizia.
4/ Supreme Soviet, USSR. See Note 2.
5/ Republic Supreme Soviets. See Note 3.
6/ Supreme Soviet, USSR. See Note 2.
7/ Republic Supreme Soviets. See Note 3.



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The total population of Central Asia at the beginning of 1955 is reckoned at 18,020,000 ± 10,000.

This final figure gives a false impression of precision. The possibility of a far greater error should be borne in mind. Thus, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan in 1954 had a population estimated at 1,800,000 each on the basis of the elections that year. Yet in the following year they appear to have lost a combined population of 455,000.

Similarly, the larger republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan appear to have gained in population by a respective net of 25,000 and 60,000. This is far below the expected annual rate of increase.

In the cases of Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan, the apparent loss is predicated upon differences in the estimation of population in the all-union elections as opposed to the republic-wide election. In the case of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the populations were estimated virtually identical in the elections to the All-Union Soviet and to the Republic Soviet. They allowed for little increase in population.

The total population increase in Central Asia during 1939-1956 was 1,580,000, or nine per cent, according to the voting district data. The increase by republic is given in Table 1.c.XXVII.



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Table 1.c.XXVII. Central Asia. Increase in Population by Republic, 1939-1954/55.[1]

| Republic | Absolute Increase (Thousands) | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | 1,066 | 17.5 |
| Uzbekistan | 48 | 2.5 |
| Kirgizia | 264 | 18.0 |
| Turkmenia | 36 | 0.3 |
| Tadzhikistan | 165 | 12.0 |
| Total | 1,579 | 9.0 |

1/ The 1954/55 figure is based upon the mean of the 1954 and 1955 totals, except in the case of Turkmenia.



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The results by this method are considerably at variance with those given on the basis of indices in Table 1.c. XXIII and Table 1.c. XXIV above. On the basis of previous tables, a total population in Central Asia of 20 million in 1955 is imputed. On the basis of Table 1.c. XXVI, a total population of 18 million is imputed. Because of what is known about in-migration into Central Asia - primarily Kazakhstan, secondarily Kirgizia - the higher figure is more reasonable.

There are areas of agreement between the two population series in Table 1c.XXIII and Table 1.c.XXVI. In both series, there is an over-all increase in the population of Central Asia. The highest of increases in the period 1939-1955 and the largest population in 1955 are in Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan was slightly larger than Kazakhstan in population in 1939; it is considerably smaller in both series after that year. The same relative proportions and rates of increase for the other republics are shown in both tables.

Turkmenia had an average increase of 20,000 voting registrations per annum in 1947-1953. Tadzhikistan, with 19 per cent more voters in 1947, had an average annual increase in the period 1947-1954 of 34,500, or 70 per cent above Turkmenia's rate. The difference is explainable to a large extent by the 1948 earthquake.

Soviet Eastward Movement

Kazakhstan has participated in the eastward movement of population in the USSR since World War II to a greater extent than the rest of

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Central Asia. The primary factor in the eastward movement has been the expansion of industry in southern Siberia and the Urals; the development of mining in Kazakhstan has been an important part of this industrial expansion. The secondary factor has been some increase in the rural population in the Kulunda and Barabin Steppes of Kazakhstan - an increase through in-migration. These steppes have been part of the virgin and abandoned lands program of Soviet agriculture. (See Chapter on Agriculture.) There has been an ebb and flow in this movement, but an undoubted net gain for Kazakhstan since World War II.

Kirgizia and Uzbekistan have had a net increase through in-migration. This has been composed of internal movement in Central Asia, primarily from Kazakhstan, but also from the RSFSR. The in-migration has been mainly in the mining and industrial sectors of Kirgizia and Uzbekistan.

The comparatively slow rate of growth of Turkmenia and Tadzhikistan is related to the low in-migration rate. The most important factor in the rate of growth has been natural increase, that is, the excess of births over deaths. The natural increase factor has supported the population-increase trends throughout Central Asia. But the most dramatic gains have been through the eastward migration in the Soviet Union.

Urban and Rural Trends, 1939-1955

The last topic to be treated under Population will be the urban and rural trends. As we


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have seen, the urban population of Central Asia increased from 1,897,000 in 1926 to 4,090,000 in 1939, an increase of 2,293,000 or 120.9 per cent.

The rural population of Central Asia in the period 1926-1939 remained relatively static; it increased from 11,775,000 to 12,537,000, a difference of 762,000, or 6.4 per cent.

Table 1.c.XXVIII shows the urban and rural population trends in Central Asia by republic, from 1939 to 1955.



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Table 1.c.XXVIII. Central Asia. Urban and Rural Trends by Republic, 1939-1955

(Thousands)

| Kazakhstan | | |
|---|---|---|
| Year | Urban Per Cent | Rural Per Cent |
| 1939 | 27.8 | 72.2 |
| 1950 | 30 | 70 |
| 1955 | 32 | 68 |

| Uzbekistan | | |
|---|---|---|
| Year | Urban Per Cent | Rural Per Cent |
| 1939 | 23 | 77 |
| 1947 | 26 | 74 |
| 1955 | 26 | 74 |

| Kirgizia | | |
|---|---|---|
| Year | Urban Per Cent | Rural Per Cent |
| 1939 | 18.5 | 81.5 |
| 1951 | 23.5 | 76.5 |
| 1955 | 26.5 | 73.5 |

| Turkmenia | | |
|---|---|---|
| Year | Urban Per Cent | Rural Per Cent |
| 1939 | 33.2 | 66.8 |
| 1955 | 30 | 70 |

| Tadzhikistan | | |
|---|---|---|
| Year | Urban Per Cent | Rural Per Cent |
| 1939 | 17 | 83 |
| 1947 | 15 | 85 |
| 1951 | 19 | 81 |

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The calculations in Table 1.c.XXVIII are made on the basis of rural-urban ratios included in the voting districts in the various republics.

The urban population of Kazakhstan increased two per cent in the period 1939-1950. Around 1950 there was a lull in the eastward movement within the Soviet Union; part of the eastward movement was the migration into Kazakhstan. Since the larger part of this movement was urban, the relatively low increase in the urban ratio in 1939-1950 would be complemented by higher rates of increase in the years prior to 1950, and after.

The urban proportion of the total population of Kazakhstan increased by two per cent in the five years 1950-1955, a higher rate of increase than the 1939-1950 period. In 1955 Kazakhstan had the highest urban ratio of Central Asia, 32 per cent, and contained 48 per cent of the total urban population of Central Asia.

The rural population of Kazakhstan increased by 1.3 -1.4 million from 1939 to 1950. Despite the great urban gains, in 1955 Kazakhstan was still over two-thirds rural.

Urban Uzbekistan grew both absolutely and relatively from 1939 to 1955, increasing from 23 per cent of the total population in 1939 to 26 per cent in 1955. Rural Uzbekistan increased from 1939 to 1955.

Kirgizia doubled its urban population from 1939 to 1951; the urban rate increased by

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five per cent of the whole population in this period, more than any other republic in Central Asia. The urban rate in Kirgizia continued to grow, so that in 1955 it was three per cent greater than in 1951. There was a decline in the rural population of Kirgizia, despite an over-all increase. The faster rate of urban growth accounts for this decline.

The urban population of Turkmenia fell during 1939-1955. The rural sector of the population increased both absolutely and relative to the total population; Turkmenia was the only Central Asian republic in which the rural proportion increased over the urban in this period. Tadzhikistan's urban rate dipped slightly during World War II, from 17 per cent of the total population in 1939 to 15 per cent in 1947. However, the urban rate increased to 19 per cent in 1951, the highest in its history but the lowest urban rate in Central Asia.

The figures cited above are to be understood only as rough approximations and guideposts, not as a report of the actual situation. However, with the figures and ratios, a number of conclusions may be drawn.

(1) Central Asia is a predominantly rural land. The population is chiefly agricultural. The urban rate varies from a low in Tadzhikistan of about 20 per cent to a high in Kazakhstan of about 30 per cent. On this basis, Central Asia is 70 to 80 per cent rural. In the main, the population is scattered in farms and herding camps. The country is thinly settled.

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(2) The growth of urban population in Central Asia was great at first, from 1926 to 1939. In this period the urban population increased by 120 per cent, that is, more than doubled. From 1939 to 1951 the rate of urban growth was 30 to 50 per cent. The war years both aided and hindered this process. There has been a slight increase in the ratio of urban to total population.

(3) The rural population increased by 6.4 per cent from 1926 to 1939. The low rate of increase was composed of a loss in Kazakhstan, counteracted by gains in Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan. Turkmenia suffered a loss of three per cent in this period. The population losses in rural Kazakhstan and rural Turkmenia are related to the collectivization of the 1930s. The rural population has decreased slightly in proportion to the total population. But at the same time there has been an over-all increase in the rural population between 1939 and the 1950s.

(4) The urban rate of growth has been sustained by the growth of city industries and mining developments in Central Asia. The primary factor in the growth of cities has been Russian in-migration.

(5) In consequence of the number of Russians in Kazakhstan, the Kazakhs are no longer a majority in the republic. The Kirgiz are probably close to, but less than, 50 per cent of the population of Kirgizia. The Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, and Turkmens are majorities, but less so than they were 30 years ago.

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**Appendix I.**
**Growth of Cities in Central Asia**
**50,000 Population and Higher, 1939-1955**
**(Thousands)**

| Kazakhstan | 1939[1] | 1946[1] | 1948[1] | 1950[1] | 1955[1] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alma-Ata | 230.5 | | | 292 | 292 |
| Karaganda | 166 | | | 350 | 370 |
| Semipalatinsk | 110 | | | 102 | 102 |
| Petropavlovsk | 92 | | | 102 | 102 |
| Chimkent | 74 | | | 85 | 102 |
| Uralsk | 66 | | | 68 | 68 |
| Dzhambul | 63 | | | 102 | 102 |
| Leninogorsk | | | | 102 | 102 |
| Aktyubinsk | | | | 85 | 85 |
| Akmolinsk | | | | 85 | 85 |
| Ust-Kamenogorsk | | | | 85 | 85 |
| Guryev | | | | 51 | 51 |
| Kokchetav | | | | 51 | 51 |
| Kzyl-Orda | | | | 51 | 51 |
| Pavlodar | | | | 51 | 51 |
| Temir-Tau | | | | | 51 |
| **Uzbekistan** | | | | | |
| Tashkent | 585 | | | 594 | 615 |
| Samarkand | 134 | | | 150 | 165 |
| Kokand | 85 | | | 75 | 75 |
| Andizhan | 84 | | | 90 | 105 |
| Namangan | 77 | | | 90 | 90 |
| Bukhara | 50 | | | 60 | 60 |
| Chirchik | | | | | 60 |
| Fergana | | | | | 60 |
| **Kirgizia** | | | | | |
| Frunze | 93 | | | 148.5 | 155 |
| **Turkmenia** | | | | | |
| Ashkhabad | 127 | | 134 | 115 | 121 |
| Chardzhou | 55 | | | (60) | 55 |
| **Tadzhikistan** | | | | | |
| Stalinabad | 82.5 | | | 130 | 150 |
| Leninabad | | 50 | | 65 | 65 |

1/ All figures entered are for the first year in which the city reached a population of 50,000 and over. Populations are computed by voting district analysis alone.

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## Annex "A." 1.c.

# SIZE AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

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- Khiva

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- Khiva

Kostenko 1880

Krader 1955

——— 1955 a.

Levchine 1840

Lorimer 1946

Meyendorff 1826

Muraviev 1823

Poddubnyi 1914

Rossiia 1905

Sulkevich 1940

Turchaninov 1914

Ujfalvy 1878

——— 1879

Volkov 1930

Vsesoiuznaia Perepis Naseleniia 1926


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## Annex "A." l.d.

## ETHNIC GROUPS

### General

The chief ethnic groups of Central Asia are, in order of size, the Turkic, Slavic and Iranian peoples.

In addition to the three chief ethnic groups, there are minor ethnic units: the Jews, who form two distinct groups, the ancient residents and those who came from Europe in the past century; Arabs and Islamic peoples not included among the Turks and Iranians; Turks who are not native to the region, who have come from the Caucasus and European Russia (These may also be counted among the Islamic peoples); Koreans; Chinese; Balkan nationals as distinct from Slavs originally from European Russia; Germans; and other nationalities not included in the census lists.

From this classification it may be inferred that language is the principal criterion of ethnic grouping. Language is indeed the most convenient classification for several reasons.

(1) The cultures of the different groups of people in general tend to divide along linguistic lines. For example, the Slavic and the

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Turkic peoples of Central Asia are sharply distinctive. The Iranians and the Turks have much in common, but also have distinctive differences.

(2) Problems of language and communication should have an important function in this Handbook. Therefore, the language criterion in classification of ethnic groups has an even greater significance than it would have from the first or cultural consideration. It should be clearly understood that language and communication are not the same. Nevertheless, they are closely related, for the chief means of communication is by language. This question will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter on Language.

Central Asia has a variegated population. Reasons for this are:

(1) The pattern of conquest, both conquering and being conquered. Arabs, Turks, Mongols, Iranians, Russians and Chinese have all been involved as either the active or the passive elements in this pattern of conquest.

(2) The trading pattern, even more complex than the conquest pattern because, in addition to involving all the above-mentioned peoples, Central Asiatic trade also has involved secondary movements in and out of the region. For example, Turks from Central Asia have settled for many centuries in the southern and eastern parts of European Russia. They have come in large numbers to Central Asia for trading and other purposes.

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(3) Exploitation of natural resources. The Iranians, who first nomadized and farmed in Central Asia, today are almost exclusively farmers or urban dwellers. The Turks are both herders and farmers. Russians are farmers of another kind, for they have little irrigation, whereas the Iranian and Turkic farmers are heavily irrigational. Although the older populations practiced some mining, extensive exploitation of the mineral resources was developed by the Europeans - at first the English and Russians, of late the Russians alone.

The earliest identified population of the region was Iranian. In the first millenium B.C., Persian and Greek writings mention the Saka or the Scythians - Saka in Persian, Scythian in Greek - and the Massagetae who formed a part of the Saka. The second major population which came into the region is the Turks. The course of the Turkization of Central Asia was followed in the chapter on History of the region. The third major population, the Slavic, appeared only during the course of the 19th century, in connection with Russia's conquest of the area. These peoples were primarily pastoralists, hunters, fishers and gatherers of wild plants.

The oldest identifiable agriculturalists of the region were the Khorezmians and Bactrians, both Iranian peoples. Whether they are the ones who built the original canals along the Amu-Darya and practiced agriculture in the eighth-sixth centuries B.C., is not clear. The known peoples in question were part of the north and east Iranian group of languages, whose modern

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forms exist as Ossetian in the North Caucasus, and as Persian, Tadzhik, Yagnobi and the Wakhan-Shugnan-Sarikoli group in the Pamirs. The Iranian group of languages are in turn a part of the satem or eastern wing of the Indo-European linguistic stock, among which the Slavic languages likewise are counted.

The principal Indo-European speaking peoples of Central Asia are shown in Table 1.d.I.

Table 1.d.I. Principal Indo-European Speaking Peoples of Central Asia.

I. Iranians

A. Tadzhiks

B. Persians

C. Mountain Tadzhiks (Galchas)

1. Yagnobis
2. Wakhans-Shugnans-Sarikolis

D. Others: Beluchis, Afghans, Kurds

II. Slavs

A. Great-Russians

B. Ukrainians

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It was stated above that language is not always the most incisive means of grouping cultures and peoples. For example the Iranians, who are in the same linguistic group as the Slavs, have less in common with the Slavs than with the Turks, who are not Indo-European speakers at all. The Uzbeks of the Turkic branch of the Altaic language family and the Tadzhiks of the Iranian branch of the Indo-European have little in common linguistically but much in common culturally.

The Altaic linguistic stock comprises three main families: the Turkic, the Mongolian and the Manchu-Tungus. The Turkic is the westernmost of these languages; the Mongolian group lies in the center; the Manchu-Tungsic in Manchuria and eastern Siberia lies to the north and east of the Mongolian.

Table 1.d.II shows the Altaic linguistic stocks.



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Table 1.d.II. Altaic-Speaking Peoples

I. Turks*

A. 1. Osmanli-Anatolian
2. Crimean
3. Azerbaidzhani
4. Turkmon

B. 1. Eastern Turki, Uigur
2. Sart-Uzbek

C. 1. Kazakh
2. Kirgiz
3. Nomadic Uzbek
4. Karakalpak
5. Bashkir
6. Kazan Tatar
7. Nogai-Kumyk-Balkar-Karachi
8. Karaim

D. 1. Altay Mountain Turks, Khakas, Turkicized Samoyeds
2. Yakut

E. 1. Chuvash

II. Mongols

III. Manchu-Tungus

* For details see chapter on Languages, Table 1.e.II.

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The Turks of Central Asia are in the center of the Turkic distribution on the map. To the north are the Altay Mountain Turks, the Khakas, the Turkicized Samoyedic groups, and the Yakut. To the east are the Turks of Chinese Turkestan. To the south are the Turks of Iran and Afghanistan. To the west are the Anatolian Turks, the Azerbaidzhanis, the Turks of the north Caucasus, of the Ural mountains, of European Russia, of the Balkans and of Poland.

The Turks succeeded in causing many non-Turkic speakers to adopt the Turkic tongue in one form or another in Central Asia. The peoples thus acted upon were the Iranians, e.g., the Khorezmians, and the Mongols, e.g., the Mangit. However, the Turks in turn were influenced by the Iranians. Thus, a cultural interplay between these two language areas may be seen.

Other Iranian groups in Central Asia besides the Tadzhiks are the Mountain Tadzhiks (an older name for whom is Galcha), and the north Persians, Dzhomshids, Afghans, Beluchis, and Kurds. The Mountain Tadzhiks are further differentiated as Yagnobis, Ishkashims, Yazgulemis, Wakhans, Shugnans, Sarikolis, and many others. Just as is the case among the Altay Mountain Turks, the Mountain Tadzhiks are both named for, and give their name to, the locality in which they live. They have no all-embracing unity.

## Ethnic Groups before the Revolution

During the 18th century a few Slavs (primarily Cossacks and Great-Russians) came to the newly acquired territories in the Kazakh

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Steppes. Likewise the Tatars of European Russia, Turks themselves, came as merchants, bankers and political agents. During the 19th century this movement accelerated. A great representation of the dissenting sects entered the region. Among these sects the Old Believers alone numbered 65,000 in 1911, and formed about ten per cent of the total population of Russian Central Asia (exclusive of Khiva and Bukhara) at that time. Adherents of the Russian Orthodox Church were 540,000.

The Jews of Central Asia are of two kinds, those who were there in the Middle Ages and the so-called Bukharan Jews, and the Jews who came into the region from European Russia in conjunction with the Russian in-migration. Both groups are highly urbanized. They have little in common culturally. Arabs in small numbers have been present in the region from the eighth century on. Merchants from India and Persia also form an old population segment.

In the 1860s Russian Turkestan comprised only what is today Kazakhstan, part of Kirgizia (Issyk-Kul district) and the valley of the Syr-Darya as far as the Tashkent Oasis. Kokand and the Fergana, Bukhara, the Amu-Darya Basin, and the Trans-Caspian district (in the triangle beyond the Caspian between the Aral Sea and the Persian frontier) had not yet fallen to the Russians. Table 1.d.III shows the ethnic composition of territory under Russian domination in 1867.

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Table 1.d.III. POPULATION BREAKDOWN

| 1867 | 1870 | 1897 | 1900 | 1911 Nomadic | 1911 Sedentary | 1911 Mixed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian | Russian | Russian | Russian | | Russian | |
| Afghan | | | Afghan | | Afghan | |
| | | | Arab | | | |
| | | Armenian | | | | |
| | | Bashkir | | | | |
| Chinese | | Chinese | Chinese | | Chinese | |
| Dungan | | | Dungan | | | |
| | | | Galcha | | | Galcha |
| | | German | German | | | |
| | | | Gypsy | | | |
| Indian | Indian | | Indian | | | |
| Jewish | | Jewish | Jewish | | | |
| | Kalmuk | Kalmuk | Kalmuk, Torgut | | | |
| | Karakalpak | Karakalpak | Karakalpak | | | Karakalpak |
| | | Kashgar | | | | |
| Kazakh | | Kazakh | Kazakh | Kazakh | | |
| | Kipchak | Kipchak | Kipchak | | | |
| Kirgiz | | Kirgiz | | Kirgiz | | |
| Kurama | Kurama | | Kurama | | | |
| | Manchu | | Manchu | | | |
| | | Mordvin | | | | |
| | Persian | Persian | Persian | | | |
| | | Polish | | | | |
| Sart | Sart | Sart | Sart | | Sart | |
| Tadzhik | Tadzhik | Tadzhik | Tadzhik | | Tadzhik | |
| | Taranchi | Taranchi | Taranchi | | Taranchi | |
| Tatar | Tatar | Tatar | Tatar | | Tatar | |
| | Turkmen | Turkmen | Turkmen | | | Turkmen |
| | | Ukrainian | | | | |
| Uzbek | Uzbek | Uzbek | Uzbek | | Uzbek (including Kipchak) | Uzbek |
| | | | Other Turkic Peoples | | | |

1/Population breakdown of Bukhara in 1826: Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmens, Arabs, Persians, Kalmuks, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Karakalpaks, Bukharan Jews, Afghans, Lezgians, Gypsies, Tatars, Hindus, and Russian and Persian slaves.
2/Population breakdown of Tashkent in 1867: Russians, Afghans, Chinese, Indians, Jews, Kazakhs, Persians, Sarts, Tatars.

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A comparison of the various groupings is possible, because the procedures in classification were all the same. The primary classification principle is by language, the secondary principle is occupational, distinguishing between nomadic and sedentary. Acculturated peoples are then listed as members of the acculturating groups, e.g., those Sarts who were Turkicized Iranians are listed as Turks. There are certain inherent difficulties, for example in the case of the Karakalpaks. In the earliest classifications by Ujfalvy and Kostenko, no Karakalpaks are found. It is possible that they were not known in the areas familiar to Ujfalvy and Kostenko; alternatively the investigators upon whom Ujfalvy and Kostenko drew may not have been alerted to the possible presence of the Karakalpaks.

A more challenging problem is posed by the minor Turkic peoples: Taranchi, Kurama, Kipchak and Kashgar. The Uigurs should appear in this list, but appear only in later classifications made during the 1920s and on. The Taranchi-Kashgar-Uigur group are now regarded as one and the same people with different local names. The Kipchaks are a part of the Uzbek people who settled and ruled in Kokand. Kurama is a local name for a people of mixed (primarily Kazakh) origin later joined to the Uzbeks. The Taranchis are close to the speakers of non-Iranized Uzbek; they are considered by Radlov to be descendants of the ancient Uigurs. This is probably a simplified version of their origin.

The Kuramas are reported by Ujfalvy. They are considered by him to be the product of a crossing among Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Sarts. On

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the other hand, Aristov and Maksheev considered the Kuramas to be a population fundamentally déclassé (because they have taken up farming) Kazakhs acculturated by Uzbeks and Sarts. The later view is better founded historically. It is closer to Radlov's opinion, which holds the Kurama to be a Kazakh-Uzbek mixture. During the 20th century the Kuramas have become thoroughly Uzbek and are indistinguishable from the body of Uzbek population, save by their territorial unity and the name which they apply to themselves.

The most complex question of all relates to the Sarts. The term Sart appears at first to have been not an ethnic term, but a designation of an occupational group, the merchants. The term is of Indic origin, meaning merchant, passing into Iranian; the chief merchants in Central Asia at the time (end of the first millenium A.D.). From the 11th century on the term came to designate Persians whom the Turks and Mongols had come to regard as a nation of merchants. Among the Mongols of the 13th century the term Sart meant Moslem. By the 16th century the term took on the meaning of Islamic Iranian generally. At this time it began to take on the meaning of sedentary farmer in contrast to nomads, especially among the Uzbeks. Thus, it came once again to have an occupational significance, although it retained its religious meaning. The occupational significance changed from merchant to farmer. The close correlation between agriculture and Islam in Central Asia has been noted above.

The Kazakhs use the term Sart to designate an agriculturalist in contrast to a herdsman.

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In the Fergana Valley, on the other hand, the term Sart designated at the beginning of the 20th century a Turkic-speaking city-dweller. The term was applied by the Kazakhs and Kirgiz to Tadzhiks and sedentary Uzbeks. It also refers to sedentarized Kazakhs and Uzbeks. The term is, therefore, difficult to use as an ethnic classification. The Sarts have been distributed among the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks where possible, otherwise among the Uzbeks, since the core meaning of the term at present is a Turkic-speaking farmer or city-dweller. The history of the term is interesting for its insight into religious and economic factors in classifying peoples applied by the native peoples themselves.

Table 1.d.IV indicates the ethnic groups prior to the Revolution.



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Table 1.d.IV. Ethnic Groups before the Revolution

| Sedentary, Farming and Urban | Nomadic |
|---|---|
| Russian | Kazakh |
| Ukrainian | Kirgiz |
| Armenian | Turkmen |
| Bashkir | Uzbek |
| German | Kalmuk |
| Jewish | |
| Mordvin | |
| Polish | |
| Tatar | |
| Tadzhik | |
| Uzbek | |
| Taranchi (Kashgar, Uigur) | |
| Kurama | |
| Karakalpak | |
| Chinese (including Dungan) | |

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Among the sedentary, farming and urban peoples, the Mordvins are a people of the Finno-Ugrian linguistic group. The Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, and Germans need no further comment. The Jews, as we have noted, were of two types: the older population of Central Asia, highly urban, merchants and craftsmen; and those who moved into the area from Europe after the Russian conquest. The Tatars are generally European Turks who came into the region in connection with the Russian advance. The Tatars were a mercantile group and moneylenders, and functioned also as political agents. The Bashkirs are more specifically Turks of the southern Urals, basically a farming people but urban too, much like Tatars in the latter respect. The Uzbeks are of two kinds: nomadic and sedentary. Sedentary Uzbeks have been expanded of late to include the Turkic Sarts and the Kuramas. The Taranchi and the Kashgarians are grouped with the Uigurs. The Chinese are basically Dungans, i.e., Islamic Chinese, resident chiefly in Sinkiang and farther east with a small number in Russian Central Asia. The Tadzhiks include Iranian Sarts as well as Mountain Iranians or Galchas. The Karakalpaks, while originally nomadic, are to be listed as sedentary.

The nomadic peoples of Central Asia are the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz and the Turkmen. Turkmen have been engaged in agriculture to a large degree, but have not left nomadism as completely as Karakalpaks or Uzbeks. There were a few Kalmuks in Russian Central Asia at the beginning of the 20th century. However, of late they have disappeared almost entirely from the region. In the 1930s there were still a few thousand so-called Sart Kalmuks, i.e., farming

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Kalmuks, in the vicinity of Lake Issyk-Kul in Kirgizia. These Kalmuks are descendants of the original Oirats (Ölöts) who moved from the Chu River Valley to their present location. They are primarily agricultural; each year their pastoralism diminishes in importance. Former Buddhists, they have been converted to Islam. In 1935 they still retained their original Kalmuk tongue, but had adopted Kirgiz also.

Several processes in the ethnographic trends of lesser peoples are worthy of note. It is important to devote attention to the minor peoples, for they as well as major peoples illuminate cultural processes. The Sart Kalmuks are so-called because they are sedentary and agricultural; thus the term Sart appears in a context other than Turkic or Iranian as a designation for a certain occupation or way of life in Central Asia. It is in use in the Soviet period. The Sart Kalmuks likewise are instances of the close correlation between sedentary life and the Islamic faith: as a people is transformed from pastoralism to agriculture, the role of Islam as an organized religion increases.

The Slavs who have come into Central Asia are exclusively farming and urban people. At first they were military colonists (Cossacks), Russian traders and political administrators, and agents. Soon the farming Russians, other than Cossacks appeared: Great-Russian farmers from European Russia and Siberia, members of the dissenting sects such as Old-Believers and Ukrainians. The Old-Believers settled in the Altay Mountains of northeast Kazakhstan and neighboring parts of southern Siberia. The Great-Russian farmers settled in the north of

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Kazakhstan and in neighboring southern Siberia, where the Virgin Lands program is currently being carried out. The Ukrainians closely followed the Great-Russian pattern of settlement.

Russians moved into the cities of Central Asia, creating whole new quarters or wards in the ancient cities of Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand. The Russians settled in agricultural regions where irrigation is practiced only to a small extent. Irrigated agriculture is not a traditional Russian institution, and the settlers remained urban, or practiced dry farming in the north. They took little part in the traditional Central Asiatic subsistence patterns of nomadic pastoralism and irrigation agriculture. Below, in the chapter on Economy, the relations of the different ethnic groups to the economy will be made more precise. It will suffice to mention here that agriculture of the native populations is more intensive than Russian agriculture. On the other hand, livestock raising of the Russians is more intensive than is native pastoralism. Intensity may be measured either by capital investment per production unit or by productivity per unit of land. The over-all result will be the same.

The Russians have introduced another element into the economy, industry. They have extended the meaning to a great degree: and, in pursuit of their mining operations, have settled in parts of Central Asia where hitherto only pastoralists nomadized. The Russians have developed industry in cities, and thus added new population elements to the urban labor force. Finally the Soviet regime has re-settled many populations foreign to the region. The Volga

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Germans in Tadzhikistan, the Chechens of the Caucasus in Kazakhstan, and Russians in Central Asia generally have been moved in by force or persuasion.

Within the language families the peoples have been classified by their way of life because it is important to know whether a population is fixed in one place or moves about the landscape as nomads; similarly, whether it is scattered in villages or concentrated in cities.

## Ethnic Composition during the Soviet Period

Within the limits of Central Asia, the 1926 census grouped peoples in the following administrative units of the time: Uzbek SSR, including the Tadzhik ASSR; Turkmen SSR; Kazakh ASSR, and Kirgiz ASSR, both within the RSFSR. The Kazakh ASSR included Karakalpakia, an autonomous oblast in 1926. Ethnic composition of the different administrative units at the time of the 1926 census is given in Table 1.d.V.

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Table 1.d.V. Central Asia.
Ethnic Groups Greater than 1,000 in 1926.1/

(In Thousands)

| | Uzbekistan | Tadzhikistan | Kazakhstan | Turkmenia | Kirgizia | Karakalpakia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afghan | 1 | | | 4 | | |
| Beluchi | | | | 10 | | |
| Iranian | 9 | | | | | |
| Kurd | | | | 2.3 | | |
| Persian | 10 | | 1 | 7 | | 0.8 |
| Tadzhik | 351 | 617 | 8 | | 2.7 | |
| Yagnobi | 2 | 2 | | | | |
| Arab | 28 | 3 | | | | |
| Armenian | 5 | | | 14 | | |
| Belo-Russian | 3.5 | | 26 | | | |
| Great-Russian | 246.5 | 5.6 | 1,280 | 75 | 116 | 5 |
| Ukrainian | 26 | 1 | 861 | 7 | 64 | 0.6 |
| Bulgarian | | | 3 | | | |
| Polish | 3 | | 4 | | | |
| Kipchak | 33 | | | | | |
| Kurama | 50 | | | | | |
| Uzbek | 3,475 | 176 | 213 | 105 | 111 | 84 |
| Kashgarian | 4 | | | | 7.5 | |
| Taranchi | | | 52 | | | |
| Uigur | 32 | | 11 | | | |
| Tatar | 28 | | 81 | 5 | 5 | 0.9 |
| Turki | 21.5 | | | 4 | 4 | |
| Turkmen | 26 | 4 | 10 | 720 | | 10 |
| Karakalpak | 26.5 | | 118 | 1.5 | | 116 |
| Kazakh | 107 | 1.6 | 3,713 | 9.5 | 1.8 | 86 |
| Kirgiz | 91 | 11 | 10 | | 661 | |
| Bashkir | | | 1 | | | |
| Chuvash | | | 2 | | | |
| Central Asian Jewish | 18 | | | | | |
| European Jewish | 20 | | 4 | 1.8 | | |
| Chinese | | | | | 6.2 | |
| Dungan | | | 8 | | 6. | |
| Sart Kalmuk | | | | | 2.5 | |
| Esthonian | | | 2 | | | |
| German | 4.6 | | 51 | 1.2 | 4 | |
| Gypsy | 3.7 | | | | | |
| Lithuanian | | | 1 | | | |
| Moldavian | | | 3 | | | |
| Mordvin | 2 | | 27 | | | |

1/ 1926 Census, Vol. XVII, Table VI.

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From the foregoing table it may be seen that a certain amount of re-grouping of peoples took place during the first quarter of the 20th century. The impact of Sovietization on Central Asia was weak in the first decade of the USSR. Nevertheless, certain traditional categories of peoples, such as the Sarts, had been eliminated.

The most important ethnic groups at this time were:

Slavic (Great-Russians and Ukrainians; Belo-Russians, Poles, and Bulgarians in small numbers);
Iranian (Tadzhiks; small numbers of Persians, Afghans, Beluchis, Yagnobis, Dzhemshids, Kurds);
Principal Central Asian Turks (Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kuramas, Taranchis);
Other Turks (Tatars, Bashkirs, Azerbaidzhanis, Chuvash);
Arabs;
Jews (Bukharan and European);
Germans;
Chinese Moslems (Dungans);
Estonians and Lithuanians;
Moldavians;
Mordvins;
Sart Kalmuks;
Gypsies.

The principal difficulty in later analysis appears in the classification of the minor peoples of Turkic linguistic stock in Central Asia. These are the Kashgarians, who are the same as the Taranchi, differing only by residence; the Kipchaks, who are simply a local

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branch of the Uzbeks; the Kuramas, who are Kazakhs become Uzbeks; Turki; and the Uigur, comprising the Taranchi and Kashgarians, all grouped under Uigur. The former Galcha classification, Mountain Tadzhik, survives only as Yagnobi; the rest have been absorbed within Tadzhik in the 1926 census.

Certain in-migrants may be noted. The Beluchis of Russian Central Asia live exclusively in Turkmenia. They have not been in the region long, for they came to their present habitat in the Serakhs and Tedzhen Oases shortly before the Revolution. These two cases are near the Iranian border. It may be seen that the Beluchis have not moved very far into the Soviet Union.

The most important in-migrants during the period of Soviet rule have been the Slavs, primarily the Russians, by whom we will understand the Great-Russians, secondarily the Ukrainians. The Great-Russians were settled in northern Kazakhstan, in the area adjacent to southern Siberia. In the cities of Kazakhstan, in the mining sections and in the black-earth farmlands of northern Kazakhstan, nearly three times as many Great-Russians were settled as in the rest of Central Asia combined. The Ukrainians conformed to the Great-Russian pattern of settlement in Central Asia, in a proportion 55 per 100 Great-Russians.

By the time of the census of 1939, many changes had taken place in the peopling of Central Asia. The Kazakhs had become sharply reduced in number. The Russians poured into the area by force and attraction in ever-greater numbers. In addition, many peoples were re-grouped and re-

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classified.

The Kazakhs lost about one-fourth of their population during the period 1926-1939. This was a direct result of factors set in motion by the collectivization drive of the early 1930s. Some Kazakhs starved to death, some disappeared in the labor camps of the USSR, some fled across the borders, some changed nationality. These factors are listed according to their presumed significance.

The Russians migrated into the area in great numbers. In Uzbekistan, the Russians [illegible] (1926 and 1939). In Kazakhstan they [illegible]. In Turkmenistan, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan, Russians [illegible] but are still numerically small. They are [illegible].

In Uzbekistan there is little dry farming and little mining. In comparison to Kazakhstan, however, the Russians are an important segment of the urban population. The Russian settlement of Turkmenistan, corresponding to that of Uzbekistan, is mainly urban; there is little dry farming and only a limited amount of mining. In Tadzhikistan the Russians are few in number.

The Ukrainian settlement pattern follows the Russian. The places where the Ukrainians have come to live, and the economic roles which they fill are the same as those of the Russians.

The Volga Germans in Central Asia lived chiefly in Kazakhstan in 1926. Their native area bordered on Kazakhstan. The Volga German Republic was suppressed during World

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War II; these people are now reportedly in Tadzhikistan in both rural and urban settlements and occupations.

The Jews of European Russia settled mainly in Tashkent and in other cities of Central Asia. The Central Asiatic Jews had long been concentrated in the urban communities of Central Asia.

The Uigurs, according to the 1926 "List of Nationalities" were a "mixture of two specifically designated groups, Kashgarians and Taranchis." This practice was reversed in the 1939 listing. Kashgarians, Taranchis and Uigurs were not listed in the 1939 census. However, Uigurs have been mentioned after 1939 among Ili River Valley inhabitants of southeastern Kazakhstan.

The Taranchis were settled by the Chinese in the Ili Valley in the latter part of the 18th century. Here, in the vicinity of Kuldja, they were expected to supply grain for the Chinese garrisons (largely Manchu Sibo). The term Taranchi is derived from the Turkic for "grower of grain." During the Moslem insurrection against the Chinese in the 1860s, the Taranchis were politically independent. However they were subjected to Russia during the brief Russian occupation of Kuldja (1871-1883). Most of the Taranchis migrated to Russian Turkestan after the return of Kuldja to China in 1883; some remained on the Chinese side. The Taranchis are related to the Kashgarians (Kashgarlyk), differing only by place of settlement. In this respect Taranchis resemble the Kipchaks, a local name for Uzbeks. Radlov believed Taranchis were

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descendants of the ancient Uigurs.

Soviet terminology of the most recent period has combined the Kashgarians and the Taranchis with the Uigurs, calling them all Uigurs. The decision to group these peoples is based on linguistic grounds, because the differences are only those of dialects. To what extent these tongues are far different from one or another of the Uzbek dialects is not clear. Historically neither the Taranchis nor the modern Uigurs are descended from the ancient Uigurs. Perhaps the ancient Uigurs formed part of the modern composition of the Ili River Valley people. The Kashgarians moved into the Fergana Valley in the 1880's; their number fell from [illegible] in 1897 to 13,900 in 1926, most probably because of absorption by Uzbeks.

The Dungans or Chinese Moslems are Islamic Chinese people who came to their present settlements in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia in the 1880s. Now in number, they live close to the Uigurs, mainly in the Ili and Fergana Valleys, and in Kirgizia.

Of considerable interest are the Koreans who were not listed at all in Central Asia in the 1926 census. However, during the late 1930's in the face of intermittent conflict with the Japanese, the Soviet authorities moved Koreans from their places of settlement in the Soviet Far East. The motive for this move appears to have been doubts about the loyalty of Koreans in the USSR. They were re-settled primarily in the rice-growing district of the Karatal River, south of Lake Balkhash, in the so-called Dzhetysu (Semirechie, or Sever Rivers), and in the valley

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of the Syr-Darya. Koreans numbering 73,000 were also settled in Uzbekistan in 1939.

The ethnic composition of the republics at present, or according to the most recent information, is given in Table 1.d.VI.

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Table 1.d. VI. Ethnic Composition of Central Asia after World War II

| Kazakhstan | Uzbekistan | Karakalpakia | Turkmenia | Tadzhikistan | Kirgizia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russians | Uzbeks | Karakalpaks | Turkmens | Tadzhiks | Kirgiz |
| Kazakhs | Russians | Kazakhs | Russians | Uzbeks | Russians |
| Ukrainians | Tadzhiks | Uzbeks | Uzbeks | Russians | Ukrainians |
| Uzbeks | Kazakhs | Russians | Kazakhs | Kirgiz | Uzbeks |
| Uigurs | Karakalpaks | Ukrainians | Tatars | Ukrainians | Uigurs |
| Dungans | Tatars | Tatars | Iranians | Turkmens | Dungans |
| Tatars | Kirgiz | | Beluchis | Arabs | Tatars |
| Koreans | Ukrainians | | | | Tadzhiks |
| Karakalpaks | Koreans | | | | Kazakhs |
| | Turkmens | | | | Kalmuks* |
| | Uigurs | | | | |
| | Iranians | | | | |
| | Armenians | | | | |

*Sart Kalmuk



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The preceeding table lists the peoples of Central Asia by republics according to their numerical significance. Only in the instances of Turkmenia and Uzbekistan is this listing definite. However, in the case of the other republics - Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Karakalpakia and Tadzhikistan - the listing has a fair order of probability. Russians are probably the most numerous people in Kazakhstan. They are second in number in Kirgizia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia. They are a minor group in Tadzhikistan and Karakalpakia. The Ukrainians are an important group numerically only in Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Uzbekistan. They are insignificant numerically in Turkmenia, Tadzhikistan and Karakalpakia.

As to the native populations, the Uzbeks are an important numerical minority in every part of Central Asia outside of Uzbekistan. In their native republic they were 65 per cent of the total population in 1939. On the other hand, the Kazakhs are a minority within their own republic, far below the proportion they maintained in the 1926 census. There are many Kazakhs in Uzbekistan; presumably there are many in southern Siberia; there are small amounts in Turkmenia and Karakalpakia, and insignificant numbers in Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia. Tadzhiks are represented in insignificant numbers outside of Tadzhikistan only in Kirgizia and Uzbekistan. Turkmens are found outside of Turkmenia only in Uzbekistan. Karakalpaks are found in Karakalpakia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It may be seen that the native nationalities are found in their greatest numbers in their native and in immediately adjacent regions; they have not traveled far.

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The minor nationalities present a similar picture. The Uigurs and Dungans who came to Russian Turkestan from Chinese Turkestan are settled in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia. Uigurs are also found in Uzbekistan, but Dungans are not. These people, too, have not migrated far from their point of origin. The Tatars of European Russia are found in every part of Central Asia, with the possible exception of Tadzhikistan. Unlike the Uigurs and Dungans they have traveled far. The Uigurs and Dungans are farming peoples. The Tatars, on the contrary, came to Central Asia during the Tsarist regime to trade, to lend money and to serve as officials, administrators and clerks. These are all urban occupations. The Tatars have remained urban and are widely scattered in Central Asia. There is a close correlation, therefore, between occupation and degree of dispersion of a people in Central Asia. Those who are farmers do not move far, and move in groups or communities. Those who are merchants and clerks or scribes move from city to city. The Jews have a distribution similar to the Tatars, being likewise highly urbanized. The Arabs are a remnant population of ancient times, limited in their distribution to the irrigated farming centers of Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan.

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Annex "A." 1.d.

# ETHNIC GROUPS

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## Annex "A." l.e.

## LANGUAGES

This chapter will be concerned with the languages spoken in Central Asia, their grouping and inter-relations, and Soviet language policy.

Discussion of structure of the languages does not belong in a Handbook of this nature. The emphasis therefore will be on the types of languages spoken. For more detailed discussion of linguistic structure, the reader or user of this Handbook is referred to grammars, dictionaries, and structural analyses of the languages. A bibliography of these works is appended to this chapter. Our concern will be primarily with the relations among the various languages, that is, whether they are connected and to what degree.

Another problem of central importance to this chapter will be the degree of mutual understandability among the speakers of the different languages. This is a matter of language policy, language education, the sociology of language, and communication. It is not, strictly speaking, a linguistic matter.*

*I am indebted to Professor Harry Hoijer, University of California at Los Angeles, for a most illuminating discussion of this problem.


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Three main groups of languages are represented in the region: Turkic, which is numerically the most important; Slavic; and Iranian. Other language groups are represented in small numbers: Chinese, Arabic, Armenian, German, Estonian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Mordvin, Kalmuk-Mongol, and Gypsy. However, the Estonian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Sart-Kalmuk, and Gypsy may be ignored, for they were represented by fewer than 10,000 speakers in the whole of Central Asia in 1926, or less than one-tenth of one per cent of the population of the region.

The Turkic Languages: Genetic Relationships

The Turkic family of languages in Central Asia includes the following: Kazakh, Kirgiz, Karakalpak, Uzbek, Uigur, Tatar, Turkmen, Azerbaidzhani, Bashkir and Chuvash. The Kazakh, Kirgiz and Karakalpak form a closely related linguistic group; the Uzbek includes Kipchak and Kurama of former classifications; Uigur includes Kashgarian (Kashgarlyk) and Taranchi of earlier classifications. These are branches of the eastern Turkic group. Turkmen and Azerbaidzhani are western Turkic languages. Bashkir is related in historical development and in structure to the Kazakh group and to the Uzbek group. Tatar is classed with Bashkir as generally related to Kazakh-Kirgiz-Uzbek, and others. Chuvash is not a Turkic tongue in the strict sense of the word. It is part of the Altaic language family, which includes the Turkic, the Mongol, the Manchu-Tungus and the Korean groups. There is some debate as to whether Chuvash, along with the others, is an independent member of the Altaic family or is a branch of Turkic alone, i.e., a linguistic group which had severed connections with its related dialects at an early stage,



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prior to the formation of historically reported Turkic languages. In this last view, Chuvash would be classed as a proto-Turkic language.

The Turkic languages of the area may be grouped as shown in Table 1.e.I.



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Table 1.e.I. Classification of Turkic Languages of Central Asia.

I.

A.
1. Kazakh
2. Kirgiz
3. Karakalpak

B. Uzbek[1]
1. Uigur

C. Tatar

D. Bashkir[2]

II.

A. Turkmen

B. Azerbaidzhani[2]

III. Chuvash[2]

1/ Includes Iranized Uzbek.
2/ Numerically insignificant in Central Asia.



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The Bashkir and the Chuvash may be disregarded, for they were numerically insignificant (under 10,000 in 1926). The Azerbaidzhani was spoken by a group barely larger (under 30,000), and it may be disregarded. The rest of the languages are all numerically significant, especially in view of the regrouping of some, e.g., the Uigur. This will be discussed below in the section on language policy. By the redefinition of Uigur in 1939 and after, it was spoken by over 100,000 in 1926.

The Turks of Central Asia by their linguistic affiliation belong to two branches of the Turkic family. According to a standard classification, the Turkic languages may be divided into groups as shown in Table 1.e.II.



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Table 1.e.II. Classification of Turkic Languages[1]

I. The Southwestern Group
- A. Osmanli, spoken in Turkey and the Balkans
- B. Crimean Turkish
- C. Azerbaidzhani, in the south Caucasus and north Persia
- D. Turkmen

II. The Southeastern Group
- A. Dialects of Eastern Turkestan: Eastern Turki, Taranchi, Uigur, and others
- B. Sedentary farming and urban Uzbek of Turkestan, formerly known as Sart; also Uzbek of Afghanistan

III. The Northwestern Group
- A. Kirgiz-Kazakh-Karakalpak, and nomadic Uzbek
- B. Bashkir
- C. Kazan Tatar
- D. Nogai in the North Caucasus and Crimea, also Kumyk, Balkar, Karachai
- E. Karaim in the Crimea and Poland

IV. The Northeastern Group
- A. Altay Mountain Turkic, Khakas, Turkicized Samoyedic, and others

1/ Samoilovich: Yakut in Northeastern group. Räsänen: Yakut in separate Northern group.

Chuvash is a separate group within the Turkic family. Poppe: Chuvash as either proto-Turkic or autonomous branch of Altaic.



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A somewhat older classification of the Turkic languages agrees in the main with that of Räsänen. Grönbech, writing in the mid-1930s, founded himself primarily on Radloff's work (1891-1910). Grönbech divides the Turkic families as follows: a southern group (Osmanly, Azerbaidzhani, Turkmen); a western Turkestan group (non-Iranized and Iranized Uzbek); eastern Turkic (Kashgar, Taranchi); northern Turkic (Yakut, Altai, Abakan, Turkicized Samoyedic); Kazakh-Kirgiz; Volga Turkic or Tataric; Karaim; and Chuvash. Certain advances in the direction of greater simplification on the one side and wider separation of groups on the other have been made from Radloff's and Grönbech's classification to Räsänen's. The last word has not been written on the subject. Samoilovich and Räsänen's geographic distributions are not easily followed. The northwestern group includes the southeasternmost of the Turks - the Kirgiz. And the subdivision of Uzbek into different groups, the southwestern and the southeastern, is an anomalous distribution.

Several matters are clear, however: the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz, and the Karakalpaks speak related dialects. The Uzbek language is related to the Kazakh and the other two aforementioned dialects, but more distantly. In turn, Uzbek consists of two chief dialect groups: those which have been subject to Iranian linguistic influence and those which have not. A group of dialects consisting of Kashgarlyk or Eastern Turki, Taranchi and Uigur, is close to the non-Iranized Uzbek. The Turkmen language stands apart from the above, as a member of a different branch of the Turkic family, close to Turkish of Turkey (modern Anatolian).


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A recent Soviet over-all classification of the Turkic languages divides them into two branches, a western and an eastern. This is the classification by Baskakov, done on historical principles. In this classification, the western branch consists of Chuvash, Turkmen, Azerbaidzhani, Turkish, Tatar, Bashkir, Karakalpak, Kazakh, Uzbek and Uigur. The eastern branch consists of Tuvinian, Karagas, Yakut, Khakas, Kirgiz, and Altay Mountain Turkic.

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One of the results of Baskakov's classification is that it makes Kirgiz and Kazakh only distant kin in the Turkic world. This relationship is presented on historical grounds, and does not bear in mind the recent and modern situation. Kirgiz and Kazakh are far more closely related today in terms of mutual comprehensibility than is shown in the historical and genetic chart by Baskakov.

The classification of Uzbek dialects in the 1920s distinguished Iranized from non-Iranized Uzbek. Some background on the general position of Turkic in the Altaic family is necessary to understand this distinction. With some notable exceptions, Altaic languages are characterized by the phenomenon of vowel harmony. According to the system of vowel harmony, the vowels are put into two classes, a-o-u-y and e-ä-ö-ü-i. The first class is the so-called back vowel series; the second class is the mid-vowel and front vowel series. These two series are subject to a certain amount of variation; for instance, not all languages of the Altaic family differentiate between i and y, but some have only one sound i or y which may fit into either series. The importance of this separation of vowels into classes is that the structure of words must follow definite rules. If a word begins with a back vowel, then all the other vowels in that word must be back vowels. The term for horse is at in Turkic. The plural of at in Uzbek is atlar, horses; in Kazakh the plural is attar. The term for king is xan, Uzbek plural xanlar, Kazakh plural xannar. On the other hand, the term for lake is köl (made into kul, as in Issyk-Kul). The plural of köl in Karakalpak is köller or köllör, lakes. Thus,

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the plural is -nar in some words and -ner or -nör in others. Thus, at-ler in Kazakh would be unthinkable because it violates the rule of vowel harmony, and köl-lar would be unthinkable for the same reason.

Uzbek is distinguished from Kazakh and Karakalpak by the fact that Kazakh and Karakalpak are assimilative dialects: the plural -nar/ner in Uzbek is changed in Kazakh and Karakalpak to a sound which agrees with the last preceding sound. If the end of the word is in -l then the plural is -lar or -ler. If the word ends in -n, as in xan, then the plural is xannar, "kings, khans," in Kazakh and related languages. Uzbek on the contrary is non-assimilative.

Some languages such as Iranized Uzbek and the spoken Turkish of Turkey, have lost the feature of vowel harmony almost entirely. Iranian influence, Arabic influence and that of other languages without vowel harmony are responsible for this shift. It is related in part to the spread of Islam via the Iranians and Arabs in Central Asia. Thus, Turkic peoples who have long made the transition from nomadic to sedentary life, have been under the influence of sedentary (urban and agricultural) Islamic peoples. Under this influence they lost the vowel harmony of their language. In exchange, many Iranian and some Arabic population elements have given up their native tongue for Turkic in one form or another. Possibly, they accepted Turkic without vowel harmony.

The form of the vowel influences the form of the word in general and of the nature of



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the consonants within the word. Thus, a back vowel requires a back consonant. The k-g series is pronounced relatively forward in the mouth compared with the q-gh series. This differentiation is not to be found systematically in the non-vocalic harmony languages, e.g., Iranized Uzbek.

Classical Uigur of the 12th century gave place to Chagatai of the 14th century out of which modern Uzbek arose. Uzbek has some features in common with classical Uigur. The Uzbeks of the Khiva area (lower Amu-Darya) speak an Iranized Uzbek.

Modern Uzbek has been classified into four principal dialects, according to the regions in which they are found: Khivan (around the Amu-Darya, Iranized Uzbek); Tashkentian; Fergana; Samarkand-Bukhara.

Kazakh and Karakalpak form a closely related group of languages. Whether they are to be regarded as separate languages or as dialects of the same language, may be debated; definitions of language and dialect vary. Malov considers Karakalpak to be a language separate and distinct from the Kazakh language. He has written: "... The Karakalpak language underwent the influence of the Kazakh language. The causes of this were: the topographic proximity of these two peoples, the greater percentage of teachers from among the Kazakhs. In addition, it is necessary to explain many similarities not through the influence of the Kazakh language, but through the relationship and closeness of these two languages in general..."

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Several factors are brought out in the passage cited regarding the relationship of Kazakh and Karakalpak. They are closely related tongues. Because they are closely related, features of one language are readily imported into another. Thus there are two kinds of similarity between them. One is genetic, resulting from their common origin and recent separation, no more than a few hundred years ago. The other is contact between the peoples since then. In a parallel manner, French and Italian are both derived from Latin. As a result, they share common features; in addition, French words and sayings are found in Italian, and vice versa. In the Kazakh and Karakalpak case, the influence was brought about by close geographic proximity and by the import of Kazakh teachers among the Karakalpaks. Finally, it must be stressed that Kazakhs preponderate over Karakalpaks by a ratio of over 16:1. Since Karakalpak is not a prestige language, the numerical superiority of Kazakh is the decisive factor here. (Numerical superiority is not always the decisive factor, for sometimes a prestige language may be spoken by a relatively small group. French is a good example for, despite the relatively small number of Frenchmen as opposed to Americans and British or Russians, until recently French was the language of diplomacy.)

Kazakh and Kirgiz are somewhat less closely related than Kazakh and Karakalpak. Kazakh is in the central position regarding the other two, both structurally and geographically, for Kazakhs separate Karakalpaks from Kirgiz.

The last language of this group is the Tatar. The Tatar was thought to be the language

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of the Kazakhs and Kirgiz by the Russians in the 18th and 19th centuries. Russians addressed their diplomatic correspondence with these peoples in the Tatar language. This, it has been shown, would be the same as addressing the French in Spanish or the Czechs in Polish. In addition to preventing communication and understanding, it is an insult to national pride. It may be imagined that the Tatars did nothing to prevent this blunder by the Russians. It was to the Tatars' advantage, for they attained a splendid position in negotiations and transactions.

The modern Tatars are descendants of the Turks living around Kazan who were defeated in the 16th century by Ivan the Terrible. Long resident in European Russia and for several centuries living under Russian rule, they served as intermediaries between Russia and Central Asia. Geographically they were well placed for this role, for they lived between the Volga and the Ural Mountains, part of the way from Central Russia to Central Asia. Culturally and linguistically they were well suited also. They are Turks, who were heavily and early Islamized, with a common history in the Golden Horde together with the Kazakhs, Uzbeks and others. They served as advance political agents and representatives of the Russians, and acted as merchants, moneylenders and middlemen.

The Tatar language is related to Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Karakalpak, but only in a general way. Mutual comprehensibility between Tatar speakers and Kazakh speakers is low. There is another factor. The speakers of Tatar Turkic are city-dwellers, heavily urbanized, with a long period of close contact with the

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Russians. The Tatars, moreover, have long been Islamic in their religion.

The Kazakhs and Kirgiz are but little urbanized; their contact with the Russians is a matter of the last two centuries. The Karakalpaks are similar in these matters to the Kazakhs and Kirgiz; yet they are agricultural to a far greater degree than the other two.

The Turkic Languages: Mutual Comprehensibility

The degree of mutual comprehensibility among Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Karakalpaks is high. Their common origin and historical course, their geographical proximity, all closely identified, contribute to comprehensibility. Uzbeks stand at a slight remove from these three peoples. Tatars are further removed, and Uigurs as well.

The ability to communicate is not a linguistic matter pure and simple. Communication by words depends to a great degree on common language, but many other factors are involved. Two dialects of the same language are at times mutually incomprehensible, depending on social, political and historical factors. The various dialects of Germany are a good case in point. Germany lacked political unity until the last century, and the German linguistic disunity is connected with the political disunity. No quantitative work has been done in the field of language, dialects and politics, but the relation between political unity and linguistic unity is too striking to be ignored. Modern India is a case parallel to Germany.

It should be stressed that the converse does not necessarily hold. Political unity does



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not guarantee linguistic unity in all cases: a demonstration of this is to be seen in China, where there has been political unity for many centuries, but no linguistic unity.

In Central Asia, political disunity has contributed to linguistic disunity. Nevertheless, certain generalities may be drawn. Addressing a speaker of Kirgiz in Kazakh, one has a fair chance of being understood. Similarly, addressing a Karakalpak in Kazakh, one has a somewhat better chance of comprehension. Uzbek and Uigur are more hazardous ventures for purposes of comprehensibility. Tatar is another language entirely. The linguistic unity of Turkic Central Asia is fair. Tatar is, as we have seen, a recent import into the area, and is far removed from whatever linguistic unity there is.

Turkmen belongs to a linguistic domain within the Turkic world different from either Tatar or Uzbek, Uigur, Kazakh, Kirgiz or Karakalpak. Turkmen is a southwestern Turkic language related to Osmanli and modern Anatolian Turkish (the Turkish of Turkey) and to Azerbaidzhani. Because of its geographic proximity to Karakalpak, Turkmen has exerted an influence upon the latter. However, as Malov has stated, this influence was less than that of Kazakh, where the linguistic relationship was far closer.

The Slavic Languages in Central Asia.

The Slavs of Central Asia are almost exclusively Eastern Slavs: Russians, by which we understand Great-Russians, Ukrainians and Belo-Russians. Of these the Belo-Russians were



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numerically of little significance (under one-third of one per cent of the population) and may be disregarded. Other Slavs and nationals of eastern Europe, such as Bulgarians, Poles, Moldavians, Lithuanians and Estonians, were even smaller in number than the Belo-Russians. The two noteworthy Slavic groups represented in Central Asia are the Russians and Ukrainians, who are settled in cities and farms everywhere in the region. They have a prominent position in the Party and government. They form the majority of the population in Kazakhstan, are the largest group (but not a majority) in Kirgizia, and are important minorities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia. In Uzbekistan, Russians and Ukrainians together were 13 per cent of the total population in 1939. In Turkmenia, Russians alone comprised 19 per cent of the total population. Ukrainians are few in Turkmenia. The proportion of Russians in Tadzhikistan is the smallest in all of Central Asia.

The Russians and Ukrainians have been treated as a unit because they are differentiated by language as a rule only in the rural parts of their home areas. This would be less likely in migration and exile, e.g., in Central Asia. The Russians and Ukrainians are of great importance in urban industry, mining, and white-collar work. They are the most important element in the Party of Kazakhstan and Kirgizia. Therefore they may be grouped linguistically in Central Asia. That is, if one addresses a Ukrainian in Central Asia in Russian, there is little likelihood that he will not understand, unless he does not want to.

The Iranian Languages

The Iranian group of languages has a


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great many representatives in Central Asia. The chief of these is Tadzhik. Speakers of Persian, Beluchi, Kurdish, Yagnobi are to be found in Central Asia, primarily in Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia. They live in areas bordering upon Iran and Afghanistan, but only in scattered thousands. The Yagnobi should be singled out for mention in connection with reported links across the border. Yagnobi is a close relative of ancient Sogdian in the mountains of Tadzhikistan, thrust back by the Tadzhik advance. This matter will be taken up in the chapter on Religion.

Tadzhik is particularly important because it is the lingua franca of the Iranian peoples of the Pamirs. The welter of tongues and dialects in this area makes it difficult to orient oneself. Studies of these mountain dialects are not well-developed. Therefore it is necessary to note that Tadzhik is spoken or understood by the Mountain Iranians (Galcha or Mountain Tadzhiks).

Tadzhik has been entered into the political arena by Soviet writers in order to show that it has a greater antiquity than the language of Iran. The reason for this emphasis is an attempt to inherit the prestige of great Persian poets and philosophers, and thus to enhance the reputation of Tadzhik, and by inference that of the USSR, over that of Iran. Two arguments are advanced by the Soviet writers: (1) The distinctness of Tadzhik from Iran and (2)The greater antiquity of Tadzhik in its present locality (i.e., within the present boundaries of the USSR). .. These lines of argument have not been subjected to critique, but the propaganda value they would have if valid is obvious.



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The word Tadzhik once meant Arab. In the 11th century it came to mean Iranians and non-Arab Moslems. Later it designated the Iranians who formed the majority of Islam in Central Asia. The language of these people was called Dari at the time, according to Bertels. Above we have seen that the term Sart once meant Iranian, but solely the urban and irrigation farming Tadzhiks; the Mountain Tadzhiks were not called Sart. On the linguistic history, Barthold has written that the influence of Persian during the early Islamic period was strong in Central Asia. At this period, for the first time since Alexander the Great, a united political state was formed over Persia and Central Asia. The Central Asian Iranians adopted the legends of the ancient shahs of Persia. Barthold has stated: "The Iranian dialects of Central Asia were gradually thrust back by Persian, and the Iranians in Iran and Turkestan created a general Persian literary language. The earlier languages of the Central Asian Iranians, including the Sogdian literary language, gave place to the language which now is called Tadzhik, and which differs very little from Persian."

This view of Barthold's is confirmed by Freiman, who regards Tadzhik as a Central Asian Persian which arose on the basis of an eastern or Khorasan dialect of Persian among the Sogdian Iranians of Central Asia. Tadzhik gradually thrust back the eastern Iranian tongues. Freiman and, by implication, Barthold have come under the heavy fire of Bertels. Bertels seeks to protect Tadzhik from the imputation that it is a deformed Persian dialect.



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Languages can not be considered deformed. What is significant here is only Bertels' charge that Freiman and before him, Barthold, had placed outside the Soviet Union the center of the historical and linguistic development of a people living within the Soviet Union.

Eastern Asian Languages

The language of the Dungans is Chinese. These people, the majority of whom live in Sinkiang, are distributed in all parts of Central Asia with the possible exception of Tadzhikistan. Chinese-speaking Moslems, they fought bitter wars and rebellions against the Chinese; yet they must be classed with the Chinese linguistically. The Dungans far outnumbered the Chinese in Central Asia during the 1920s. The chief centers of both groups of Chinese speakers are in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia.

The Korean in-migration took place recently. An involuntary movement, it was caused by military necessity resulting from the Japanese war in the Far East during the 1930s and Soviet doubts about Korean loyalty. The Koreans were not present in Central Asia during the 1920s. They appeared in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the rice-growing regions. By 1939 the Korean-speakers were 73,000. An additional number, possibly larger, settled in Kazakhstan. In 1939 the Koreans in the USSR totalled 180,000.

Small numbers of Arabs are found in Central Asia, chiefly in Uzbekistan. They are farmers in the main.

European and Central Asian Jews are urban-dwellers. In language the Central Asian



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or Bukharan Jews were little distinguished from the Uzbeks, among whom they dwelt traditionally. European Jews are Russian-speakers.

Volga Germans are found in Tadzhikistan and possibly elsewhere in Central Asia. Some of these people were forced to move from their native republic in the lower Volga during World War II, for fear they would join with the German invading forces. Their native language is German. They numbered 1.4 million in 1939.

It is not known whether the forced resettlement of the Volga Germans and the Chechens into Central Asia involved the entire populations. However, the Volga Germans have been reported for certain in both urban and rural life in Tadzhikistan. The number of Volga Germans in their native republic was 600,000 in 1939. This number could not be absorbed into Tadzhik life without serious and profound readjustments in the education, publishing, agitational, Party and other activities. Nothing of this sort has come to light. The resettlement of the Volga Germans in Tadzhikistan can only have been a move affecting a limited number of people. The Chechens, on the other hand, must have been moved to Kazakhstan and Kirgizia in considerable proportion. It is quite conceivable that the entire body of Chechens was moved to Kazakhstan and Kirgizia. They have their own press in these republics; thus there is an effect on the publication program and cultural life of Central Asia caused by the forced migration. Moreover, there is a continuity of Chechen life and letters. Again, the Chechens, who numbered 408,000 in 1939, would constitute only six per cent of the 1939 population of Kazakhstan.

The Volga German and Chechen situations are therefore not comparable. The notices of Volga German and Chechen life raise the question of the fate of the Kalmuks, the Crimean Tatars and the

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lesser nationalities who had been abolished as political units in 1944-1946. This question cannot be explored in the present Handbook.

Standardization of Language

During the Soviet period there has been a tendency to standardize the various languages of Central Asia. Dialect differences have been disregarded. None of the languages of Central Asia had been entirely standardized prior to the Soviet period. For example, there were many Tadzhik dialects, and none was considered more normal than any other. Today one standard language has been established for Tadzhik. Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgiz and Turkmen have all been standardized in the same way.

For each language a standard set of grammatical rules has been written. The alphabet has been standardized for each. The alphabets have undergone considerable change in the Soviet period, but are now fixed. The spelling of words has likewise been standardized, although the process of change has not been terminated.

(1) Grammars and Dictionaries

Uigur, Kazakh and Karakalpak have standardized grammars. (See bibliography at end of chapter.) If the other languages of Central Asia - Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kirgiz and Turkmen - have acquired grammars in the recent period, they have not come to our attention.

The production of dictionaries is mainly from Russian into the native language: Russian-Kazakh, Russian-Kirgiz, Russian-Uzbek, Russian-Karakalpak, Russian-Tadzhik. Kazakh-Russian and Tadzhik-Russian dictionaries exist. However the priority is from Russian into the

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native language

Dictionaries are important for learning, for standardizing forms and meanings of words, and for general reference. The highest priority has been given to making Russian available to the peoples of Central Asia, rather than making the native languages available to Russians. Russian is by far the most important language in education, in government, and in literature.

(2) Alphabet

The alphabet problem for Central Asia has been a difficult one. During the middle 1920s (1924-1928) an Arabic script was modified for the purposes of the different languages. However, the Arabic writing had religious as well as international overtones. Therefore the Arab-derived alphabet was dropped, and a more neutral alphabet from the viewpoint of religion was chosen. The new alphabet was based on Latin script. Variations on the Latin alphabet were adopted between 1928 and 1938. At the end of the 1930s further reforms were introduced into the Latin alphabet. Since about 1940 the Russian alphabet, with certain variations, has dominated in Central Asia. Russification of the alphabets began in 1939 with Azerbaidzhani, and by 1944 had reached Kirgiz.

(3) Spelling

Aside from the alphabet, standardization of spelling had to be solved. Russian words introduced into the native languages may either be changed to conform to local pronunciation or retained in the Russian form. At first the words were changed to conform somehow to local pronunciation.



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However in the most recent period (1950s) a stricter rule has been introduced. Russian words are now retained in Russian spelling.

The linguistic question in regard to Kazakh was aired in September 1952. Among the points raised were the following: Russian was praised for enriching the sounds of the Kazakh language, adding y, ts, and f to the language. Kazakh words have changed meaning. Russian is being learned by millions. Grammar has been changed by contact with Russian. New prepositions have been added. Russian is replacing native words. For example, the Russian word for fodder, korm, is replacing the local word dzhemshop (Russian transcription).

The Kazakh writer Auezov has been criticized for his spelling errors, and for declaring that Russian words are foreign to the rhythm of Kazakh and that they should not be used in Kazakh poetry.

Two rules have emerged from these language innovations:

(1) Russian is the "second native language" of Central Asia. It is used over the entire territory. But its development in rural areas is still low, years behind the cities.

One can live in the cities solely with the aid of Russian. On the farms it is doubtful whether Russian is widely known except by Party members, teachers and technical experts.

(2) Words from Russian, even when they



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came originally from a foreign language such as French, now must be spelled after the Russian style in the native languages.

Written and Spoken Language

The standardization of national languages usually means the establishment of one speech form or dialect as the normal one over all others. At the same time this chosen dialect as the standard one becomes the written norm. The standard language is used over the radio and in the press; other dialects must give place to it.

Simultaneously an arbitrary factor enters: why this dialect rather than that, for example, why the Leninabad (Fergana) Tadzhik rather than the Stalinabad Tadzhik, or conversely.

There has been some discussion about whether the three hordes of the Kazakhs were differentiated by dialect. Dialect differences in Kazakh exist. There is one dialect which has y as in English "yes" instead of j as in English "jam." Another Kazakh dialect uses j for y in the same position (at the beginning of words).

Choice of one dialect over others for a standard language creates a problem because the standard language becomes the written language, yet the remaining dialects are spoken. The result is a gap between written and spoken language.

Of all the languages in Central Asia, only Uzbek and Kazakh had a standardized written tradition at the beginning of the Soviet period. The Uzbek which had been standardized was the Iranized Uzbek. (See above.) Turkmen, Tadzhik,

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Kirgiz and Karakalpak had no standard national language, although they had a literature and writing of their own. And even the Kazakh and Uzbek were not entirely standardized.

The rapid standardization of language has made for an arbitrary process in the development of the national cultures. While the literary advancement of many nations of the world has been as rapid as the Central Asian, the linguistic advancement has not usually been as arbitrary. The growth of literature is usually part of the growth of cultural autonomy, whereas the Central Asian literature and language standardization has emerged in an era of loss of autonomy. During the Soviet regime the decisive factor has always been in Moscow's hands. Hence the linguistic standardization has not always been "natural," if by that we mean obedient to the process of development internal to Central Asia itself.



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## Annex "A." 1.e.

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# LANGUAGES

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## Annex "A." 1.f.

## SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The inherent unity of the peoples of Central Asia may be seen most clearly in the social structure. The manner in which the different groups hang together follows a series of patterns which are closely interrelated among the various indigenous peoples. The description of the social structure which follows will be in terms of the fundamental pattern and variations upon the pattern.

The indigenous peoples are divided into two basic groups, the sedentary and the nomadic. The farmers and city-dwellers live by their produce and manufactures. Among the farm products are wheat, cotton, silk and fruits. Urban crafts produce metals, rugs, pottery, tiles and porcelain, leather, felt, and cloths of cotton, wool and silk. In olden times this region was a world center for growing melons, cotton and other products of the fertile valleys.

The nomads live by their flocks of sheep and herds of horses, cattle, camels and goats. Nomads have traditionally traded with farmers and urban communities in the neighborhood. Each was dependent on the other, a relationship which has helped to give the area its unity. This unity by mutual dependence has now



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been broken. Today European Russia is the great center for the movement of goods and ideas in and out of Central Asia. Moscow has supplanted the old centers of movement within the region. The end of the 20th century and the end of the traditional society in Central Asia came slowly. Russian conquest and colonization were vastly accelerated at the close of the 19th century. The nature of the native leadership changed considerably in the face of the Russiance advance; however, the fundamental relations among the different social classes were relatively unchanged. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was less of a dynamic event than might have been expected. Its effect was to set in motion certain processes which culminated a decade later when the traditional society was precipitately changed.

## Soviet Society of Central Asia

### The Early Period

The changes in Central Asian society from the pre-Revolutionary period to the present have been profound. Some of the old leaders of Central Asia were physically liquidated during the wars around the year 1920 and during subsequent police and military actions; some of them fled into exile; and some were absorbed into the lower strata.

The upper strata had changed composition in certain details during the last generation of Tsarist rule. The ruling aristocracy continued to exist in Bukhara, Khiva and Turkmenia



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at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. The aristocracy had begun to crumble in Kazakhstan during the mid-19th century. In various parts of Central Asia a new elite began to form, composed of intellectuals interested in modernization of their societies. Leaders such as the Kazakh writer Altynsarin and Adzhzi among the Uzbeks, were acculturated individuals with a kind of European education. They sought to increase literacy and political democracy among their peoples. However, these movements were swept aside by the Russian Revolution transported to Central Asia. The successors of the elite disappeared during the 1920s. These first steps toward reshaping Central Asia on a European model under conditions of acculturation were replaced by the Soviet process.

During the 1920s Central Asia passed through a transitional period. The Soviet processes of collectivization with powerful police backing, arrests of resistant groups, urbanization, and industrialization did not begin until the end of the decade. These processes caused a secondary wave of resistance from 1930 to 1933. The primary wave in the early 1920s involved the liquidation of the Alash Orda among the Kazakhs and of the Basmachi movement among the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks. The campaign against the Basmachis was not entirely successful, for the movement continued down to 1931. Thus it extended from the period of primary resistance through the secondary wave. The Alash Orda was early absorbed into the Bolshevik movement. However, the leaders all came under sharp criticism for views of Kazakh



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society which ran counter to the Bolshevik doctrine. Eventually these leaders disappeared from public notice.

The period of the 1920s, aside from the Basmachi resistance and its suppression, was a period of quiescence. The period came to an end in 1929 with the beginnings of collectivization. This process was more complicated in Central Asia than in other parts of the USSR because it involved more than moving the peasants onto collective farms. It also meant making farmers out of herdsmen. The attitude of the Turkmen and Kazakh herdsmen to this changeover was clear. A herdsman who became a farmer was taking up a despised task, a task of the poor, the weak, and the woman. A few Turkmens went into flight in Afghanistan and Iran. However the struggle against collectivization, against sedentarization, and against Sovietization generally was sharpest in Kazakhstan.

The Kazakhs numbered some four millions in the census of 1926. They numbered 3.1 millions in the census of 1939. The two census years bracket the period of collectivization. It has been shown that no simple explanation is possible. The official Soviet explanation is that during the 1930s the Kazakhs joined other nationalities of Central Asia and migrated to the cities of western Siberia and the Urals. But this is an inadequate explanation. That is, it does not



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account for an actual loss of nearly one-quarter of all Kazakhs; and it does not tell why and how the Kazakhs became members of other nationalities in moving to the cities, whereas, say, the Ukrainians, or the Azerbaidzhanis did not.

The Soviet record shows that thousands of Kazakhs were arrested by the GPU during the period 1929-1933. Thousands more fled to other republics and beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, to Mongolia and Sinkiang. The great majority probably died by starvation. Livestock figures fell sharply during this period, from 70 million head of stock of all kinds in 1929 to five million head in 1933. The increase in grain-growing did not take up the slack of the 800 per cent drop in livestock. An additional factor was probably the lack of adequate preparation of collective farms to receive the larger numbers of Kazakh herdsmen who had become collective farmers.

The great amount of attention paid to the Kazakh case has overshadowed a parallel if less dramatic trend among the Turkmens. While the Soviet Union as a whole increased at a rate of 16 per cent from 1926 to 1939, the Turkmens increased by six per cent. The neighbors of the Turkmens to the west, across the Caspian, are the Azerbaidzhanis, who increased 33 per cent during the same period. To the east, the Uzbeks increased by 22 per cent. Applying the All-Union average, we would expect a 1939 population of 886,000 Turkmens, and an increase of 122,000 over 1926. Applying the combined rate of increase of Azerbaidzhanis and Uzbeks, 26 per cent, we would expect a 1939 population of 962,000 Turkmens, an increase of 198,000.



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The actual Turkmen increase was 48,000, which is a net gain, but a projected loss. The Turkmen case is the more interesting because it complements the Kazakh case. The Turkmens participated in the same general trend as the Kazakhs, although not in so extreme a fashion.

Herdsmen became farmers for reasons of economic and political pressure. The economic factor involves the consideration that agriculture means a more efficient use of the soil. A smaller amount of land can support a given number of farmers more adequately than the same number of herders. The political reason is that farmers are a fixed population. They move over a small area, from the farmhouse to the field and back again, and occasionally to market. The nomad covers far more territory, and is less subject to political control or to police supervision.

The standard form of the farm village of Central Asia is a closely knit settlement pattern. Houses are built within a small radius of each other; there are no isolated houses. In former times a fortified settlement (kala) surrounded by a wall was spread over the area. The walled villages have not been built for many centuries, but the pattern of close settlement exists today. There was a brief period when, shortly after the Russian conquest, the typical Tadzhik village was scattered among the fields and canals. But this trend was reversed and in recent decades the village has become a densely settled unit rather than a dispersed one.

The degree of kinship solidarity of the various village types is approximately the same today as it was before the Revolution. The nomadic villages of the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz are

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clearly constituted of kin groups. In the first part of the present chapter, the general principles of kinship structure were set forth. The kin groupings are patrilineal; membership in a given group is established by descent in the male line from the group ancestor. This descent pattern may be either real or fictional; that is, an individual may have been adopted into the group but the villagers act as though he had been born into it.

Women marry into the group, that is, wives are taken from outside the village or lineage, in accordance with the general practice of out-marriage, or exogamy. Daughters of the village or lineage marry away from their place of birth. The exogamic marriage pattern means that residence on marriage is patrilocal, in the house of the father of the family. The family forms will be discussed in the chapter on the Family. Here it will suffice to say that women are low in the scale of social values; they are not considered full group members. This social value is observed today just as it has been in the past. This, too, will be discussed below in the chapter on Social Values and the Pattern of Living.

The village is not identical with the lineage. The lineage is slightly larger as a rule. The ideal lineage is seven generations long, which is the unit of the rule of exogamy. According to this rule, a boy cannot marry a girl who shares a common ancestor within the seventh ascending generation.



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1.




The couple above may marry because, although they are descended from a common ancestor, that ancestor is seven or more generations removed.

2.




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This second couple may not marry, for they are descended from a common ancestor less than seven generations back. In the latter case, the boy and girl are related in the sixth degree of patrilineal kinship. In the first diagram, the couple is related in the eighth degree, in which case marriage is possible. The crucial number is seven as a rule. In the case of prohibited marriage, the boy would marry a girl from an entirely different line. A child of his could then marry a child of the girl whom he was forbidden by law to marry.

The seven-generation line of descent forms an exogamic lineage. That is, all members of this lineage must seek wives or husbands outside that lineage.

The kin-village is, as a rule, composed of members related by less than the seventh degree. A kin-village usually consists of people descended from a common ancestor in the fifth generation, that is, people who are related in the fifth degree of male kinship. The number of generations and degrees of relationship can only be construed in the broadest manner, as central tendencies, nothing more.

The number of generations in an outmarrying lineage is as small as five, or it may be nine or ten generations. To a certain extent magic, especially magic numbers or numbers with a mystic aura to them, help to fix the number of generations. Some peoples have the number five, seven or nine as a magic number. The most usual number is seven.



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Circumstances impose themselves and alter the ideal, symmetrical pattern. A shortage of men or women may cause a shift in the preferred marriage pattern. Islamic religion has had a profound effect on the exogamic lineage; Islam has changed the lineage of certain peoples entirely, notably the Uigurs. These people now marry according to the law of the Koran, and not according to the practice of the other Turkic peoples of Central Asia. At the beginning of the 20th century those Uigurs living in Chinese Turkestan followed the law of the three prohibited types of marriage: a man may not marry his sister, mother, daughter, granddaughter or aunt; he may not marry his milk-sister or his wet-nurse; and he may not marry his mother-in-law or his sister-in-law. The Uigurs practiced marriage within the village, and not outside it as the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Turkmens, Uzbeks and other Turkic peoples do.

The lineage is a larger social unit than the kin-village in Central Asia, but it has no center of authority or leader, and has no economic function. The village is the true political and economic unit, the building-block of the society. (In one sense the family is the building-block of the village. This question will be discussed in the chapter on the Family.) Above we have seen how the village nomadized together, organized its economic life generally, ruled itself through its leader, and served as the basic unit of social life.

In the Soviet period the Kazakh and Kirgiz village, called aul, still serves as the basis of social organization. This was the case in the 1920s and remains the case today.



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## The Collective Farm

The rural population of the Soviet Union is settled in collective farms and state farms (kolkhozes and sovkhozes). The Kirgiz are identical with other peoples in this respect. The collective farm is further composed of brigades in Kirgizia just as it is elsewhere in the Soviet Union. The brigades of collective farmers form a functioning unit in crop-raising and other aspects of agriculture. At times they form a village. It should be understood that the collective farm and the village are not the same. A rural settlement may be composed of several collective farms, or a single collective farm may be spread over several villages.

In Kirgizia one kolkhoz, "Kzyl Oktiabr" ("Red October"), consisted of four brigades in five villages in 1949. A brigade of the kolkhoz lived in each of three villages, and in one case a brigade occupied two villages. In each of the villages the kinship system is the basis of social organization. For example, one village is inhabited by 17 families of the Aranzhan lineage; the Kaiduulat lineage is settled in two villages of this collective farm. This ethnographic sketch is presented as an instance of a general principle, the kinship basis of those kolkhoz villages in Kirgizia which are composed of Kirgiz.

The Kazakh collective farm system and villages are organized along lines which parallel the Kirgiz system. To a certain extent the traditional Kazakh and Kirgiz social systems are the same. The identity of the two systems is primarily on the lower levels of social organization,


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that is, in the family, village lineage and clan structures. The Kazakh and Kirgiz traditional systems diverged in the manner of organization of groups of greater compass than the clan. The Kirgiz were lacking in a hereditary nobility. The Kazakhs, who had this feature, looked down upon the Kirgiz. However the aristocracy was not a feature of the smaller Kazakh social structures. It was found only on the level of the clan-confederation, the principality and the empire. These structures have been eradicated under the Soviet regime, having first been weakened under Tsarism. But certain features of the lower levels of social organization shared among Kazakhs and Kirgiz have continued into the Soviet period. These features tend to emphasize the cultural and social unity of the two peoples. That is, the Kazakhs would no longer hold the Kirghiz in contempt for being without a hereditary nobility, since it is lacking in both. This would increase the social unity of the two peoples.

The consideration of the social unity of the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz is introduced because it relates to the problem of the separation of the peoples in the Soviet administrative system. The present political and communications system tends to underscore the cleavage and differences between the peoples. Linguistically the Kazakhs and Kirgiz are moving farther apart. Classifications of Turkic languages are being proposed by Soviet linguists which remove each of the peoples, Kazakhs and Kirgiz, to the most distant poles of the Turkic world. One such classification, by Baskakov, was set forth in the chapter on Languages. Here Kazakh was listed in the western Hunnic branch and Kirgiz in the



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eastern. The membership of the Kirgiz in the eastern branch is based upon a proposed identification of the ancient Altay Mountain Kyrgyz with the late medieval and modern Tien-Shan and Pamir Kirgiz. The identification has been questioned and is far from established. The division is in any case historical and has little relation to modern problems of linguistic unity, structural or communicational.

In the matter of the collective farm organization the same structural features have been noted for the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan as for the Kirgiz in Kirgizia. In 1949 an ethnographic study was conducted in a Kazakh collective farm near Alma-Ata. These Kazakhs were nomadic herdsmen before the Revolution, and had little agriculture. Russian and Ukrainian farmers migrated into the area at the beginning of the 20th century, introducing agriculture and greater personal hygiene, according to the report.

Among the present-day (1949) Kazakhs, the clan affiliation of each man is known. Not only the old men, but also boys of ten or 12 years know their ancestry. They identify themselves by their villages as in former times, although the kolkhoz name has replaced the older aul designation. There is a certain identification made between village and collective farm which is not exact, but is a rough equation in everyone's minds.

It may be further said that the genealogies are carefully preserved. A recent book of memoirs by the Kazakh novelist Sabit Mukanov shows a genealogy of ten generations listed in



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detail. The author states that he knows his genealogy even farther, but he does not want to ". . . uncover traces in the snow where no one will ever go . . ."

Family Names and Social Unity

In this connection it may be interesting to turn to the analysis of local names. The analysis of names is important for a number of reasons, and the observations which underlie the analysis are doubly pertinent.

Family names are not a cultural trait of Central Asia. An individual has his personal name, but beyond that he is known only by his ancestry and lineage. For purposes of identification the Central Asiatic asked, in the traditional manner, "Whose son are you?" "And whose son was your father?" "And his father?" With the coming of the Russians, the system of Russian family names was introduced.

The Russian system is more complex in the sense that a full name conveys a great deal of information. A man named Ivan has a father named Alexander. The son is therefore named Ivan Alexandrovich, the -ovich ending designating the filial relation. The family name of both father and son is something else, quite different as a rule from the patronymic. Let us say the family name is Ivanov. The full name of this son is thus Ivan Alexandrovich Ivanova, adding the final -a as the feminine form. His wife bears his family name on marriage; let us say her father is Petr Nikolaevich Semenov. She was reared as Elena Nikolaevna Semenova, changed on marriage to Elena Nikolaevna Ivanova. The wife



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retains her father's name as part of her own, adding to it her husband's family name.

The 19th century Central Asians began to introduce the Russian system. The first of these were the Kazakhs. The name of the Kazakh nobleman, explorer and writer, Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, reflects this change. Chokan's father was Chingis, and Chokan's grandfather was the Khan Vali. The grandfather's personal name and his title, khan, were incorporated into the family name of Chokan and the typical Russian -ov ending added, thus Valikhanov. Moreover, following the Russian manner the patronymic was formed out of the father's name, and became Chingisovich; the whole was preceded by his personal name, Chokan.

This went too far in many people's eyes; however, the Russian pattern is now almost universally followed, save that the patronymic is not always recorded. For example, the current writer Sabit Mukanov is actually Sabit, the son of Mukan. The father's name is made into a family name just as we have made Jack, the son of Robin, into Jack Robinson - and probably as quickly. The difference is that the evolution of our name system is our own, whereas that of the Tadzhiks, the Kazakhs and certain other Central Asians is the result of Russian acculturation.

The women too reflect the family name system. If we find a married woman with an apparently Turkic first name and a Russian family name, then we are faced with the inference that a mixed marriage between a Turkic woman and a Russian man has taken place. A survey of these names



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should tell us the approximate ratio of intermarriages among the ethnic groups. A further discussion of this problem will be given in the chapter on the Family.

The Kazakh and Kirgiz in the rural areas, both herdsmen and farmers, have strong links with the genealogical system. This is not a matter of the survival of a quaint custom of the past, but is a matter of a genuine social institution with important functions today. This social institution has a series of vital social attitudes and values associated with it. The record of the Soviet ethnographers is important, in consequence, because it affirms the continuity of present society with the past, despite profound changes by acculturation.

Conflict of Systems

There is a sense of the conflict between two social systems on the everyday, newspaper level and in the scholarly journals - Uzbek, Tadzhik, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirgiz. The conflict is recognized in a way, and there has been an attempt to expunge it from the record by denying the existence today of clans and of the bride-price (See below, Family) in the villages.

The Soviet social system is anti-traditional, while the Central Asian social system is oriented to the past in its values as well as in its social structure. Examples of this contrast may be drawn from contemporary Uzbek, Karakalpak, Turkmen and Uigur life. Some of the Uzbek farmers know their clan affiliations to this day.



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In certain parts of Uzbekistan, ethnic maps based upon clan divisions may be, and have been, drawn. In one region of Karakalpakia, 14 collective farms are composed exclusively of the Kongrat division of the Uzbeks. This division has given its name to the district known as the Kungrad Rayon.

The ethnic record for the Karakalpaks is even more complete than it is for the Uzbeks, whose long history of agriculture has weakened the genealogical record in certain cases. The Uzbek divisions, where they are not genuinely genealogical, are based upon notions of Turkic versus Iranian descent; some divisions have no such genealogical pattern at all.

The Islamic religion and agriculture have transformed the social system of Central Asia in part. The peoples who are now or have recently been shamanist and pastoral nomads have a strong genealogical structure in their collective farms. These are the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz, and the Karakalpaks. These three peoples have taken up agriculture in a significant degree only in the past two centuries. And as recently as the end of the 19th century the role of Islam was weak among them.

The Uzbeks are Islamic in the main. Uzbek agriculture dates from the 16th century. However, some Uzbeks are still nomads; and the clan-genealogical system is still widespread, although not universal, among the Uzbeks.

The Turkmens are somewhere between the



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Uzbeks and the Kazakhs and other Central Asian peoples. The difference between the Chomur and the Chorva Turkmens was noted previously.

The Uigurs, including the Kashgarlyks and Taranchis, are the most advanced of all the Turks in concentration upon agriculture. They are close to the Tadzhiks in this respect. They all are Moslems and farmers of long standing.

It would be a mistake to equate a genealogical clan structure with an orientation to the past. In the cases of the Uigurs and the Uzbeks, the clan formation has been changed. In the cases of the Turkmens, this change has been a partial or incomplete one. Among the Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Karakalpaks the change has been minimal in the lower levels of social structure. The Tadzhiks have been heavily acculturated by the mass of Turks in the fields of kinship terminology, organization and behavior.

The Central Asian peoples have an orientation toward the past in another sense as well. Leadership and authority are in the hands of the males, and among the males, the senior and the old. These societies are gerontocracies, societies ruled by the elders.

Furthermore, a thing is valued because it is old. It would be false to assign an exclusive importance to the old in Central Asia, just as it would be false to think women counted for nothing there. But as a general rule, it may be said that the senior takes precedence over the junior, and the males over the females. And by

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way of contrast with Western society, this order of precedence is not mere lip service but has substantive weight. The sinews of the society are attached along these lines. The system is far more rigid than Western society. The society of the West is a relatively loose organization in these respects, more compartmentalized, and hence possessed of far more alternatives in ways of life, choice of self-expression and social behavior patterns. The Central Asian society even today is monolithic by comparison.

As an example it may be said that Western society has within it certain social segments with a rigid code. The well-bred man is gracious toward ladies, but only toward ladies of his social level, and not toward charwomen, prostitutes or female beggars. The Central Asian assigns all women a back place regardless of origin. There are exceptions, such as a princess, who might take precedence over all men.

Youth may also be served in Central Asia, but not as in our society. The popular figure in Central Asian tales is the clever younger prince. The succession to the throne belongs to the older son of the khan, and the younger son is left to his own resources. The younger son outwits the older son and wins a kingdom, sometimes the father's, sometimes another's. But the younger prince is not the legal heir. He is the expression of the popular wishful thinking, for legality is a burden. If we are deprived of our wants by a senior person who stands in the way, then we daydream. "Wouldn't it be fine if ..."



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3:American U. S-4,5 1956 RL1 Turkestan

In the relatively rigidly ordered societies of Central Asia there is a need for escape-hatches and vents. The tale of the clever young prince is such an escape-mechanism. There are other loopholes in the iron web of society in the religious life, and these will be discussed in the chapter on Religion.

The Soviet value pattern places a stress on the young, the inventive and the daring. Authority has passed from the village old men to the young Soviet hero, an engineer or other ideal Soviet type. The two ideals of leadership are incompatible; however, the Soviets have been unable to stamp out these indigenous Central Asian social structures and the associated system of values. The incompatibility is most sharply expressed in the field of authority and leadership, because in this field the Communist Party has established itself. The Party can brook no rival, and yet a rival exists in the old men of the Central Asian village, both the farming and the herding village.

A Film Biography of Chokan Valikhanov

The genealogical links are with the great leaders of the past. Thus the attack on Kenesary and others is an attack on the social system, because genealogical reckoning is part and parcel of that system. The writers who praised Kenesary have been criticized, and some of them purged. All had to admit their ideological errors before the Soviet press, and the conflict over the interpretation of the past has been given full publicity, penetrating into films


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and reviews of films. The figure of Chokan Valikhanov has been made into a heroic model. The film-makers who defied the creed regarding Kenesary have been sharply criticized in the literature on a film of the life of Valikhanov. The general line depicts Valikhanov as a hero who advocated the union of his people with the Russians as a progressive act. But the film did not show the influence upon Valikhanov of Chernyshevsky, the Russian revolutionary. For this the film is criticized. Moreover the film idealizes Sadyk, the son of Kenesary. The Soviet reviewer accuses Sadyk of having been a pan-Islamist. For this the film is doubly damned. The film glorifies the slogan of the Alash Orda, calling for the life of the free nomads of yore, another ideological error.

The analysis of this film is highly revelatory. It may appear that a single film is of minor interest, and a review about it even more so. But the attack on the film took place late in 1952, six years after the attack on Kenesary was launched. It is clear that these ideas die hard, that Kenesary and his son Sadyk are heroes to this day.

It would be dangerous to draw all the opposite inferences from a discussion of Kenesary. If pan-Islamism is attacked it does not follow that pan-Islamism is a live issue among the Kazakhs today. Pan-Islamism as a movement has existed sporadically for a long time. Its ideology is the union of all the Islamic peoples. Whether or not this is a force in Central Asia will be discussed in the chapter on Religion. The film



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review typically presented many details of the Soviet line, not only the main object of attack, but many minor ones and some which are not even related at all.

Most interesting in the review is the friendship depicted between the writer Chernyshevsky and Valikhanov. Chernyshevsky is depicted as a Russian progressive. While Tsarism was reactionary, it nevertheless contained progressive elements which eventually won out in the Russian Revolution of 1917. These progressive Russian elements stood at the vanguard of related movements among the minority nationalities. The histories of the national minorities are now being assayed in the Soviet press in order to separate the "progressive" from the "reactionary" forces. The discussion of this film has supplied a detailed example of the various forces at work within the Soviet Union. The division of opinion between the official line and the local view of national heroes and of the society in general is sharp and clear.

## Traditional Society

The two indigenous peoples of Central Asia - Turks and Iranians - have had a long period of interaction. The Turks, originally nomadic, came to Central Asia where they encountered the Iranians already resident. The Iranians were farmers, and the Turks entered into close political and economic relations with these established residents. Many Turkic groups, but far from all,



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took up agriculture. The nomadic Turks and the sedentary Iranians and Turks traded and warred with each other, and combined politically, the Turks usually in the ascendant. The language, the poetry, and the religion of the region reflect this close interaction, and contribute to it. Within this common framework of historical development, a common social structure emerged.

Kinship and Politics

The primary feature of this common social system in Central Asia is the central position of the kinship bond. This bond was most strongly expressed amond the nomads, and became gradually weakened in the sedentary agricultural and urban peoples, but only in the state formation, not on the village level. That is, the agricultural state was not bound by ties of kinship; the agricultural village and the nomadic village and empire were all units of kinship and common descent.

In theory, the nomadic state and empire were united from top to bottom by kinship. Not so the agricultural state; it was at this point that the consanguineal tie was loosened. The new factor that was introduced here, the city, was incompatible with the maintenance of kinship ties. The city was, of course, lacking on the nomadic steppes.

The peoples of Central Asia had a series of social institutions or structures ranging from the village to the state or principality (khanate)



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in increasing size and power. Both the nomads and the farmers had this hierarchy of social structures in common. However, a pastorial Turkic khanate lacked a fixed point, for the capital lay in the nomadic court of the khan. The only fixed point it could occupy lay in the sedentary capital, the city. Thus, the pastoral capitals were fixed only on those occasions and during those periods when the nomads invested and occupied them. The city was therefore a potential capital for the nomadic state when it was combined with the sedentary through conquest or alliance. The Mongols had another system of fixed points in the net of Buddhist lamaseries of Mongolia.

The city lay in the agricultural domain, and it was here that the kinship base for the society broke up. Nevertheless, there were many practices and customs shared by the city-dwellers with the kin-bound farmer or nomad, for the population of the cities came from one or the other of these two sources.

The nomadic society was a series of concentric circles in form. The nomadic village was composed of a series of related families, and was bound by ties of blood and marriage. The nomadic village in turn combined with related villages into a larger unit, the lineage. The members of this lineage all shared a single ancestor many generations back. This ancestor was a male, and descent from him was traced solely in the male line, from father to son.



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Lineages were further combined into a clan based upon the same principle: descent in the male line from a far-distant ancestor, the clan founder. The clan was usually combined with other clans into a confederation, all related by ties of descent in common from a single founder, traced from father to son. This clan confederation was the basis of a political unit, the state or principality which we call the khanate. The khanate was in theory a single consanguineal unit, all members of which had a founding ancestor in common.

However, the nomadic society was at the same time divided into social classes: aristocracy, commoners and slaves. The aristocracy was based upon priority of birth. Thus we may distinguish two principles in the structure of Central Asian society. (1) The principle of patrilineal descent through the male line, which united the society into a group related by ties of blood. (2) The principle of primogeniture which divided the society into nobility and commoners. The slaves came into the society from outside by capture or purchase.

Primogeniture, the right of the first-born, was the principle upon which the aristocracy was founded. But there was no vague feathering off from one class to another. The cleavage of the nobility from the commoners was sharp.



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The cleavage was based upon some specific event, usually a war. That is, a political leader was fixed in his position by his right as first-born. If he then led his group, e.g., a clan, in a successful war, he came to rule over a larger territory and a larger group of people. Those immediately related to him formed a separate line. Their descendants, by right of descent in the line of the first-born, formed a class apart, the aristocracy of that particular clan or clan-confederation. The political ruler was the khan.

The khan obtained the mandate of the people, for he became their spokesman for the maintenance of the group against outside influences and insidious internal developments. He obtained his mandate from the people, and his rule was formally sanctioned.

When we turn to the empire of Chingis Khan, we find a formal mandate again, actually a twofold mandate. Chingis Khan was empowered by divine sanction and by a ritualized election. This election was initiated and supervised by powerful supporters among his immediate following, which was the nascent aristocracy. That is not to say that the Mongols were developing an aristocracy in the 13th century. They had had one long before; Chingis Khan caused it to be re-formed around his throne. This was new. The struggle between aristocracy and commoners attributed to the earlier nomadic state of the Orkhon Turks was not found among the Mongols. Chingis Khan emerged as the leader of all the Mongols, high and low. To acquire this role for himself he was twice elected khan within the first decade of the 13th century; thus he had a doubly affirmed mandate to rule, and a divine sanction.


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The traditional form of society has imposed itself on the present way of life at two distinct levels: (1) The social structure proper. (2) The ideological. In the present social structure many elements are continuities of past forms. Some of these have aided, some have impeded Sovietization. In the current native ideology, many older forms are still idealized, and exist as active forces in the political life of the people.

Ideology and Kinship: The Genealogy

The older social forms which aid Sovietization have been welded to the new forms; those forms which impede Sovietization stand out as centers of potential opposition. The relationship between the two, and between structure and ideology, will be discussed after the Soviet forms have been described.

The entire social system of Central Asia is heavily oriented to the past. The genealogies which the people maintain are symbolic of this orientation. The maintenance of a genealogy requires a detailed knowledge of the past, and the past is thus seen to possess a great importance. A Central Asian clan is founded upon a genealogy which is shared by all its members. It is a unilineal descent group, that is, descent is traced in one line only, the male line. Relationship through the mother and female kin is simply not counted for purposes of clan membership. The clan genealogy is actually the roll-call of the clan.

The genealogy serves other functions. A clan may be very large, comprising thousands of

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members spread over a vast area. Clansmen are seldom strangers to each other. On meeting, they establish their relationship as clan members, their relative seniority and precedence, the authority of one over the other, the claim of each to hospitality and support. Each clan member legitimates his membership through the genealogy, and establishes his social position in regard both to other individuals and to the group.

These genealogies are traced to the founding ancestor of the clan, and through him to the founder of the entire people - Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgiz, Turkmen and others. The genealogies begin with some mythical being, such as a dog in the case of the Kirgiz, a wolf in the case of the Mongols and also the Turkmens, and Adam in the case of the Islamized Uzbeks. The genealogies are very long, spreading over 20, 40, 60 or more generations. Since they are exceedingly long they will not always conform in every detail. There is a considerable amount of play in these ancestral lists since they were not written until long after they had been begun - or perhaps never written. Literacy was not common in Central Asia, and memories, even if long, were fallible.

Some of the genealogies appear as though they have been altered, even invented. But this must be understood in another sense from the invention of a genealogy which traces to the Mayflower. The genealogies of Western society are maintained for purposes of prestige. Consequently, they are jealously guarded by those who believe they can gain prestige thereby. The genealogies of Central Asia, on the other hand, are the life-blood of the society. No affairs of the society can be set in motion without the genealogy.



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Military rank is established in terms of order of descent, that is, by claim to clan membership and aristocracy within the clan on the basis of genealogy. Law cases are heard and tried on the basis of kinship. Kinsmen take oaths for each other; they contribute to each other's fines, and share indemnities.

Kinship predicated on genealogy is the foundation of the Central Asian social structure and of the functionings of that structure in all civil and military affairs as well as in family life. The clan supplied something like a regiment to the army of the khan. A group of related clans supplied something like a division or an equivalent large-scale military unit. The clan, a unit of kinship, had both military and civil administrative functions. It had a common territory, a single leader and center of authority, as well as common descent in the male line.

The clan genealogy is not a fixed and closed document; it is frequently amended for a particular purpose. Clans have combined out of economic necessity, through military alliance, or by conquest and absorption. The fusions of clans and lineages was regularized after the fact by changing the genealogy to suit. One clan head might offer to make another clan leader his younger brother or his nephew in keeping with a proposed alliance, the alternative to which would be military conquest.

If the alliance was accepted, the weaker clan was brought in as junior kinsmen of the stronger, and the genealogies of both were fitted accordingly. Otherwise the union was carried out by force. The stronger people would conquer the


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weaker, killing some, taking others as slaves. In the latter case the slaves would merge into the free class either after the passage of time or in the next generation. Concubinage was a frequent means of merging slave women into the free class. The men would be freed after a time; or if they died in slavery the children would pass over in menial but free status, as poor dependents and hangers-on. There was no permanent class or caste of slaves.

Genealogies were in part fictional, in part biologically demonstrable. Genealogies were moved about like pawns in a chess game to establish a desired fact. But the genealogies were at the same time revered, for they started with a mythical and in some sense holy founding ancestor. Genealogies may be likened to the charter of incorporation of a firm, a roll-call of the membership, a passport for the establishment of identity, an insignia to show relative rank, a ticket to be exhibited on demand for hospitality, and a card calling for cooperation.

The genealogical kin-group, whether lineage, clan, clan-confederation or tribe, was like a corporation in some respects, like a state or nation in other respects, like a trade or labor association in yet others.

Social mobility was high in general. Unlike feudal Europe where the barrier between serf and lord was as near to absolute as human device could make it, the fortunes of Central Asian man were subject to sharp rises and falls. Both Chingis Khan and Timur rose from impoverished conditions to the highest power. Each was a



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nobleman of junior rank, and at one point or another in his career each was destitute and friendless. A commoner could not rise to the highest position but he could rise to a generalship, to a governorship or to great wealth. Just as the rise could be swift and high by reason of bravery in war or shrewdness of council, the fall could be low. The power in the hands of the ruler was supreme. The Central Asian monarchy was a typical Oriental regime in its monarchic and despotic character. Ideally, power was concentrated at the top. If the despot could enforce his rule, it was absolute. If he could not, then the regime fell apart into smaller central units.

The regimes of Chingis Khan, of Timur, of the Uzbek Khanate of Sheibani, of the Kipchak or Golden Horde, of the Kazakh state under Khan Teuke - all corresponded to this form of rule. They all gave rise in the same fashion to a system of disunited succession states. The surviving social structure in the succession states had a smaller degree of political agglomeration and a tighter kinship base on the level of the smaller units.

## The Formation of Kin-Groups

The process of fusion of kin-groups through alliance was often a matter of names of clans. If two clans in unrelated groups bore the same name, the inference in the minds of the people was that they had a common ancestor. This gave one of the clans the right to call upon the other for help in times of crisis. The resulting fusion of descent lines was either temporary, long-term or permanent.



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The process of fusion is well exemplified in the writings of Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, who lived in the middle of the 19th century. Valikhanov was a native Kazakh, the son of a Kazakh nobleman and the grandson of Khan Vali, who lived at the beginning of the 19th century. Valikhanov wrote that the clans of the Kirgiz were in a fluid state in his day. Certain Kirgiz clans nomadized with the Atygai clan of the Argyn federation of the Middle Horde of the Kazakhs, gradually merged with the Atygai clan, and formed two lineages in the Atygai - the Yana-Kirgiz (New Kirgiz) and the Bai-Kirgiz (Rich Kirgiz).

In order to obtain the genealogical right of clan-fraternity, the two new Kirgiz lineages trace descent from one of the 12 sons of Daut, who founded the Atygai. Whether the two new lineages' identification as to origin was suggested by the name or whether it is actual cannot be ascertained and is irrelevant. The identification is a fact, and becomes the basis for social analysis. The usefulness of this fact in historical reconstruction is another matter. Sometimes these facts are useful, sometimes they are not. The myth may relate to history, but the myth cannot be entered into the historical record unless it is verified by other means. Archaeology, written records and internal evidence and consistency are among these other means of verification.

The above example of fusion of kin-groups and of descent-lines involved the Kirgiz and the Kazakhs. The following example, furnish-also by Valikhanov, involves two different hordes of the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks.

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The Kereit are a clan of the Kazakhs of the Great Horde. Part of these Great Horde Kereit separated from the Kazakh federation at one time and joined a clan of the Uzbek which also bore the name of Kereit and traced descent from an ancestor Kerei or Girei, who gave his name to his descendants. A small portion of the original Kazakh Kereit then left the Uzbek Kereit and returned to the steppes to establish itself as a neighbor of the Little Horde. These people are now the Djety-Ru (Seven Clans) division of the Little Horde, and trace descent from Karakat, the founder of this division, in a totally different line from the Kereit.

This second story, about the Kereit, is more complicated but clearer than the first, about the Yana-Kirgiz and the Bai-Kirgiz. The genealogy is known, and its twistings and alterations are also known. The genealogical record, which is in part mythical, was corrected by the historical record which was known to Valikhanov but was not known to the unlettered Kazakh.

In the movement of the Kereit away from the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde to the Uzbeks, a relationship was advanced between the relevant Kazakh and Uzbek groups. The nomadic Kazakh Kereit asserted a relationship with the sedentary Uzbeks on the basis of a common name. From this name they argued a common descent from the putative founder, Kerei, and kinship on that basis. Being kin, the Kazakh Kereit could make a claim for succor upon the Uzbek Kereit. When these originally Kazakh Kereit later left the Uzbek domain, they sought hospitality among the Little Horde of the Kazakhs. But in doing so they joined



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the Karakat descent line, a line totally unrelated to the Kereit although generally within the framework of Kazakh ancestry. The ancestral line of the Kereit was altered to justify the change in group membership.

From these reports we see that the various peoples of the steppe were involved in a series of intricate interrelationships. Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Uzbeks considered themselves kin in certain cases, on the basis of a common clan name and ancestry.

The Karakalpaks have devised a genealogy for themselves (set forth in the chapter on Historical Setting). In this genealogy the Kazakhs, the Karakalpaks, the Uzbeks and the Turkmens are all shown to have a common ancestry. The Karakalpak genealogy reports only those relationships among ethnic groups which were significant to the Karakalpaks. The immediate neighbors of Karakalpaks are the Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Turkmens. The Kirgiz are separated from the Karakalpaks by the body of Uzbeks and a wedge of Kazakhs, and do not figure in Karakalpak genealogies. Finally, the Karakalpak genealogy reported above shows the degree of remove of the various peoples. The closest are the Kazakhs, who branched off only in recent generations. The Uabeks branched off at an earlier time than the Kazakhs, and the Turkmens earliest of all.

The Karakalpak genealogy thus corresponds in a general way to known ethnological, historical and linguistic data. The Kazakhs and the Karakalpaks are most closely related historically, linguistically, ethnically and in the consciousness of the peoples. Next closely re-


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lated to the Karakalpaks are the Uzbeks by the same criteria; most distantly related, but still within the Central Asian Turkic world, are the Turkmens. The Kirgiz are not mentioned at all in the Karakalpak genealogy, for the Kirgiz and the Karakalpaks are not neighbors. Thus, kinship and neighborhood are closely connected.

Lastly, the Karakalpak genealogy establishes the rank order of the different peoples. The Uzbeks are the senior line; the Kazakhs are next in rank; the Karakalpaks are next; and the Turkmens are the last.

Another Turkic genealogy shows a list of 68 generations descended in the male line. The genealogy begins with Adam through the tradition of the Koran and the Bible, and thus purports to account for all mankind. The genealogy ends in the 19th century with the genealogist, a minor leader of the Kazakhs. It tells his position in the Kazakh line; it explains to whom he is related; and it asserts his right to a status as a minor nobleman (batyr). In the course of its exposition, the genealogy assigns a place to nearly all the Kazakh clans, and shows the relationship of the Kazakhs to the Uzbeks, i.e., how many generations since they branched off from each other.

In the cases reported by Valikhanov, it is probable that the Kirgiz clans were impelled by economic need to join the Kazakhs, and that the Kazakh Kereit moved out of the pastoral steppes for the same reason. The Kazakh Kereit returned when conditions were propitious, albeit this time to another horde of the Kazakhs. Thus the fission



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and fusion of descent lines related to economic as well as military considerations. Ultimately one line might branch off and either join another or set up an independent existence, if it felt itself to be strong enough.

The danger of using genealogies to reconstruct historical courses without otherwise verifying them is seen through one Kirgiz genealogy. Many peoples of Central Asia consider the Nogais the most ancient nomadic people of Central Asia, and trace descent from them. We know that the Nogais were formed in the era of Chingis Khan and his immediate descendants, prior to the formation of the Karakalpaks. However, the Kirgiz are more ancient than the period of Chingis Khan. In spite of this, the Kirgiz reckon their ancestor to be Nogai.

Although the genealogies are more vital in the life of Central Asian nomads than in the life of the farmers, the latter too tend to maintain genealogies, but with less significance. The city-dwellers are least avid in the maintenance of genealogies. The reason is that social unity and differentiation were based upon the descent line in its specific details among the nomads. The farmers considered their functions important in the small social units, in the lineages, kin-villages and families. But the state form of the Turkic farmers had broken with the consanguineal unity in the era immediately following Chingis Khan. The agricultural Uzbek empire and the khanates which succeeded it - Bukhara, Kokand, Khiva - were not integrated by recognition of common kinship as the nomadic Uzbek or Kazakh peoples were.

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## The Corporate Group

The kinship systems of the steppe societies are of a kind which has been termed corporate. They are in fact corporate bodies in the sense that a business firm is a corporation. They are not sovereign units but are component parts of a state or empire; and they are perpetuated in the sense that they survive the death of any member; they are not dissolved with each generation and re-formed. They are unilineal structures. That is, descent is traced through the male line as opposed to the tracing of descent through both parents. (Descent through the female line alone, the matrilineage, is also unilineal or single line, but is not found in this part of Asia.) As a general rule, Western civilization traces descent equally through both parents. My maternal uncles are no different from my paternal uncles. Both are called uncle. Any difference in the respect I pay them is a personal matter and is not decreed by the customs of the society. I may inherit from the estate of either, and in the same proportion should they die intestate.

Not so in Central Asia. Here the maternal uncle is carefully separated from the paternal uncle in terminology - each is called by a different term. I must pay a great deal of respect to my paternal uncle regardless of what I think of him personally. On the other hand, the maternal uncle is either totally unimportant or he is regarded as a friend. There are exceptions to these generalizations; they will be discussed in the chapter on the Family.

In a bilateral (two-sided) system of


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kinship relations such as our own, the family dissolves with each generation and is founded anew by the next generation. There are exceptions to this rule in some parts of the United States, but it is generally true.

The family in the unilineal kinship structures tends to be more stable and less brittle than in the bilateral - the patrilineal more so than the matrilineal. In the patrilineal societies there is a heavy emphasis on the transmission of the line from father to son. The authority of the family, the kin-village, the lineage and the clan, passes from one generation to the next in the senior male line. Families do not dissolve in Central Asia on the death of the parents. In this sense they are stable and corporate; they are also corporate in the sense that they are part of a larger whole, wherein they are held in place, assigned to a place by a long genealogy.

Corporations have a center of authority and rules of membership. In a business corporation the center of authority is the board of directors and the chairman of the board. In the nomadic societies the center of authority is the senior male member of the senior male line. In a business corporation the rule of admission to membership is investment in the firm. In the nomadic society the rule or admission is by descent properly attested by genealogical recitation when called in question. Corporations delegate authority. The chairman of the board does not keep the accounts of the firm or report on them or verify them; he does not try law cases involving the firm nor does he personally hire and


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fire personnel. He delegates these powers. So, too, the khan and the clan chief on the steppes have the power of delegating a part of their authority. Both the corporate structures of Western civilization and the corporate structures of the patrilineal system of Central Asia are durable bodies within a sovereign state; they are not sovereign powers themselves. They are an empire within an empire - imperium in imperio. The distinction between corporate kinship structure and corporate political structure cannot be made in Central Asian nomadic societies, for the two are interwoven and merged.

The social structure of the farmers parallels that of the nomads, with the exception that on the highest level of social structure the kinship system plays but little part. The khan's office among the farmers was much like a regal institution anywhere. It rested upon the legitimacy of his succession and the strength of his support. Like the feudal estate of Europe, the khan's line was differentiated from the lesser nobility by seniority of descent. The lesser nobility in turn was different in descent line from the commoners. However the khan was an absolute ruler, a despot in the true sense of the word, whereas the European feudal lord was not. The European feudal lord had not divided his office or functions to the point where public and private law, public and private purse, public and private retainers were differentiated. The differentiation of the public from the private was systematic in Central Asia. In the economic sphere, the money economy was weakly developed in feudal Europe. In Central Asia it was rather strongly developed for its time, as strongly as in predominantly agricultural regimes anywhere.


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Private property in land was a powerful institution in Central Asia; it was weakly developed in medieval Europe.

The khan was surrounded by a court, ministers, servants and slaves in both nomadic and sedentary Central Asian states. The sumptuousness of these courts was world-famous in medieval Europe; even in the 16th and 17th centuries some small degree of their earlier grandeur was retained by the courts. By the 19th century these courts were mean and impoverished by comparison either with their earlier state, or with contemporary Europe. The central armies of these khanates could not oppose even the few regiments Russia sent out to meet them. The invading armies over-ran Central Asia almost at will.

## The Unity of Central Asiatic Social Structure

Central Asia was a unitary area by tradition. A common tradition upon which all Turkic people could draw was a vital factor contributory to this unity. The recurrence of ethnic names at various times and in various parts of Central Asia and neighboring regions - names such as Oguz, Kipchak, Uigur, Kereit, Karakalpak - bespeaks the unity of tradition. The close political and economic involvement of the various peoples was another expression of the unity. This unity involved both the Turkic and Iranian peoples.

## Aristocracy

The Kazakhs and the Mongols have had

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two clearly separated social strata, the aristocracy and the commoners. In these societies, the line of descent from father to son gives the group its existence and continuity. The group is then divided in two, according to the theory of society as worked out by the Central Asian peoples themselves. The higher stratum bears the name of "white bone," and the lower stratum "black bone." Today, among the Ordos Mongols of Inner Mongolia, the term "bone" is paired with "flesh" as a kinship term. "Bone" among the Ordos Mongols means paternal kin as a group; "flesh" means the maternal kin. Together they form the whole of society.

The "white bone" and the "black" as separate entities are not found everywhere among the Turks of Central Asia. They are found among the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks, but not among the Kirgiz, the Altay Mountain Turks, the present-day Uigurs and the Turkmens. There is a question whether the peoples of Central Asia who had no distinction between "white bone" and "black bone" had a hereditary aristocracy at all. The Altay Mountain Turks and the Uigurs did not have a hereditary aristocracy, but for different reasons. The Altay Turks are mountain pasturalists; a scattered people, they are relatively few in number, with poorly developed political institutions in the matter of complexity and centralization. They have the concept of the "bone", but not the division into "white" and "black." The Uigurs are heavily Islamicized, are urban and agricultural. The kinship bond among them is virtually missing, and they have no concept of the "bone" at all. They follow the Koran in their social order.

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The Kirgiz have the concept of "bone" even at present, but have no division into "white" and "black," that is, they have not had a true hereditary aristocracy. They had local leaders called manaps, who would try to pass on their power to their sons. However, only if they were rich and influential could they do so. There was no continuity of descent inherent in the office of manap.

The Turkmens had a hereditary aristocracy of sorts, but their own conception of their social order was different from that of the others, for the Turkmens was not a "bone" society. That the Turkmens had hereditary khans there is no doubt. However, the khanates of the Turkmens were not so rigid in structure as those of the Kazakhs or the Uzbeks. During the past 400 years the Turkmens appear never to have been integrated into one political unit, and had few traces of a hereditary nobility other than the khans of the different divisions.

The divisions of the various indigenous peoples were at once political and consanguineal structures; the analysis of steppe society in the present and preceding chapters makes this plain. The social aspect of their structure was kinship, and remains so to this day. The territorial-economic aspect of the various kinship unions has also been described above. Each kinship unit had, and in the main still has, its own territory from which it gets its living by means of farming or herding. The units of political, consanguineal and territorial-economic function were the solidary groups in the religious life as well. Both shamanist and Islamic groups were political-



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economic-kinship units. The authority of the chief in the various socio-political units was based upon armed might, wealth and influence on the one hand, and on priority and prestige by right of birth on the other. These various conditions were all needed in equal degree to create a political domain and to enforce authority within it.

The socio-political divisions of the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs were set forth in the chapter on Historical Setting. The various divisions of these peoples were politically active in a sense equivalent to the experience of Western civilization. Hence they could be treated in a historical fashion without further introduction. They had armies, fought wars, engaged in treaties and negotiations, maintained courts, levied taxes, and otherwise comported themselves like states in the European sense. The Kazakh hordes - the Great Hord, the Middle Horde, and the Little Horde - along with the Uzbek Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, were more loosely organized than European states but sufficiently like them to permit the application of general categories of historical activity.

Non-Aristocratic Societies

At the other extreme of social organization in Central Asia are the Tadzhiks and the Altay Turks. In recent centuries these peoples have had no trace of their own politico-social integration. The Altay Turks were for a time within the Dzungarian Federation. The Tadzhiks have been part of the Uzbek Khanate and its successors, the Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Ko-



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kand. Neither has had a political integration of its own. The Altay Turks live thinly scattered in the valleys of the Altay Mountains, without any centers of population density. Such centers of population density are necessary for political integration , because connected with them are centers of authority, of communication, of order, and of the symbolization of political integration. These centers serve as focal points for a common tradition and the representation of that tradition.

The Tadzhiks are unlike the Altay Turks in that the Tadzhiks have focal points of their own.Yet while they have great population concentrations in cities, especially in the Fergana Valley, the political integration has been monop- ooc olized by the Turks.

The Altay Turks have had no name for themselves as a people. They are identified only by the valleys in which they dwell, such as the valley of the Chuya River. These people have borne the name of Chuy-Kizhi or "Chuya People." By generalization the Altay have come to be known as Altay-Kizhi, "Altay Mountain People." Since the Altay Turks once formed a part of the Oirat or Dzungarian Federation, they have been identified at times as Oirots. They themselves have talked about a Great Khan Oirot who would come back some day and liberate them from the Russians. They had a short-lived and half-forgotten politico-religious movement around this belief at the beginning of the 20th century.

The Tadzhiks had no name for themselves as a people until the Soviet period. The Mountain Tadzhiks were known collectively as Galchas

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by 19th century writers such as Ujfalvy. The Tadzhiks of the valleys were known as Sarts, a name never applied to the Mountain Tadzhiks. It is also doubtful whether the term Tadzhik was applied to themselves by those known as Galchas.

The Tadzhiks sometimes refer to themselves as Dihkan -"villagers," "farmers." Closely related to them are the mountain Yazgulemians and Yagnobis. The Galchas properly so-called are the Ishkashims, the Wakhans and the Shugnans, names which are derived from place-names representing the mountain areas where they live. The largest of these groups, the Shugnans, is in turn divided into several sub-groups, the Rushans, the Bartangis, the Shugnis and the Goranis, all names derived from places of residence. Although all these peoples are Islamic, there are considerable religious differences among them. The Ishkashims, the Wakhans and the Shugnans living in the mountains close to the Kashmir and Afghanistan frontiers, are Ismaelians. The bulk of the Tadzhiks are Sunnites; a few of the Yazgulemians are exceptional for being Shiites.

The Kirgiz are somewhat more highly integrated and differentiated than the Altay Turks or the Tadzhiks. The Kirgiz have been able to put armies in the field, and were victorious over Khan Kenesary in the mid-19th century, having brought about his ultimate defeat when he sought to invade their valleys. However, they are divided into groups without a higher leadership or hereditary aristocracy. Their leadership was local, based on wealth and influence, and the leaders were known as manaps.

The Kirgiz were split into two great



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divisions, the On or right wing, and the Sol or left. These have never been joined, as far as is known by anyone, whether he is Kirgiz or not. The On was subdivided into six clan-confederations, and these in turn formed a series of clans. The largest On confederation, the Bugu or Deer, was composed of 17 clans. Other confederations of the On wing were composed of from two to 11 clans. The Sol consisted of seven clans. The clans were highly fluid, and the sub-divisions of the clans were vague in difinition by the Kirgiz themselves.

Each of the confederations of Kirgiz clans had recognized territories where they nomadized with their herds. However neither of the great wings had an aggregate territory marked off as opposed to the other. Neither was a distinct entity as far as internal social organization was concerned.

The Turkmens were divided into five great units or confederations. These five Turkic confederations are shown in Table 1.f.I.



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TABLE 1.f.I

DIVISIONS OF TURKMEN

I.

A. Salor[1]
1. Karaman
2. Yalovach
3. Kichi-aga

B. Sarik
1. Alash
2. Pulat-Shah

C. Teke
1. Tokhtamysh
2. Otamysh

D. Yomud
1. Kara-Chaka (or Kuttu-Temir)
2. Bairam-Choly (or Utly-Temir)

E. Yemrili

II.

A. Chandar (Dzhandor)
B. Goklen
C. Khatab[2]
D. Mukzi[2]
E. Kara-dashly
F. Karkyn
G. Ersari
H. Bayat
I. Agar
J. Ogurdzhaly

III.

A. Turkmenized Arab
1. Ata
2. Shikh
3. Khodzha
4. Said
5. Makhtun

IV.

A. Old Non-Oguz Turkmen
1. Sunchi
2. Nokhurli
3. Ananli
4. Murcha

V.

A. Recent Non-Oguz Turkmen
1. Ali-eli
2. Khizr (or Kutlar)
3. Khizreli

1/ The Salor were counted the most noble, i.e., senior, of the Turkmen confederations.

2/ Related to the Goklen



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Certain elements of a dual organization have been discerned in the social structure of the Central Asian Turks. These peoples have many traces of division into two parts, with reciprocal functions such as in rules of marriage between the two divisions. According to these rules, a girl from one division marries into the other. This is the preferred form of marriage. However, this is preserved only as a faint trace.

On the other hand, the Turkmens have a veritable division into two parts according to economic function. The Yomud Turkmens have an agricultural subdivision known as the Chomur, and a pastoral subdivision called the Chorva. The Chorva are the prestige group, just as herding is the prestige occupation. The Chomurs aspired to become pastoral Chorvas; and conversely, the Chorvas, becoming impoverished, changed to Chomurs. The cleavage between the two groups is a functional one, not a rigid one.

The Turkmens are Sunni Moslems. The Persians are Shia. The raids and wars between the Turkmens and the Persians had a religious aspect, although it was only a nominal one, for the Turkmens were not scrupulous in observance of the Islamic faith.

## The Village

The basic unit of the Central Asian peoples, both Turkic and Iranian, has been the village. This determines the economy, residence and neighborhood, local authority, law and administration, and taxation both in kind and in corvee labor. The nomadic village is the aul, the sedentary agricultural village is the kishlak.



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The feature of kin-community break-up was observed in the 19th century when certain Kazakh clans and villages were forced to quit their pastoral way of life and to take up agriculture. Economic necessity and demographic pressure by Russians migrating into Kazakhstan lay at the heart of the matter. Added to this force was the administrative change superimposed on the Kazakhs by the Russians. The Kazakhs were re-grouped into Russian administrative units. These units were incompatible with the Kazakh social structure, and therefore caused all but the smallest structures, i.e., the kin-village and the social units within the village, to collapse. And even the kin-village changed where the Kazakhs took up agriculture. Thus the larger social units were transformed through administrative change and the smaller units were transformed through economic change.

The village of the nomads is generally small, ten to twelve tents. The village of the farmers is comparatively large, 50 houses or more. The nomadic village expands and contracts to a considerable degree during the year. This expansion and contraction is related to the annual nomadic round. The sedentary village, in contrast, retains a constant size through the year.

The nomadic movements of the herding peoples are not willful and lawless. On the contrary, they are as fixed in their pattern as the farmers are in theirs. The nomads have a winter camp which they occupy from November to March. During this season the entire village is gathered and the village attains its greatest size in the year. The winter village site is



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generally established in a locality protected from winds but which at the same time is accessible to open places. The wind-protected valleys and hollows are necessary for the survival of the livestock, for the steppe winters are rigorous. However, the livestock forages for grass under the winter snow. If the snow is too thick, the stock may starve. Therefore the stock is set out to forage in the wind-swept and snow-free steppe, but is brought back to the protected camp.

In the spring, the winter camp breaks up and the group seeks pastures which are not in protected places. These are always known and allotted by kin-groups, just as are the winter camps. There is no concept of property in land, but group pasture-rights are closely observed, and infringements are subject to retaliation by feud. The spring camps are stopping places on the way to the summer pastures. Here the winter village breaks into smaller groups and disperses with the flocks and herds. In the autumn and winter the procedure is reversed. The people concentrate in larger numbers and in fewer places for the winter camp.

The annual round is fixed. The seasonal camps and the routes from camp to camp are known to be associated with particular villages. The summer dispersal usually breaks up the winter group into three or four groups of two or three tents each.

There is a fundamental difference between the true steppe pastoralists and the mountain-valley pastoralists of Central Asia. Mountain herdsmen in Central Asia are the Kirgiz,



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the Altay Turks and the Galchas. These herdsmen do not nomadize with their stock over great distances; they move from the valleys to the mountainsides and back again over the year. Such a move involves a vast change in ecology, but a distance of only a few miles. The steppe herdsmen are the Kazakhs as well as the nomadic Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Karakalpaks. (The term "steppe"actually is used to cover a range of conditions from desert to desert-steppe to steppe.)

These pastoralists travel great distances in their quest for grass and water for the livestock. They are capable of far greater population concentrations and dispersals than the mountaineers. Hence they have been able to achieve greater concentrations of political power and a centralized authority system in their khanates, even in the absence of permanent settlement. The mountain pastoralists have not been capable of such developments. In this way, habitat, economy, ecological conditions, and social structure are all interrelated with the political life and political history of Central Asia.

## The Ideologies of Herdsmen and Farmers

The higher political integration of the steppe nomads has enabled them to put armies in the field which have fought the sedentary peoples and at times conquered them. By these conquests the steppe nomads gained access to the great permanent settlements, for the cities are in the agricultural domain. The integration of farmer and herdsman through peaceful trade was discussed in an earlier chapter.



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The herdsmen of Central Asia look down upon the farmers. The world-view of the Central Asian nomad is something like that of a Calvinist in the West. One gets one's just desserts, and whatever fate one has is deserved. A man who fails is condemned for his failure. Failure is a punishment for having gone wrong morally, or done something wrong, in particular through carelessness or lack of effort and concern. A man's fate is his character.

A Central Asian nomad is proud of his herding ability and his means of getting a living out of an inhospitable environment. The steppes are waterless and tend to extreme temperatures, both hot and cold; they are dusty wastes, without shade or comfort. Not every form of life can survive in this environment, and not every kind of man. Survival on the steppes is a signal of success. Wealth in herds and virility appear to be associated in the views of the people. Agriculture is the resort of the poor man and the woman's task. To take up farming and give up herding means a loss of manhood, of status and of success. This attitude is well-exemplified among the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz and the Turkmens.

The farmers include most of the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, the Karakalpaks, some Turkmens, some Kirgiz and a few Kazakhs. The Slavic inmigrants all comprise either urban or farming population. The indigenous farmers, primarily irrigation agriculturists, are highly concentrated in a few rich valleys and oases. These are among the richest farming territory in the world when properly irrigated, judging by the population density and the richness of the crops. The valleys and oases in question are the Tashkent,



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Khivan (lower Amu-Darya), Zeravshan (Samarkand and Bukhara), Fergana, Chu, Ili, Syr-Darya, Murgab, Tedzhen and Akhal (Kopet-Dag). The Slavs practice dry farming. There is a small amount of dry slope farming (bogara) practiced by the indigenous cultures of Central Asia.

The Russian villages of Central Asia were closely modeled upon the villages of European Russia in their economic practices and local government. Even the village plan was often consciously derived from the European original. This is true especially of the villages of Siberia. The Russians in Central Asia up to the Revolution lived primarily in adjacent zones. That is, in northern Kazakhstan they resided along the Volga, Ural and Emba Rivers; they settled in the black-earth zones of northern Kazakhstan, and in the Altay Mountains in the northeast. They systematically sought to preserve their old way in the face of the conditions of this new part of the world.

This picture obtains for the Cossack settlements, which were maintained in their formal structure by official policy; and it holds also for the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox peasants, and the Old Believers and other sectarian peasant groups.

In the farming areas are the chief centers of administration, commerce, manufacture, learning, arts and wealth. In their time these centers were among the most highly developed urban communities in the world. Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara had no superiors and few rivals so long as the East and the West had to consort by the land route alone. It was only



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after the development of oceanic navigation during the Age of Discovery (15th-17th centuries) that Central Asia declined. Not even the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 was so important a factor. Russia sought to re-establish the land route, but could not compete with oceanic shipping.

It is only in the 20th century when a great rail net - the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern railroads - became projected and partly built, that Russia and China have been joined. In this case the historical weight has shifted northward to southern Siberia, for the overland route in the past joined China with Iran and the Mediterranean world.

## Soviet Theory of Central Asiatic Society

The unity of the traditional social structure of the steppe society has been advanced by Soviet writing on the region. The characterization "feudal-bai" is constantly mentioned, and broadly applied. The term feudal needs no further explanation. The bai is a local figure of authority, sometimes important by right of birth, sometimes by wealth. He is not a great ruler.

There was considerable struggle in the Soviet Union over the exact nature of Kazakh society. There were those who claimed that the Kazakh clan was a kin unit, peaceful within. Others claimed that the Kazakh kinship units were riven by dissension and class exploitation. The latter was the view that prevailed. The Russian tsars supported the leaders



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of lesser rank - the bais - against the sultans, khans and other high nobility, according to this view. One of the proponents of this view held that it was the higher stratum of Kazakh society in general and not some intermediate stratum, which entered into union with Tsarism.

The earlier Soviet attitude regarded Tsarism as an unqualified force of evil; this attitude was supplanted by one which regarded Tsarism in its national-colonial aspect as a force of evil mixed with good. In the historical context the change in views was exemplified by the attitude toward the popular heroes of the conquered peoples. Heroes who sided with Russian revolutionaries are good; heroes who sided with the conservative forces are bad. A parallel distinction by the Soviets concerns life. At first the social life of the Central Asian peoples at the time of the Russian conquest was depicted as idyllic. Or at least some writers were permitted to idealize pre-Russian steppe-nomad society; some of these writers were former leaders of the Kazakh nationalist movement, such as Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov, who had later joined the Bolsheviks. But Russian Bolsheviks also expressed the view that steppe-nomad society was devoid of class warfare and exploitation of class by social class.

Later this view was supplanted by an interpretation which regarded the nomadic society on the steppes of Central Asia before the Russian conquest as an arena of the class struggle exactly like the European or any other advanced society. But the form of the class struggle was sharper in Europe. Hence an alliance of the Europeans' revolutionary movement with rebellious



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forces of Central Asia would pitch the struggle in Central Asia at a higher level and intensify it. This is the current Soviet view, as set forth in the recent works of Viatkin on the Kazakh warrior Batyr Srym and of the editors of the official publication of the Historical Section of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

The old Central Asian heroes are now weighed in the Soviet Union on the scale of their attitude toward Tsarism and toward the Russian revolutionary movement. And the Central Asian society is regarded as a society shot through with class antagonism. The implication is that the lower classes in Russia and in Central Asia ought to have made common cause. The political stage in both societies was one, this philosophy declares, and the vanguard in the common struggle was Russian. The writers who saw the intrinsic unity of Central Asian society with Islamic society generally, Iranian society generally, or Turkic society generally, have been condemned. Barthold is such a writer. The history and social structure of Central Asian society is not regarded as indigenous to the peoples within the boundaries of the USSR. They are kept separate from their neighbors and kin across the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

Local writers who have sought to preserve the old leaders, such as Adzhzi or Kenesary, and to maintain the old social forms as ideals, have been condemned. Similar attacks have been made by Moscow on the supporters of Islamic leaders in the Caucasus, above all the Imam Shamil.

The nationalist character of uprisings



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in Central Asia is likewise played down. The revolt of the year 1916 in Central Asia is incorporated into the revolutionary movement of European Russia. Finally, the nationalist leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are depicted as agents of Tsarism seeking to involve the Central Asian peoples in World War I, or as agents of foreign powers seeking to tear Central Asia away from Russia and join it to England, to Turkey, to Iran or to other foreign powers.

These doctrinary debates are not entirely studies of society or of history. They are also aspects of the ideological and propagandist advocacy of the Soviet Union and of the Communist Party in ironing out a doctrine. The doctrine incorporates the peoples of Central Asia both into Soviet society and into Russian history. The consequence is to deprive Central Asia of its independent social and historical being, just as the Tsarist conquest and colonial policy of the 19th century deprived the peoples of Central Asia of their political independence. The conquest having taken place, it then becomes the task of ideology and propaganda to integrate the conquered territory in the world of ideas, of slogans and of party doctrines.



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# Annex "A." 1.f.

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Annex "A." 1.g.

# THE FAMILY

The Central Asian family is an extended family. The family of Western society is usually a conjugal unit composed of parents and children alone. This conjugal or nuclear family breaks up with each generation. The Central Asian family has far greater stability, for it is composed of several generations living in one household, and is therefore more extended than the simple conjugal family; hence the name. Typically, the extended family consists of a patriarch, his wife, his married sons and their wives, his unmarried sons, his unmarried daughters, and the children of his sons. In the past if a man was wealthy, the family was even further extended by distant poor relations, hangers-on, servants and such.

The family was polygamous in theory. A man was permitted to take several wives. Usually however he could not afford to, and so the average family was monogamous. The family was and is patriarchal in its authority pattern: the father is the ruler of his family. Just as the ancient Roman family was an empire within an empire, so also was the Central Asian family. The family was and is patrilocal in its residence pattern; the bride comes to live with her husband, who in turn remains by his father.



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Membership in the family is by birth or adoption; the patrilineal principle of kinship in the male line is sustained by the family organization. Women born into the family marry away; wives come from outside the family. In this sense, the men of the family are its core. Women come and go, by out-marriage if they are born into it; or if a woman marries into the family she may leave it by divorce. It is the husband who stays. Divorce is common if not ubiquitous.

The Central Asian family is a permanent organization. It is not dissolved with each generation and then re-formed, as our own tends to be. It survives the life cycles of its individual members. For this reason it has been likened to the corporation of Western society. Henry Maine has stated the cardinal attribute of the corporation to be perpetuity; by this is meant its capacity to survive the death of individual members. And like the corporation, the Central Asian family is a distinctive body within the larger body of the society or nation.

The Central Asian family has continuity through its male members. That is, the son remains to procreate the family into which he is born. His natal family and his conjugal family are one and the same.

Not so the daughter, who must leave on marriage, except in rare cases where a family without sons may adopt a son-in-law. However, this last is an interesting feature only insofar as it illuminates the more general process of male continuity. The son-in-law who is adopted to marry the daughter is in a miserable situation, for he has no rights of his own.



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The Central Asian family is stable also in its territorial and economic base. It keeps its rights in herds and land, whether pasture or farmland. These rights are preserved intact from generation to generation. The authority passes from father to son, although sometimes from elder brother to younger brother. Thus the stability of the family is based on a complex of relations - territorial, economic, legal, authoritative - in addition to the sentiments of family unity.

The family is not a unity of love in our sense of the term. Mother-love is not a striking feature of the Central Asian family. It may exist in individual cases, but it is not the overwhelmingly idealized relationship which we have made of it. The father is habitually depicted as a stern authoritarian. The mother rules her part of the household as a female father. This status follows from the fact that the standard relationship between the generations is that of respect.

A mother in addressing her son may exhort him to bravery in battle. This is the typical recorded relationship between mother and son. This may not correspond to the statistical frequencies of conversations between mother and son, but it is an ideal expression of what the pattern should be in the conception of the people. It is what the Kazakhs or the Uzbeks like to think of as the typical relationship between parent and child of old.

The expression of tenderness appears primarily between brother and sister in the Central Asian poetry. The love of brother for brother has



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an economic argument against it: they are potential if not actual rivals for control of the family, its property, and the paternal authority.

The basic pattern of relations within the family is a stern and rigorous one. No person has his equal. Everyone is carefully graded according to order of birth and precedence. The parents are authoritarian toward the children and demand respect from them. Brothers are rivals of brothers. The only escape is the tenderness between brother and sister, and of this the poet occasionally sings.

Youths of the same age who are not brothers and who meet by chance, are another source of tenderness and affection. They might meet on a field of battle or on a steppe pasture, conceive a liking for each other, and swear blood-brotherhood.

The marriage norm is arranged between parents of children long before the maturity of the children, sometimes in their infancy and sometimes even prenatally. No consideration is given the sentiments of the prospective marriage pair. There is an impersonality to the marriage arrangement; the marriage is usually first proposed by a marriage broker. Not only have the future marriage partners not seen each other; neither have their parents. This is again an ideal case. The marriage go-between acts on behalf of the family of the groom and makes inquiries about the girl and her family. The broker then brings the parents of the prospective marriage pair together. He makes sure the marriage is not prohibited by rules of descent and exogamy, and obtains agreement on the amount of dowry and bride-price.

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It has been constantly stressed that these societies are patrilineal in organization. This means that the primary groups of any duration are those based upon kinship in the male line. Family groups, economic-cooperative groups, raiding parties, groups organized for religious observances and rituals, for vengeance, for the receipt and distribution of blood-money or wergeld - all these are composed of kin related patrilineally. Those who give and receive the marriage feasts are the patrilateral kin of either the bride or the groom.

The rigor with which these peoples have pursued the patrilineal mode of social organization, both within the family and without, has few parallels anywhere in the world. The ancient Roman family had many features of patrilineality, or agnation in their terminology, but were not so systematic as the Turks and Mongols and Tadzhiks. The Central Asiatics contrast with their neighbors, the Chinese to the east and the Slavic peoples to the west. Among the Slavs and the Chinese, the father is a patriarch, true, but the mother represents a pole of love, opposite to the paternal pole of authority and obedience. The Central Asian mother does not, in the ideal pattern depicted in the literature, represent such a pole of love.

However, the Central Asiatic family is not simply a mechanical representation of authority from above and obedience and respect from below. The mother's brother is sometimes a source of aid and support to his sister and her children. Yet among the Kazakhs, the Kalmuks and the Kirgiz there has been a certain amount of conflict between the mother's brother and his nephew, the



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sister's son. The reason for this was in the changing rules of inheritance.

Traditionally the women did not share in the paternal estate. Only the sons had the right to share in the estate, and the daughter had no claim after she was allotted her dowry. However during the past few centuries, the Kazakhs and the Kalmuks introduced certain changes in the status of women in the inheritance of property. The daughter in these societies had no right to inherit in her own person, but her son had a right to share through the mother in her father's estate. If the father was dead, it was the mother's brother or brothers who had to share the estate with the sister's son. This legal requirement was not always complied with willingly, and social conflict occurred. The young man, the sister's son, often had to assert his rights in his mother's father's estate by legal seizure or rustling of livestock from the herds of the mother's brother. This change has not taken place among the agricultural Turks, the Uzbeks, the Uigurs or some other Central Asian farmers, nor is it at all relevant to the Tadzhiks.

The fundamental rule of marriage is exogamy, marriage outside the group. The extent of the group within which marriage is prohibited is determined, as we have seen, by counting generations. The ideal pattern is to reckon the descent on both the boy's part and the girl's to a common ancestor in the seventh ascending generation or higher. In practice a considerable amount of leeway has been noted. Under conditions of acculturation the Turkmens, Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Uzbeks reckon no more than three or four generations.

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The great exceptions to these rules of exogamy are found among the Uigurs and the Mountain Tadzhiks (formerly called Galchas). Data collected by Oshanin on six Mountain Tadzhik tribes show a very high rate of endogamy, or inmarriage. A survey was made of the following peoples: Shugnan, Rushan, Bartangi, Wakhan, Ishkashim, and Goran. These tribes have no lineages or clans; they are constituted simply per se, divided chiefly by language and by the valleys in which they live. Of 245 married women, six came from outside the group of Mountain Tadzhiks.

In a larger series, including those not entered in the data above, Oshanin found only one instance of marriage between a Mountain Tadzhik and a stranger. In this instance the marriage involved a Shugnan woman and a man from Kashgar. Several things are of interest in this marriage. The husband was an Islamic Turk; the wife did not leave the mountain valley, but it was the husband who came to stay; he had migrated into the Shugnan mountain district long since and was counted a permanent resident. He called himself a Shugnan, although he had Mongoloid features quite unlike the Europaeoid Mountain Tadzhiks. Perhaps the most interesting statement by Oshanin is that the man regarded himself as a Shugnan. And judging by his marriage within an endogamous group, he was accepted as such by the other Shugnans.

The Uigurs, with whom we include the Kashgarlyks (Kashgarians) and Taranchis, appear also to have favored marriage within the village. These people live beside the long valleys of the Ili, the Chu and other rivers. They are not cut off by high mountain barriers as are the Mountain Tadzhiks. On the contrary, communication among Uigurs is quite easy. Nevertheless they stand in



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contrast to the neighboring Kirgiz, Kazakhs and Uzbeks by favoring village endogamy. Or put in other terms, the greater the proximity of the two families, the more is the marriage to be preferred. This we may call vicinal or neighborhood marriage. It contrasts with the marriage pattern found among other Turkic peoples. The Yakuts, Turks of northern Asia, have lost their genealogical reckoning. Nevertheless they adhere to the old Turkic and generally Altaic marriage prohibitions against marriage between close kin. They have drawn an equation between close kin and close neighborhood, such as is drawn everywhere on the steppes of Central Asia. By this is meant that the closer the neighborhood, the closer the kinship; and conversely, the more distant the kinship, the more distant the residences of the kin. Since the Yakut no longer reckon kinship, they regard physical distance as the key factor in favoring or prohibiting marriages. This is known as extra-vicinal marriage, marriage outside the neighborhood.

The Uigurs are a deeply Islamic people. It is Islam, and not Russian or Chinese acculturation, which accounts for the change in marriage customs among the Uigurs. They have adopted the Shariat and its rules of marriage to a greater degree than any other Turkic people of Central Asia. The other marks of their Islamic culture will be discussed in the chapter on Religion.

The Mountain Tadzhiks and the Uigurs have been discussed at length, perhaps out of keeping with their numerical strength. The reason for this treatment is that both peoples show significant changes from the general pattern of Central Asia. The Uigurs are found in Eastern



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Turkestan or Sinkiang, and in Western Turkestan. The Mountain Tadzhiks are found in Tadzhikistan and in Afghanistan. They are found in the Pendj (Pyandzh) Valleys of Tadzhikistan. They are found in the Wakhan corridor of eastern Afghanistan between the Hindu-Kush and Wakhan ranges. Moreover, they are located in Jammu and Kashmir and in Chinese Turkestan.

These so-called Mountain Tadzhiks change their designation as they cross national frontiers. But they are all basically the same population of Iranian tribesmen, long resident in the Pamirs and related chains. Their linguistic relatedness and diversity has been discussed in the chapters on Ethnic Composition and on Language. Here it may be said that they come under heaviest Turkic acculturation in their family and social structure within the Soviet Union as opposed to Tadzhiks outside the Soviet Union. This may be measured by the number of kinship terms of Turkic origin among the Vakhio-Bolo, the Mountain Tadzhiks of the Khingou Valley. Kinship terms of Turkic derivation appear in about one kinship relation out of five. Since kinship terms do not change under acculturation as readily as, let us say, technological terms, this may be taken as evidence of heavy acculturation.

Inheritance

Among the Tadzhiks of the Fergana and the Zeravshan Valleys, and other rich lands of Central Asia, the revolution has not deeply changed the family structure.

Among these valley Tadzhiks authority and money are tightly controlled by the patriarch of the family. The extended family form has



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fallen into conjugal component units chiefly through Russian contact. The revolution and Soviet life have accelerated the movement of Russians into the area; thus, these two related forces have in a way directly and in a way indirectly affected family forms and family relations.

Traditionally among the Tadzhiks living near Leninabad (Khodjent) in the Fergana valley, a married son was set up in a house, with a few head of stock and properties; but the tillable land was controlled by the father. The family was truly an extended family.

This family form exists today. In one village under study, the number of families with eight to ten members is large.

A part of the family wealth was and is set aside for the dowry and wedding of the daughters; the bulk of the property is distributed among the sons. The sons receive some property when they marry, and the rest on the death of the father. The family retains its unity if the amount of available land permits.

The Turkic pattern conforms to this in the main. The general mode of inheritance may be described as differential inheritance. In other words, the various members of the family inherit in various ways. The sons inherit the physical property of the father in more or less equal proportion. The oldest son inherits the social position of the father; the other sons are granted lesser ranks. The youngest son remains by the father and inherits a ceremonial position together with the physical possession of the paternal hearth.



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The sons receive the paternal estate in two stages:(1) On attaining their majority, which is normally at the time of marriage;(2) On the death of the father, when the residual property is divided. These patterns are found both among the farming and the herding populations of Central Asia.

The women have certain rights in the paternal estate. It is sometimes maintained that Oriental women are without rights, are in fact slaves of their fathers or husbands. The conflict of the Soviet ideology with the traditional society of Central Asia is based on this premise. However this premise is false. The women are possessed of definite rights and duties which define their social status. Authority is ultimately patriarchal in the family. Yet the mother rules her household with full authority; she, too, has an empire within an empire. This paradoxical situation has its precedent, for the family is itself an empire within the larger social whole, as described previously.

The position of women may be traced from birth to death in terms of the increase in these rights. Prior to puberty and marriage the girl has few rights and little that she can call her own. However by the time of puberty she has already been betrothed. A dowry is set aside for her, and she no longer belongs wholly to the natal family; the bridal payments or kalym are now being paid in installments by the groom's family, and the girl is increasingly regarded as belonging to her future husband's family. With dower rights in property of her own, and with an interest in her by the two families, her father's and her



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future husband's, she can no longer be considered a chattel in any sense.

On marriage she is expected to supervise her household, for which her husband has been given a separate tent or apartment. Within the economy there are certain economic specializations by sex, and she must cooperate in or direct those of women. Agriculture is a woman's concern among nomads. Silk-raising, dairy production, gardening are women's tasks. The men are herdsmen, canal diggers and cleaners, housebuilders. Other forms of agriculture like cotton and grain raising are joint tasks among the farming peoples. The chief increase in status, rights and respect for the woman comes from bearing a son. This is the primary purpose of the marriage, for thereby the continuity of the family line and descent group is assured. The birth of a daughter does not count as much toward increased status of the mother as does the birth of a son.

With the birth of a son, the woman attains a great increase in status, as measured by her newly acquired rights. Divorce may be easily arranged by the husband, although it is not necessarily common. The chief protection of the woman without sons is that, if the divorce is demonstrably a caprice of the husband, the bride-price will be retained while the bride is returned. On the birth of a son, the woman's position is virtually unassailable. Usually a divorce is conceivable only if she is guilty of some grave offense.

With the birth of a son, the mother gains property rights. If she is widowed, she



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acts as guardian of her son's portion while he is a minor. In general her position is secure and stable. An instance of the increased status may be found in the levirate.

The levirate is the practice of marriage of a widow with the deceased husband's brother, usually the younger brother. Even if the husband's brother is already married, this new union is possible within the framework of polygamy. In a sense the levirate is a form of social insurance; thus the widow will be taken care of. But she comes as a second wife into a strange household, with a distinct loss of right and status as second wife. However the rule of the levirate does not apply if she has borne a son. Her first obligation is now to the son, and to the continuation of the husband's line. She now has property, and retains control over it. She may marry whom she pleases, within the rules of exogamy; but the son remains in the father's line and group.

Thus, in the matter of inheritance the women's role is a complex one. Women have dower rights; as widows they have the right of guardianship over their sons' property while the sons are still minors; and above we have seen how, among the Kazakhs and Kalmuks, a son has rights through his mother in the mother's father's and mother's brother's estates.

Marriage

The woman, we have seen, goes through her life in a cycle of increasing rights and status. This is true provided all goes well: if her family can provide her with a dowry, if she enters her husband's household as the first wife, if she is not divorced, and if she bears sons.

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However these conditions are the regular ones, and are usually fulfilled: most Central Asian girls have dowries, few households are polygamous, divorce occurs only in a minority of marriages, and most families have sons.

Arrangement of the marriage by a broker, who acts according to the social rules and who obtains agreement on dowry and bride-price, has been described already.

The bride-price, kalym, is a misunderstood phenomenon. It is not a purchase price paid as for a slave or chattel, an animal or any other thing. The woman is not a chattel, for she has definite rights and obligations. The Soviet Union has declared a propaganda campaign against the kalym, but the campaign is founded on a mistaken conception of the status of women and the nature of the marriage relationship in traditional Central Asian society. Perhaps more than in any other aspect of the conflict between the Soviet and the indigenous cultural systems, the question of women is the center of sharpest conflict.

Hundreds of articles in the local press bring out this conflict at the present day. For example, in the Leninabad oblast of Tadzhikistan, a young Communist League secretary, Dzhalilov, was accused of having his wife wear the Moslem veil and walk behind him. This instance is remarkable only because it involves a Communist official. Similar instances involve the chief of the Bureau of Culture and Enlightenment of Ura-Tyube, Tadzhikistan; a teacher in a Pedagogic Institute in Kanibadam, Tadzhikistan; and other leaders. Identical cases are reported for



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Kirgizia, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

The kalym comes under consistent attack in all the Soviet sources. This is possibly a case of semantic blockage, for the term has acquired a translation of bride-price or bride-wealth both in Russian and in western European languages. A marriage is not a purchase of a wife in Central Asia. It is part of a complex movement involving a person (the bride) and goods, together with feasting, paying of respect, competitions and other rituals.

The marriage may be viewed as a contract concluded between the husband's line and the wife's line for the services of the woman in supplying a son, i.e., in assuring the perpetuation of the husband's line. The marriage respects the personal sentiments of the husband as little as those of the wife; it is a relationship between two groups: the two extended families in question, and beyond them the lineages to which each belongs.

The dowry moves with the bride from her family to the husband's. In exchange a kalym moves from the husband's family to the bride's. The kalym is usually several times the value of the dowry, but is like it in many respects. Both usually consist of some livestock; the dowry may consist, moreover, of items of clothing, especially ceremonial garb for the woman. If both families are wealthy, each tries to outdo the other in sumptuousness and value of bride-price against dowry. And if both families are poor, the value of either bride-price or dowry may be negligible.

During the wedding ceremony there is



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feasting by either side. This too is a heavy burden of effort and wealth. Competitions of racing on foot and on horseback, wrestling and mock battles between the two sides also take place. The payment of respect is not a chance phrase. The husband owes a definite obligation of respect to the senior males of the bride's family. This is shown in address, in precedence on encounters, at ceremonies, feasts and other public gatherings.

The woman's contribution is shown by the change in status. The increase in status and rights when her part in the fulfillment of the contract is realized was noted above. When a son is born the mother becomes almost another legal person, in view of the demands which may or may not be made upon her. She has achieved the main purpose of the marriage. The term contract is introduced here in an extended sense, but is no less valid a use of the term than in its strict sense.

Size of Family

The family or household is an extended family both ideally and normally in Central Asia. A certain confusion has entered the literature at times by making an equation between household and individual house or tent. This single dwelling unit is usually a conjugal family. The extended family or household is a compound of tents or other single dwellings, depending on whether a herding or a farming population is in question.

One instance of possible confusion may be cited. In three villages of Kirgizia subjected to intensive study in the 1920s, there was a total population of 2,776. These were held to be



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distributed among 622 households, yielding an average household size of 4.4 individuals and a range of 4.3 to 4.6. This presentation rested on definition of household (khoziaistvo in the Russian). These were actually tents of conjugal families grouped in larger extended families. A study almost contemporary with the above, also in Kirgizia, shows a significantly higher household size, which leads us to infer that a household or extended family is meant. In this second study a total of 611 individuals lived in 111 households, an average of 5.5 per household. This difference is significant. Many observations among the Kazakhs show that the average family size, four plus, is that of the tent or conjugal family. In 1876 Kazakhs of the Middle Horde numbering 18,895 lived in 4,546 tents, an average of 4.2 individuals per tent. This tells nothing of the household size.

The most extensive breakdown of household size is given in the 1897 census. It has not been duplicated since that year, although as we have seen, individual studies in the 1920s went into this matter. The total number of rural households in Central Asia, according to that census, was 1,239,000; the total rural population was 6,812,000. Thus the average household size was 5.5 individuals. Of the total rural households, 504,000 had fewer than five individuals; 718,000 households had five members or more; and 16,000 single individuals were listed in the census. (Figures will not add up due to rounding.)

Of these various figures the largest number of rural households was the group containing six to ten individuals. These households numbered 475,000, which represented 38 per cent of



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the total.

Studies of rural settlements in Tadzhikistan made in the 1950s showed that the typical family in the eyes of the people was a family of eight to ten members. Unfortunately there are no contemporary numerical data to support this notion. Nevertheless it is clear that the census data at the end of the 19th century are corroborated by the qualitative data of the 1950s. From this it follows that there is a continuity in family size and structure from the traditional society to the present in rural Tadzhikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia.

This conclusion is further supported by the traditional manner in which houses and tents are constructed during the Soviet period. Judging by plan and over-all size, the houses are built to contain more than a conjugal family. It is precisely the extended family whose needs they meet. The nomadic tent typically contains only one conjugal family. The extended family of the nomadic pastoralists consists of a group of closely neighboring tents. However, in the Soviet period the nomadic tent is giving way to the fixed domicile among the pastoralists.

Despite the radical changes introduced by Sovietization the family continues to exist in a relatively unchanged form. Despite changes in the way the people get their living, the family continues in almost the same form as of old. For example a fishing family living on the north shore of the Aral Sea has 12 members (1953). About a century ago because of poor herding conditions they moved from the opposite side of the Aral Sea, the Kara Kum semi-desert area, where they had



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been engaged in herding. The present head of the family is the 80 year old patriarch Abubakir.

By making this sharp break in its mode of subsistence, the family also broke away from its lineage and clan affiliations. Nevertheless we see that it has maintained its fundamental structure.

The 1897 census data indicate that sizes of rural and urban families were approximately the same. The nationality factor presents a problem which cannot be solved with available data. The highest average household size was in the Syr-Darya district, farthest from the center of Russian population. The average family size there was six individuals. The lowest average family size was in the Semipalatinsk region, where the average was 4.5 members. (The Semipalatinsk region in the northwestern part of Central Asia is an old and large area of Russian settlement.) Thus the Russians were probably living in smaller family units than the indigenous populations of Central Asia. However, this conclusion is qualified by other data of the same census which show that Russians living in Khiva and Bukhara had more or less the same average family size as the surrounding population.

The argument above has been founded on the premise that the extended family and the household are, effectively speaking, one and the same. The household, on the other hand is to be clearly distinguished from the conjugal family.

The theoretical relations between the conjugal and the extended family systems have been discussed above. They are in resumé as



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follows: The extended family survives the death of its members; it is a perpetual, corporate group. The conjugal family dies out with each generation, and its offspring form new conjugal families. The extended family, consisting of several generations of directly related kin, both by birth and marriage, is larger than the conjugal family. The extended family has great stability in its physical location and residence. The extended family is not bilateral as a rule; it is usually unilineal in structure. On the Asiatic steppes this means patrilineal rather than matrilineal. The great emphasis in the extended family is placed on the bearing of sons. This is not a matter of prestige or sentiment as it tends to be in our society. On the contrary, the bearing of a son in Central Asia is a matter of life or death to the extended family. Without sons the family must disband and join another group; or it must resort to a legal fiction and adopt the sons necessary for its continued existence as a social entity.

The extended family is the basic unit of consumption and distribution of goods. It is also the basic unit of production. The patriarch administers the family wealth and makes the decisions as to its disposition. The sons have control of their own property within the limits of the patriarch's final decision.

Authority in economic and other matters rests in the hands of the patriarch. He also determines the time for marriage and apportionment of his children. All matters are subject to his veto, although it is doubtful whether he would actually interfere in his wife's control of her menage. The patriarch is the ultimate arbitrator



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of all disputes within the family.

The extended family is a ceremonial unit, as shown by the wedding ceremony. The ancestral cult, another important ceremony, is still in force among the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs, and other peoples of Central Asia. This is part of the family ritual. Further discussion of the ancestral cult will be given in the chapter on Religion.

It has been shown above that these extended families are little worlds unto themselves. The ruler of this world is the patriarch, whose word is law. The traditional society had its customary legal practices and ideas. However the law of the traditional society did not penetrate within the family. If one member of a family stole from another, the matter was left for regulation within the family. Similarly the family was a legal unity in the matter of oaths and testimony. In the same way, in our society spouses cannot testify against each other. However, the Central Asian extended family was a far more independent body than the modern Western family. There was no mechanism whereby the law could intervene within it. The extended family of Central Asia exists today, as we have shown. But Soviet law does not permit independence of any social unit, such as the extended family at one time had in Central Asia prior to the Revolution. Here is a grave potential source of tension and possible conflict between the two systems.

The extended family is highly resistant to change. It seeks to maintain women as they were before the Soviet period. The wearing



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of the veil and the parandja are old customs related to the position of women. The parandja is a loose cloak that hides the entire body from head to foot. These are not worn by nomadic women nor even by all agricultural women among the native peoples of Central Asia. They are worn by Uigurs, by some Uzbeks, and by some Tadzhiks. They are not worn by Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kirgiz and Karakalpaks, or at least their role is insignificant among the latter peoples. The cases of bride-price, of veiling the women, of polygamy, are all marks of the conflict between the two social systems.

There is no intent here to praise or condemn the practice of polygamy or the veiling of women. The understanding of these much misunderstood practices is necessary for a reason other than their moral valuation in our standards. They are held by the Soviets to be incompatible with the Soviet system. They are considered by Central Asians to be functional within the Central Asian social system. They are a source of actual and potential conflict between the two systems, the Soviet and the Central Asian.



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

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